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to  tha  ganarosity  of: 

McLennan  Library 
McGilt  University 
Montreal 

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possible  considering  tha  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
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Original  copiea  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illuatratad  impres- 
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first  page  with  a  pri  itad  or  illustrated  Impres- 
sion, and  endir.g  on  the  laat  page  with  a  printed 
or  Uiuatratad  impreaaion. 


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1 

2 

3 

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gin^rositi  de: 

McLennan  Library 
McGill  University 
Montreal 

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plus  grand  soin,  compta  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
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filmaga. 

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reproduit  en  un  seul  clich*,  11  eat  filn*  A  partir 
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6 

mtmrnmamm 


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SiJ^\  '■}  H 


ESS^Y 


ON  THE 


f?i/^^^ 


/ 


NECESSITY  OP  IMPROVING 


BY 


WILLIAM  THEOBALD  WOLFE  TONE, 

FORMERLY  OFFICER  OF  LIGHT  CAVALRY,  AID-DE-CAMP  IN  THE  FRENCH 
SERVICE,    AND  MEMBER  OF  THE  LEGION  OF  HONOUR. 


Qq'  ayant  une  arm^e,  il  fau'  \'avoir  au  moins  6gale,  et,  s'il  se  peut  «upe- 
rieiire  &  celles  des  autres  puissances  en  discipline  et  ^n  instmction.  Ca^  ce  qui 
ooute  cber,  tant  au  present  que  dans  I'avenir,  c'est  une  arm^e  mediocre ; 

Guibert,  Defense  du  iysteme  de  gU«rr«  modorne.  Chap.  II. 
Vol,  IV.  page  276. 


t 

(( 


NEW-YORK: 

PUBLISHED  BY  KIRK  AND  MERCED. 

HO.  22,   WALL-STBIKT. 
William  A.  Mercein,  PWater 


1819, 


s^ai 


CONTENTS. 


■»^ni***» 


CHAPTER  I. 

A  brief  Analysis  of  the  causes  which  have  changed 
England  from  a  free  nation,  into  a  great  military  power, 
and  of  her  military  improvements. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Refutation  of  the  popular  opinion  of  the  American?,  con- 
cerning the  late  war — military  analysis  of  that  war,  and  of 
the  principles  on  which  it  was  conducted. 

CHAPTER  III. 

Development  of  the  principles  on  which  the  next  contest 
between  England  and  America  will  probably  be  conducted, 
and  of  the  chief  objects  which  Britain  will  then  seek  to  ac- 
complish. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Investigation  of  the  chief  objections  which  are  made  to 
the  augmentation  and  improvement  of  our  military  esta- 
blishments. Insufficiency  of  the  navy  and  militia  alone  for 
the  purposes  of  national  defence. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Necessity  of  organizing  both  the  materiel  and  personnel  6\ 
our  defensive  means  on  a  permanent  footing,  in  time  of 
peace,  and  under  the  sole  control  of  the  national  federal 
executive. 


IT 


OONfl'ENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI.  T 

A  brief  abstract  of  the  simplest,  safest,  and  most  effectual 
mode  by  which  the  national  forces  might  be  raised,  instruct- 
ed, organized,  and  employed  in  time  of  peace  and  in  time 
of  war. — Of  their  destination  and  numbers. 


ctual 
nict- 
time 


PREFACE. 


THE  object  of  this  Essay  is  to  disseminate 
through  this  country  some  useful  notions,  on  im- 
portant subjects,  which  appear  to  be  generally  mis- 
understood, and  to  investigate  some  popular  errors, 
which  may  hereafter  prove  very  mischievous. 

It  has  been  the  peculiar  happiness  of  America, 
that,  to  this  day,  she  has  had  little  occasion  for  mi- 
litary knowledge  and  military  institutions.  Whilst 
the  rest  of  the  world  was  agitated  by  war  and  revolu- 
tion, she  was  allowed  to  ameliorate  in  peace  her 
civil  government,  to  augment  her  wealth  and  popu- 
lation, and  to  proceed  in  the  career  of  improve- 
ment with  a  rapidity  as  yet  unexampled.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  stateof  security  and  tranqr'llity,  her 
people,  with  a  very  few  exceptions,  are  complete- 
ly destitute  of  mihtary  knowledge.  They  are  not 
aware  of  the  weakness  and  insufficiency  of  their  pre- 
sent means  of  defence,  nor  of  the  forces  which  may 
be  turned  against  them.  Their  success  in  the  last 
war,  which  was  so  highly  creditable  to  their  spirit 
and  patriotism,  has  inspired  them  with  a  belief 
that  they  are  strong  enough  to  repel  every  attack. 

Prepossessed  with  this  belief,  the  crudest  notions 
have  been  advanced  and  maiutained  by  statesmen 


VI 


PRETACE. 


and  orators  of  the  highest  political  talent,  largest 
views,  most  brilliant  eloquence,  and  purest  patrio- 
tism and  integrity.  The  handful  of  troops,  compo 
sing  the  regular  army  of  the  United  States,  has  boeii 
viewed  with  jealousy,  and  arraigned  with  virulence ; 
the  liberties  of  the  country  have  been  almost  pro 
claimed  in  danger,  from  their  spirit  of  insubordina- 
tion. The  necessity  of  maintaining  any  standing 
force  in  time  of  peace,  or  of  making  any  preparations 
for  a  time  of  war,  has  been  loudly  denied  ;  the  navy 
and  militia,  even  under  the  various  establishments 
of  the  different  states,  have  been  declared  sufficient 
for  the  purposes  of  national  defence,  and  any  at- 
tempts to  put  the  organization  and  service  of  the 
latter  under  the  more  immediate  inspection  and 
control  of  the  executive  central  government,  has 
been  denounced  as  unconstitutional,  and  leading  to 
military  tyranny  and  usurpation. 

But  the  situation  of  America  is  materially  altered. 
Europe,  after  all  her  struggles  for  liberty,  appears,  at 
least  for  the  present,  to  have  settled  in  lassitude  and 
submission,  and  the  combined  efforts  of  her  coalised 
sovereigns  are  joined  to  keep  her  down.  At  the 
head  of  this  great  confederation,  Britain  stands  pa- 
ramount. These  powers,  and  Britain  especially, 
view  this  country  with  jealous  and  hostile  feelings, 
as  still  maintaining  those  principles  which  they  have 
crushed  every  where  else,  as  fostering  them  and 
keeping  them  alive,  perhaps  to  their  future  ruin. 
Britain,  besides,  %ars  for  her  naval  ascendency  and 
commercial  monopoly,  from  our  rising  trade  and 
improving  navy.    Under  all  these  circumstances,  we 


I 


PREFACE. 


▼ii 


cannot  doubt,  that  if  it  is  not  in  her  power  to  destroy 
America^  to  overturn  her  government  and  constitu- 
tion, break  her  union,  and  reach  to  the  sources  of 
her  prosperity,  she  will,  at  least,  supported  by  the 
whole  coalition,  endeavour  to  put  a  stop  to  her  fur- 
ther progress. 

Before  the  late  wars  and  revolutions  which  have 
changed  the  whole  face  of  Europe,  the  military  in- 
stitutions of  England  were  little  superior  to  those  of 
America ;  a  fact  of  which  our  people,  who  are  too  apt 
to  take  all  their  notions  of  that  country  from  its  own 
writers,  are  not  sufficiently  aware.  This  is  well 
known  to  all  military  writers  in  Europe;  it  would  lead 
us,  however,  too  far  to  prove  it  by  examples  and  illus- 
trations. But  during  the  course  of  these  wars,  the 
whole  character  of  her  policy,  government  and  con- 
stitution,has  been  gradually  altered;  she  has  aseumed 
another  ground  amongst  nations,  and  has  become  a 
formidable  military  power. 

To  develop  and  illustrate  this  change,  to  dispel 
the  dangerous  illusions  which  our  success  in  the  last 
war  has  spread  through  the  people,  to  prove  that 
inuch  more  powerful  means  may  and  probably  will 
be  directed  against  us  on  the  next  occasion,  such  is 
the  object  of  the  first  part  of  this  work.  To  prove 
that  our  present  means  of  defence  would  be  totally 
inadequate  to  resist  such  an  attack ;  that  they  im- 
periously require  to  be  improved,  organized  and 
augmented,  and  that  our  liberties  can  run  no  dan- 
ger from  such  improvements  on  a  moderate  but  suf- 
ficient scale,  such  is  the  object  of  the  second. 

1  am  aware  that  many  of  the  opinions  which  I  have 
expressed,  will  not  at  first  view  be  popular;  some 


mm 


▼m 


PREFACE. 


ti 


of  our  institutions  I  have  considered  as  faulty,  some 
measures  as  ill  directed  and  ill  organized;  the  conduct 
of  some  portions  of  the  nation,  of  powerful  parties 
and  corporate  bodies,  1  have  blamed  on  several  oc- 
casions, and  even  considered  some  of  those  national 
triumphs  on  which  our  people  pride  themselves, 
as  useless  and  unprofitable.  But  how  should  a  good 
citizen  serve  his  country  ?  Is  it  by  flattery  and  decla- 
matioh  ?  encouraging  the  people  in  a  false  and  over- 
weening opinion  of  their  own  force  ?  undervaluing 
that  of  their  enemies?  disguising  to  them  every 
wholesome  truth,  and  inspiring  them  with  a  vain  con- 
fidence, the  sure  forerunner  of  disaster  and  defeat  ? 
Must  he  forever  cry,  we  are  the  first,  the  most  en- 
lightened, the  most  instructed,  the  bravest  people 
in  the  world ;  our  laws,  establishments  and  institu- 
tions are  all  faultless ;  our  militia,  an  army  of  citi- 
zens and  freemen,  is  irresistible ;  our  navy  superior 
to  all  navies,  and  able  to  crush  every  opposition.— 
We  need  no  instruction,  we  need  no  improvement  ? 

In  a  republic,  where  no  operation  can  be  under- 
taken by  the  government  without  the  consent  and 
approbation  of  the  people,  deceptions  of  such  a 
nature  are  peculiarly  mischievous  and  impolitic.  It 
is  the  glorious,  but  sometimes  inconvenient  privi- 
lege of  a  repubhc,  that  its  government  cannot  cover 
its  operations  with  darkness  and  mystery.  They 
must  be  explained;  they  must  be  open  as  the  day, 
that  the  people  may  judge  of  them.  This  must  be 
my  justification  to  those  who  would  accuse  me  of 
exposing  our  weak  points  to  the  enemy.  The  peo- 
ple must  know  what  kind  of  danger  renders  such 
and  such  measures  necessary ;  what  evils  they  tend 


ty,  some 
conduct 
I  parties 
eral  oc- 
national 
[nselves, 
I  a  good 
d  decla- 
nd  over- 
rvaluing 
n  every 
^ain  con- 
defeat  ? 
most  en- 
t  people 
.  institu- 
of  citi- 
superior 
sition. — 
ement  ? 
e  under- 
sent  and 
such  a 
litic.  It 
nt  privi- 
ot  cover 
.  They 
the  dav, 
must  be 
ie  me  of 
'he  peo- 
ers  such 
hey  tend 


PREFACE. 


ix 


to  correct :  they  must  know  what  points  are  v/eak, 
either  in  their  territory,  their  institutions,  or  theiv 
cstabhshraents,  l?f'ore  they  will  let  them  be  strength- 
ened at  their  expense. 

r   have   little  to  add  about   myself  and  my  mo- 
tives for  writing  this  work.     Brought  to  this  coun- 
try   in   my   infancy,  by    my  father,   an  exile   and 
a  martyr  in  the  cause  of  liberty,  my  earliest  recol- 
lections were  associated  with  the  name  of  America. 
Returned  to  settle  in  it  as  a  citizen,  under  the  hos- 
pitable protection  of  its  laws  and  constitution,  1  am 
studying    those    laws   and  that   constitution   since 
nearly  three  years,  with  increasing  c^nelight  and  ad- 
miration.    My  hopes  and  views  are  confined  to  the 
honest  independence  which  I  may  acquire  by  per- 
sonal exertions  at  the  bar,  as  soon  as  the  period 
comes  round  which  has  been  fixed  by  the  wisdom  of 
our  legislature,  for  every  foreigner  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  our  manners  and  institutions,  and  to 
depose  the  leaven  of  national  feelings,  animosities 
and  prejudices,  before  he  becomes  entitled  to  the 
rights  and  privileges,  and  before  he  is  called  upon 
to   practise  the   duties  of  an   American  citizen.     I 
can  therefore  have  no  other  motive  in  writing  thig 
Essay,  than  the  desire  of  exposing  whatever  Ithink 
conducive    to  the   benefit  of  my  adopted  country. 
Reared    in  the  military  schools  of  France,  where 
every  thing  relative  to  military  instruction  had  been 
carried  to  perfection,  I  afterwards  served  three  cam- 
paigns under  Napoleon,  as  an  officer  of  light  cavalry 
and  as  a  staff  officer.     I  have  been  several  times 
employed  in  the  raising,  organizing,  and  instructing 
of  new  corps.  Acquainted  therefore  with  the  military 


PREFACE. 


institutions  of  that  country,  which  have  served  as 
models  to  those  of  ail  Europe,  I  claim  f  me  right  of 
understanding  the  subject  of  which  I  treat. 

Before  I  conclude,  J  must  claim  some  indulgence 
for  defects  of  style.  The  English  language  is  ill 
adapted  to  write  on  military  subjects ;  it  is  remark- 
bly  deficient  in  military  technical  expressions,  cor- 
responding to  those  of  the  Frencli.  I  have  perhaps 
insisted  too  much  upon  elementary  notions  and  prin- 
ciples, but  they  appeared  to  me  to  be  little  known 
to  the  generality  of  the  people.  The  same  ideas, 
the  same  v.ords  are  repeated  perhaps  too  frequent- 
ly ;  someiimes  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  sometimes 
from  the  necessity  of  recurring  to  the  same  idea  in  the 
course  of  argument,  and  inculcnting  it  more  strong- 
ly. But  if  my  meaning  is  always  plain,  and  easily 
u?iderstood,  I  shall  be  satisfied;  and  if  tlie  !nattcr  of 
Ihe  work  be  approved  of,  I  hope  that  the  form  and 
matjncr  will  be  excuf^ed. 


as 


CHAPTER  J. 


.i  brief  Analysis  of  the  Causes  which  have  changed  England 
from  a  free  Nation  into  a  great  Military  Power,  and  of  her 
Military  Improvements, 

A.  French  engineer  of  distinguished  talent,  Chevalier  Dupin, 
has  lately  travelled  through  England  to  exaniine  into  the  pre- 
sent state  of  her  military  establishments.  The  view  which 
that  able  officer  has  given  of  her  recent  military  improve- 
ments, and  of  the  immense  means  of  hostility  collected  in  her 
arsenals,  is  calculated  to  inspire  every  reflecting  mind  with 
the  most  awful  forebodings. — (1)  vide  note  1.  However 
selfish  her  policy  may  have  been,  however  offensive  her 
pride,  whatever  evils  she  may  have  inlicted  upon  him- 
self, or  upon  his  country,  still  every  friend  of  reason, 
justice,  and  liberty,  must  confess  that  the  world  owes  incalcu- 
lable benefits  to  England.  Her  constkution,  however  im- 
perfect and  overpraised,  afforded  the  first  model  of  a  liberal 
government,  sanctifying  the  individual  rights  and  the  indi- 
vidua'  independence  of  man.  English  principles,  and  Eng- 
lish laws,  laid  the  foundation  of  American  freedom.  To  see 
that  country  rapidly  exchanging  the  character  o(  a  free  na- 
tion for  that  of  a  military  power,  must  strike  even  her  great- 
est enemies  with  melancholy  reflections. 

The  causes  of  this  unfortunate  change  are  easily  traced. — 
When  France,  towards  the  conclusion  of  the  last  century, 
broke  the  shackles  of  a  weak  and  vicious  government,  tho 
jealous  selfishness  of  England  took  the  alarm ;  some  states- 
men may  have  perceived  and  justly  feared,  that  France,  de- 
livered from  its  feudal  trammels,  would  soon  have  eclipsed 


Chaf.  I. 


12 


I 


England  ;  the  short-sighted  and  bigoted  hatred  of  the  common 
people  did  not  look  so  far,  and  they  were  more  honest  in  their 
open  aversion.  But  the  cry  that  France  must  be  put  down,  and 
government  strengthened  for  that  purpose,  was  nearly  univer- 
sal. The  generous  voice  of  the  few  who  sympathised  with 
the  cause  of  liberty  in  every  part  of  the  world,  was  drowned 
by  the  general  clamour,  and  all  opposition  to  government  be- 
came unpopular.  Europe  was  paid,  was  armed  by  England, 
and  from  the  Caucasus  to  the  pillars  of  Hercules,  torn  from 
her  foundations  and  hurled  upon  France.  Inexperienced  in 
the  formation  and  march  of  a  free  government,  the  French  on 
their  side  were  obliged  to  forego  their  attempts  for  establish- 
ing it  on  a  tirm  and  regular  foundation  ;  terror  at  such  a  uni- 
versal attack  forced  them  alsotOb*^rengthen  tlieirexecutive,and 
the  crimes  of  Robespierre  and  ihe  jacobins,  and  the  mihtary 
reign  of  Napoleon,  were  thus  brought,  were  even  forced  on 
by  the  efforts  of  England  and  continental  Europe,  to  crush 
the  rising  liberties  of  France. 


(i 


But  these  efforts  soon  recoiled  upon  themselves.  When 
France  was  forced  to  become  a  military  nation,  she  found  in 
her  old  establishments  and  institutions  a  strength  which  the 
world  had  not  foreseen.  She  possessed  the  only  corps  of 
scientific  engineers  and  the  best  artillery  in  Europe,  her  ar- 
senals were  provided  on  the  grandest  scale,  a  triple  line  of 
fortresses,  the  eternal  monuments  of  Vauhan's  genius,  cover- 
ed her  frontiers,  and  all  these  establishments  had  been  foster- 
ed and  improved  with  constant  care  since  the  age  of  Louis 
XIV.  The  inexperience  and  indocility  of  her  troops,  was 
almost  compensated  by  their  enthusiastic  valour;  the  science 
of  war  and  of  tactics  had  been  a  subject  of  study  and  medi- 
tation to  her  officers  for  two  centuries,  and  after  some  defeats, 
they  were  able  to  face,  to  beat,  to  conquer  all  their  enemies. 
Europe  was  subdued ;  a  splendid  despotism,  from  Uus<*ia  to 
Spain,  erected  on  the  ruins  of  those  powers  who  well  de- 
served thoir  fate,  and  the  face  of  affairs  so  reversed,  ihat 
England,  in  her  turn,  had  to  stand  alone,  the  combined  hos- 
tilitv  of  the  world. 


I 


n 


Chap.  i. 


She  was  saved  by  lier  naval  force,  anil  insular  situation, 
and  her  people  certainly  displayed  a  constancy  which,  had  the 
origin  of  the  contest  been  of  a  purer  and  more  liberal  nature, 
would  have  reflected  immortal  glory  on  her  name.  But 
the  cry  fo/  strengthening  the  government  was  stronger  than 
ever,  the  most  alarming  encroachments  upon  the  liberty 
of  the  subject  and  purity  of  the  constitution,  were  viewed 
with  indifference — the  end  sanctified  the  means.  The  go- 
vernment availed  itself  fully  of  the  occasion,  and  laid  the 
foundation  of  a  military  despotism,  perhaps  as  formidable  to 
the  exterior,  but  certainly  as  well  calculated  to  overpower  all 
opposition  of  the  people  at  home,  as  that  of  the  great  ruler 
of  France.  The  faults  of  Napoleon,  that  cooled  the  French 
in  his  cause,  and  inspired  the  subject  nations  with  the  desire 
and  hope  of  retrieving  their  liberty;  his  disasters  in  1812  and 
1813,  the  combined  efforts  of  Europe,  at  length  overturned 
his  colossal  power,  and  closed  at  least  for  the  present  the 
bloody  and  brilliant  scene  of  the  revolution. 


And  what  has  been  the  result  ?  England,  like  France,  has 
become  a  military  power ;  she  has  subverted  her  rival,  and 
crowned  her  arms  with  military  fame.  But  she  has  lost, 
perhaps  irretrievably  lost,  that  character  and  those  institu- 
tions which  made  her  greatness  and  her  glory.  Or  rather 
under  an  improved  form  and  better  auspices,  they  have  emi- 
grated acrofis  the  Atlantic. 


The  world  in  general  is  scarcely  yet  aware  of  the  total 
change  which  has  taken  place  in  the  character  of  England, 
in  her  constitution,  and  in  the  relative  rank  which  she  holds 
amongst  nations.  Englatul  was  a  rich,  industrious,  free  and 
enlightened  country;  her  manufactures,  trade  and  agricul- 
ture were  equally  flourishing,  and  she  was  strong  by  her  navy, 
her  opulence,  and  the  proud,  firm  and  independent  character 
of  her  people.  Her  army  was  insignificant  both  in  its  num- 
bers and  (|uahty,  (2)  vide  note  2;  but  the  bravery  and  pa- 
triotism cf  her  citijsens  8ecure<l  her  against  foreign  invasion. 


! 


Chap.  i. 


14 


The  yoke  of  the  English  weighed  heavy  upon  the  countries 
subject  to  them  ;  they  were  cruel  and  harsh  masters,  and  arro- 
gant and  overbearing  to  strangers  ;  there  was  a  great  deal  of 
corruption  m  their  government,  but  it  had  not  spread  uni- 
versally amongst  the  middling  and  lower  classes. 

Exteriorly,  England  had  little  or  no  influence,  and  when 
he  government  attempted  to  interfere  in  the  contests  of  con- 

TtTnA  T^^:  lY''  T''"'''  ^""^  ^"""'•^"3^  unpopular. 
A  bl  nd  and  rooted  hatred  against  France  was  the  only  senti- 
ment  which  sometimes  roused  the  passions  of  the  peoole 
and  turned  them  aside  from  their  true  interests,  peace,  cL-' 
rn^rce  and  industry  Jealous  of  their  small  mihtary  estab- 
.«hment  they  carefully  kept  it  down,  and  the  only  part  they 
ook  ,n  European  wars,  was  by  assisting  with  subsidies  those 

iZZ':;^:'''  ^^""^'  ^'^-^ '--  ^'^^  p-^-  -  ^^^  -^ 

At  present,  since  the  blind  passions  of  the  people  have 
enabled  the  government  to  form  a  powerful  army,  they  have 
actively  interfered  in  all  the  contests  and  interests  of  Europe 
and  with  Russia,  direct  the  whole  machine  of  its  political 
system.     British  blood  has  been  poured  as  prodigally  as  Na- 
poleon poured  that  of  the  French  ;  British  armies  Imve  ap-     . 
peared  in  every  quarter  of  the  world,  and  their  empire  has 
spread  over  the  globe  in  every  direction.     The  influence  o 
the  cabinet  of  St-  James  has  been  uniformly  exerted  to  put 

IfuJ     !"■        "^'^u  ''  "^"  ''  ^'^^'^^  have  been  press- 
ed under  Its  iron  weight,  or  betrayed  by  its  fallacious  pro- 
mises.    In  Spain  ,t  has  supported  Ferdinand  and  the  inquisi- 
tion.    In  short  England  is  no  longer  the  proud  and  mdepen 
dent  country  she  was ;  like  that  of  all  the  great  empires  tha 
have  successively  appeared  in  the  world,  her  government " 
oppressive  and  despotic  at  home,  ambitious,  grasping  and  ra- 
pacious  abroad  -England  was  considered  as  the  bulwark  of 
liberty;  she  is  become  one  of  its  chief  oppressors. 


lb 


Chap. 


I. 


The  change  wliich  has  iaken  place  in  the  interior,  is  not  at 
first  visible  to  the  cursory  view  of  a  traveller.     The  high  and 
Jidished  state  of  the  cultivation,  the  beauty,  luxury,  and  opu- 
lence which  shine  all  around,  the  immense  profusion  of  wealth, 
the  perfection  of  the  manufactures,  the  busy  bustle  of  trade, 
the  ingenious  and  universal  application  of  machinery  to  every 
useful  purpose,  and  the  prodigies  which  it  effects,  give  to  the 
whole  country   an  appearance  of  unparalleled  plenty  and 
prosperity.     But  a  very  little  observation  discloses  the  me- 
lancholy  fact,  that  all  this  is  forced  and  artificial.     Such  is  the 
weight  of  the  taxes  and  charges,  that  without  the  most  inces- 
sant activity,  labour,  and  industry,   the  people  must  starve. 
Anxious  about  their  very  existence,  they  are  grown  callous 
and  indifferent  on  every  other  subject;  and  delicacy,  honour 
Mu\  principle,  love  and  regard  for  liberty,   proper  pride  and 
independence  of  character,  the  honest  peculiarity  of  the  old 
Englishman,  arc  almost  lost  in  the  exclusive  and  universal 
ardour  for  gain.     The  precaiiousness  of  the  means  of  liveli- 
hood in  all  the  industrious  classes  is  inconceivable ;  the  far- 
mer, iiader,  and  manufacturer  live  on  their  capital,  the  la- 
boiii  ing  poor  are  in  a  state  of  the  most  abject  misery  and  dis- 
tress, ami   the  number  of  paupers  and  criminals  has  conse- 
quently ;mi,rmented  in  such  a  frightful  ratio,  that  it  baffles  cal- 
'  Illation  and  passes  belief. 

The  corrupt  ion  of  the  administration,  and  its  prodigality 
and  tyranny,  from  the  ministry,  trreat  sinecure  placemen, 
and  borough -mongers,  down  to  the  tax-gatherer,  exciscmeni 
iytheman  and  spy,  their  arbitrary  measures,  the  srispension 
of  the  Imbeas-corpus  act,  and  consequently  of  the  liberty  of 
the  press  ihc  national  debt,  the  abuses  of  the  banking  sys- 
te  M,  and  multiplication  of  forgeries,  (he  multiplication  of 
jvoor-rates,  pauperism  and  crimes,  have  been  too  ably  and  too 
freiiuently  exposed  to  require  any  comments  upon  them  here. 
LaAdi'd  with  dc'bt,  and  corrupted  to  the  vavy  core,  the  peo- 
ple and  govenuTient  of  Kngland  are,  at  this  day,  the  most 
proflignte  ;ii  d  unpHni  iplid  as  well  as  the  jno^t  powr.rful  and 


Chap,  i- 


1(5 


i 


,   .     ..        ^  1,1      Thpv  are  miserable  and  unsatistied 
splendid  m  the  world.     Ihey  are  m  ^^ 

„X  wh^ch  they  expected,  because,  ff,  fXcMh  - 
charsos  of  «ar,  it  gave  them  a  »»"r>,° ^'^J' ™  '  ^  t"« 
are  fast  losing,  and  becauu  ,ke  n..n.  '"f  "^;{;"'  ^T' 
is  cn(«rmg  «  compMion  with  Ihn.s,  and  re,«.«  to  6e  «Wp(. 

Such  is  the  present  situation  of  England,  such  is  the  result  o 
the  old  clamour  of  the  infatuated  people,  France  must  be  pu 
down  covornment  must  he  strengthened.  Francehasbeenput 
down',  and  England  ,s  reduced,  at  leas.,  at  home,  very  ncariy 
oZ'  situation  of  France  some  tm,e  h.fore  the  -voh,  ,on  O. 
the  ruins  of  her  independence  and  ol  her  1'™"?  <=> '»    "^f 

,„i;f.r.n  nf  thr  rxccutivc  power  ana  miiitaiy 
the  enormous  eclilice  oi  iiu,   uaci^uh*^  i  •      r 

despo  ism.     But  the  world,   we  n.peat  it,  and  the  people  <>t 
America  in  particular,  are  not  aware  on  what  a  nuhtary  power 
that  despotism  is  founded-nor  of  the  complete  chan<?e  which 
has  taken  place  in  the  military  .ysle.n  of  that  country.     It  s 
well  known  that  in  Ih'-  la.twar,  her  arnV.cs  were  prodigiously 
ausmented,  that  they  were  actively  thrown  n.  the  contest 
that  one  great  general  like  another  Marlborough  appeared  at 
their  head,  and  that  a  number  of  able  otlicers  were  formed 
under  him;   that  thrv  obtained  splendid  victories    and  con- 
iointly  with  the  other  nations  of  Europe  overturned  the  em- 
pire and  military  ascendency  of  France.     This,  hoMrever,  .s 
rot  all,  and  those  who  are  aware  of  no  greater  change,  when 
they  see  successive  arts  passed  for  reducing  the  numbers  ot 
tho  army,  think  that  every  thing  is  gradually  returnmg  into 
its  ordinary  channel.-But  it  must  be  observed : 

1st.  That  a  military  spirit  has  been  created  in  the  nation, 
almost  as  universal  as  it  was  in  France  under  Napoleon. 


%, 
■^ 


i:sSi>m£$limk 


17 


Ch 


AP.  I. 


S 


The  uniform  has  become  fashionable  and  honourable,  in  a 
country  where  no  drum  was  allowed  to  be  beaten  in  the  city 
of  London,  and  every  young  man,  if  he  does  not  enter  the 
army  or  navy,  aspires  at  least  to  belong  to  some  mihtia, 
volunteer  or  yeomanry  corps. 

2d.  That  military  services  are  become  the  surest  road  to 
titles,  honours  and  dignities.  A  number  of  peerages  have 
been  distributed  in  the  army,  and  the  order  of  the  Bath,  or- 
ganized on  the  model  of  the  legion  of  honour ;  an  innovation 
for  which  Walpole  or  North  might  have  lost  their  heads. 

3d.  The  composition  of  the  army  has  been  greatly  ame- 
liorated. The  venality  which  disgraced  the  administration  of 
the  Duke  of  York  in  the  time  of  the  famous  Mrs.  Clarke 
has  been  corrected.  Although  promotions  by  purchase  or 
family  interest  still  exist  in  the  subaltern  ranks,  yet  a  number 
of  able  officers  have  riaen  by  service  or  seniority  m  the  last 
war,  and  the  government  has  an  ample  choice  of  subjects  to 
fill  all  high  and  commanding  posts,  '"he  artillery  and  engi- 
neers will  hereafter  be  exclusively  recruited  with  instructed 
officers  from  the  military  schools.  The  discipline,  the  arma- 
ment of  the  troops,  their  clothing  and  equipment,  have  been 
equally  amehorated  on  the  model  of  the  French  array. 

4th.  A  good  staff  has  been  organized.  That  servfce  was 
in  its  infancy  in  Britain  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  was 
organized  in  its  present  form  by  some  French  emigrant  offi- 
cers, Messrs.  Tromelin,  Phelippeaux,  kc.  That  stalF  is  care- 
fully maintained. 

5th.  It  may  be  seen  from  the  work  of  Mr.  Dupin,  with  what 
sedulous  care  and  attention  the  British  government  maintain 
and  improve  all  their  military  and  naval  establishments,  how 
they  have  organized  and  keep  in  readiness  for  action  the 
most  complete,  effective,  and   numerous  materiel,  that  was 

3 


I 


J 


Chap.  i. 


18 


11 


In 


ever  possessed  by  a  military  power,  and  what  importance 
they  attach  to  the  diffusion  and  improvement  of  mihtary  edu- 
cation,  principally    in  the  corps  of  their  engmeers    and 
artillery.    This  improvement  can  scarcely  yet  be  perceived. 
Many  years  must  elapse  after  the  creation  of  military  schools^ 
before  their  influence  can  be  felt  in  the  army.     The  old  offi- 
cers, however  uninstructed  and  inefficient,  cannot  be  displaced 
to  put  young  men  in  their  room.     The  polytechnic  school 
in  France  has  scarcely  yet  exerted  a  sensible  influence  on 
the   improvement  of   those  branches  of  the  military  pro- 
fession, which  it  was  destined  to  recruit,  and  which  indeed 
were  already  carried  to  a  high  state  of  perfection  before  the 
revolution  by  the  fostering  care  of  the  government  since  the 
days  of  Louis  XIV.     The  British  engineers,  on  the  contrary, 
ranked  very  low  in  the  estimation  of  the  best  judges,  but  their 
government  is  forming  the  elements  of  a  new  corps  in  their 
military  schools.    Their  artillery  is  better. 

6th.  Although  the  British  government  have  disbanded  some 
corps  of  infantry  and  cavalry  which  they  can  easily  recruit 
again  ;  although  to  satisfy  the  clamours  of  the  reformers  and 
economize  their  finances,  they  may  disband  some  more,  yet 
they  carefully  keep  up  their  military  institutions,  and  a  mass 
of  troops  sufficient  to   awe  any  opposition  at  home,  and  in 
ca«^c  of  war,  to  embody  in  their  ranks  any  number  of  recruit* 
and  communicate  to  them  their  spirit  and   their  discipline. 
1  do  not  exactly  know  the  present  force  of  the  British  army. 
But  without  including  their  colonial  service  in  the  East  Indies, 
in  Africa  and   America,  1  believe  the   whole  mass  of  their 
European  troops  of  all  kinds,  will  not  be  found  under  200 
battalions  of  foot  and  200  squadrons  of  horse,  a   force  more 
than  sufficient  for  these  purposes.     And  if  the  exclusive  devo- 
tion of  these  troops  to  the  government  that  pays  them,  and 
from  which  thny  expect  recompenses  and  promotion,  if  their 
total  inditterence  to  public  spirit  and  patriotism  be  doubted, 
let  it  be   remembered  hozo   cusilif  thci/  have  been  turmd   ovf 
against  the  people  an  rccmt  occasion^' 


J^M^& 


BBsSEa&k"a 


19 


Chap. 


1. 


portance 
tary  edu- 
iers    and 
erceived. 
f  schools^ 
e  old  offi- 
displaced 
ic  school 
uence  on 
tary   pro- 
;h  indeed 
lefore  the 
since  the 
contrary, 
but  their 
)S  in  their 


ided  some 
ly  recruit 
rmers  and 
more,  yet 
nd  a  mass 
le,  and  in 
)f  recruit-s 
discipline, 
tish  army, 
i^ast  Indies, 
is  of  their 
under  200 
brce  more 
isivedevo- 
them,  and 
n,  if  their 
e  doubled, 
turned  ovf 


'■I 
1 


■i 


1 


However  strongly  the  power  of  the  British  government 
may  be  built  '^n  such  an  army,  and  on  such  a  navy,  they  do  not 
exclusively  rely  upon  them.  In  the  first  place  the  very 
abuses  of  their  administration,  its  prodigality,  and  the  num- 
ber of  people  who  live  en  the  interest  of  the  national  debt, 
have  intimately  connected  with  their  cause  a  great  mass  of 
the  population,  who  must  stand  or  fall  with  them.  The 
ramifications  of  political  corruption  reach  to  the  lowest  ranks 
of  society.  In  the  next  place,  the  splendour  and  brillian- 
cy of  their  successes  have  attached  to  ^hem  a  numerous  class, 
who  forget  the  loss  of  their  liberty,  dazzled  by  the  external 
glory  to  which  the  British  name  has  been  raised.  With  a 
parliament  composed,  organized  and  drilled  as  the  British 
parliament  is  at  this  day  ;  with  such  a  mass  of  ready  instru- 
ments in  such  a  needy  and  unprincipled  popuiation  ;  with 
«uch  an  army  and  such  a  navy  at  the  disposition  of  govern- 
ment, what  is  become  of  English  liberty  ?  It  is  time  for  other 
nations  to  look  to  theirs.  For  what  will  that  government  do 
with  the  military  force  and  spirit  which  they  have  created. 
France  was  obliged,  in  the  same  circumstances,  to  keep  her 
army  employed  in  foreign  war  and  conquest. 

Let  it  not  be  imagined  that  the  financial  embarrassments  of 
Britain  will  prevent  her  from  following  that  course.  Whatever 
be  the  distress  of  the  people,  whatever  ruin  war  may  bring  upon 
them,  the  government  are  taking  another  ground,  and  render- 
ing themselves  independent  of  its  support.  If  they  create  so 
numerous  a  class,  exclusively  devoted  to  their  interests ;  if  they 
can  only  secure  enough  to  pay  and  maintain  a  force  that  will 
keep  down  the  people,  what  need  the  ministry  care  for  their 
murmurs,  their  distress,  and  their  ruin.  When  their  army  ac- 
quires the  same  superiority  over  the  other  armies  of  Europe 
•which  the  French  possessed  in  the  time  of  Napoleon  ;  when 
their  navy  surpasses  the  collected  naval  force  of  the  rest  of 
the  world,  they  need  no  longer  subsidize  foreign  nations ;  they 
can  even  abridge  their  means  and  liberty,  their  industry  and 
trade,  draw  contributions  from  them,  and  support  their  oivn 
forces  at  ^heir  ospcns?.— (3)  vide  note  3. 


Chap.  i. 


20 


p.;     i      i 


This  forced,  artificial  and  unnatural  situation  <^-"n'>t  bow- 
.ZJ     DesDotism  and  corruption  universally  pro- 
"r  dlv  ''in  Sg  liberty  and  her  principles,  England 

SoDorted  by  force,  and  must  fall  some  day  or  other  by  the 
supported  oy  ,  ^^  ^^^^  ^^  ,^^  r„„. 

wben  it  was  always  HnUed  wHH  <^J^;^-J< ^^:,^, 

r  s;,::  i/:Xeof';'';rts;oU  .topped  ^.th  go.d 

l,.med  with  brass  and  iron,  but  reposes  on  a  fo;'"'J»"°"  "J 
Td  a^d  of  clay.    When  founded  only  on  a  m-Ma^    "- 
however  excellent,  numerous  and  well   appomted,  ever. 
However  eic  ,  f  fortune.     An  awful  eJiam- 

situation  of  England  in  such  a  ease  •,  her  r.ches,  her  mdn=try^ 

--rranrcr;fe:Tosn-^^^^^^^^^ 

„ce Ld  industry  in  England  ,  but,  - '»  F-"";^  ;  ^  „f 
„„.,lltic8  will  have  been  exclusively  applied  to  the  service  oi 
r  government,  or  all  who  join  talent  to  honesty  will  have 
emigrated  long  before. 

How  much  more  respectable  was  the  name  of  England, 
how  much  more  solid  her  power,  when  with  a  small  army,  a 
ta«™carcelv  equal  to  that  of  the  Dutch,  but  a  government 
trnrby    he  support  of  a  free,  enet^etic,  and  enlightened 
^op^cshe  stood  Ihebulwark  of  European  liberty,  against  the 
ambit!;,  of  Louis  XIV.     Under  .11  her  apparent  greatne^. 
■he  is  really  weaker  in  the  love  of  her  people  for  the.rcountry, 
t  their  moral  courage  and  principle,  than  she  was  thirty  year. 


f 


21 


Chap. 


t  how- 
y  pro- 
ngland 
langed 
lie  and 
and  re- 
)nly  be 
by  the 
le  con- 
irname 
justice 
nezzar, 
h  gold, 
ition  of 
Y  force, 
,   every 
il  exam- 
such  an 
II  be  the 
industry, 
r  people 
jple,  and 
There  is 
alent,   of 
all  these 
9rvice  of 
will  have 


England, 
11  army,  a 
ivernment 
ilightened 
igainst  the 
greatness, 
lircountry, 
hirty  yearff 


ago.  Thus,  when  the  powei*  of  Napoleon  stretched  from  Cadiz 
to  Moscow,  when  a  million  of  armed  veterans  stood  at  his 
command,  and  the  treasures  of  Europe  were  at  his  disposal, 
France  was  really  weaker,  as  was  proved  by  the  event,  than 
when  confined  between  Belgium  and  the  Pyrenees,  divided  at 
home,  without  an  army,  without  a  navy,  without  finances,  al* 
most  without  a  government ;  but  animatf  by  the  young  en- 
thusiasm of  hope,  and  the  love  of  liberty. 

But  it  must  be  remembered,  that  before  the  catastrophe  of 
Moscow,  the  power  of  Napoleon  had  repeatedly  crushed  all 
opposition  from  the  frontiers  of  Spain  to  those  of  Russia. 
It  had  risen  co  it??  acmfe,  just  before  its  fall,  and  no  human 
foresight  could  have  fixed  the  moment  of  its  decline.  In  the 
same  way  England  can  do  incalculable  mischief  in  the  world 
before  she  falls. 

It  behoves  America,  for  her  own  sake,  for  the  sake  of  that 
world,  where  she  stands  the  last  and  only  asylum  of  liberty  and 
of  its  friends  and  martyrs  in  every  country;  the  sanctuary, 
where  the  flame  of  freedom  is  yet  cherished  and  kept  alive, 
to  watch  the  progress  and  march  of  this  great  power,  a  power 
infinitely  greater  than  that  of  Napoleon.  The  jealousy  of 
England  is  chiefly  directed  against  her.  The  English  know 
right  well,  that  their  naval  supremacy,  on  which  their  greatness 
depends,  has  ultimately  more  to  fear  from  America,  than  from 
the  r.jst  of  the  world.  They  cannot  reach  to  the  sources  of 
her  prosperity,  nor  finally  prevent  her  progress ;  it  depends 
on  causes  which  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  England,  nor  even 
of  man,  to  change ;  on  her  geographical  position,  her  immense 
territory,  her  free  government,  and  the  enlightened  character 
of  her  people.  But  they  can  stop  it  for  a  time ;  they  can  give 
it  severe  checks,  and  it  behoves'  America  to  stand  upon  her 
guard. 

To  prove  these  positions,  to  show  the  necessity  of  organizing 
an  efficient  defensive  force  in  America,  and  to  point  out  some 


Chap.  i. 


22 


11 


of  the  principles  on  which  such  a  force  should  he  founded, 
such  are  the  objects  of  the  present  Essay.  I  am  aware  ihat 
the  very  examples  which  I  have  just  quoted,  of  France  and  of 
England,  whc  both  lost  their  liberties  by  over-augmenting 
that  military  force,  which  they  had  been  obliged  to  raise  for 
purposes  of  self-defence;  I  am  aware  that  these  example* 
may  be  turned  against  me,  and  that  they  have  excited  a  very 
just  and  proper  alarm  in  this  free  country.  But  that  the  situa- 
tion of  America  is  radically  diflferent  from  that  of  France  or 
England,  and  that  her  mihtary  force,  founded  on  differer* 
principles,  and  diflferently  composed  and  organized,  can  nev.  * 
endanger  her  liberties,  even  when  improved  and  strengthened 
so  as  to  protect  her  effectually,  I  shall  also  endeavour  to  prove. 


in  I 


i?fj*sy^rflr^i^? 


CHAPTER  11. 


Hefutaticn  of  the  popular  opinion  of  the  Americans  concerning 
the  late  war — Military  Analysis  of  that  mar,  and  of  the  prin- 
ciples on  which  it  was  conducted. 

Before  we  enter  into  a  review  of  the  defensive  preparations 
which  are  become  requisite  in  this  country,  to  guard  against 
the  overgrown  power  of  Britain,  it  will  be  necessary  to  correct 
some  erroneous  estimations  of  our  actual  strength,  grounded 
on  our  success  in  the  last  war.  **  Whatever  be  the  resources 
of  England,  we  need  not  fear  her;''  such  is  the  popular  and 
common  cry,  "  We  fairly  tried,  and  repelled  them."  But, 
if  success,  and  even  glorious  success,  in  a  noble  cause,  inspires 
us  with  too  much  presumption,  and  too  great  a  confidence  in 
our  own  means;  if  it  makes  us  undervalue  those  of  our  ene- 
mies, it  is  sometimes  more  mischievous  than  a  defeat. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  detract  from  the  just  fame  of  those 
brave  soldiers,  who  so  proudly  supported  the  honour  of  the 
American  flag.  Their  success  was  as  glorious  as  it  was  unex- 
pected by  the  rest  of  the  world ;  it  gave  a  great  check  to  the 
presumption  of  Britain,  and  taught  her  to  estimate  at  a  higher 
rate,  the  means  and  character  of  America.  But  the  military 
forces  of  Britain  are  improved,  and  are  still  improving  since 
that  time,  and  during  that  war  she  did  not  really  exert  them, 
as  we  shall  prove  by  a  short  analysis.  In  hazarding,  however, 
an  opinion  upon  the  mihtary  operations  of  the  British  and 
American  an.  s,  I  necessarily  speak  with  diffidence.  Em- 
ployed in  activ  service  in  the  distant  wars  of  Europe,  which 
engaged  all  my  feelings  and  attention  at  the  time,  I  cannot 
pretend  to  judge  of  the  local  and  political  interests  which 


54 


111. 


Chap.  ii. 


24 


may  have  swayed  the  governments  and  chiefs  on  either  .jde. 
To' hole  who'were  atl  distance  and  not  i"  the  secret  the.r 
movements  ppeared  strange  and  unsystematical ;  hut  1  can 
onlypretend  to  ground  my  opinions  upon  pubhc  documents, 
and  geographical  positions. 

When  the  American  war  broke  out,  the  vast  edifice  of  the 
French  empire,  that  menaced  the  very  existence  of  Br^am, 
was  beginning  to  give  way.  and  the  nat.ons  of  Europe  to      e 
in  arms  and  assist  in  ovedurning  it:  they  all  required  Bnti.h 
ubsidies,  andall  the  energy  at.d  inspiration  that  Britain  codd 
give  to  them  (4)  mdenoleA-,  her  armies,  gradually  formed  dunng 
the  Spanish  war,  were  poured  in  the  peninsula  or  m  Belgium 
to  join  in  the  contest;  her  navy,  roling  from  the  Baltic  to  he 
Mediterranean,  not  only  enforced  a  strict  blockade  round  the 
French  dominions,  but  formed  a  line  of  communication,  to 
connect  every  attack,  and  convey  troops,  stores,  and  ammu. 
nition  to  e-  ery  point  at  once,  from  Venice  and  Sicily,  to  Kiga, 
Hamburgh,  and  Holland.     When,  under  these  circumstances, 
Z  resolution  of  the  Americans  was  known,  the  British  cabi- 
net  could  scarcely  be  persuaded,  that  their  long  patience 
under  insults  and  injuries  of  al!  kiads,  was  at  length  subdued, 
or  that  they  would  declare  war  upon  Britain  at  the  very 
moment  in  which  the  .cale  was  turning  in  her  favour.     Her 
colonies  in  America  were  quite  unprovided  ;  a  few  battalions 
of  regulars  with  the  Canadiau  militia,  whose  tidelity  wavered, 
were  the  only  defence  of  her  northern  possessions,  a  few 
frigates  blockaded  the  coast,  from  the  station  of  Halifax,  and 
pressed  by  closer  and  more  important  cares  in  Europe,  she 
could  spare  but  a  very  small  proportion  of  her  means  to  occupy 
the  Americans  at  home.  The  inferiority  of  these  forces  obliged 
the  English  to  stand  on  the  defensive  in  Canada,  whilst  then 
frigates  might  operate  some  diversions  on  the  coast  of  the 
United  States.     In  this  they  were  singularly  assisted  by  the 
geographical  character  of  that  country,  and  the  unwillingness 
with  which  the  New  England  states  appear  to  have  entered  la. 
(he  contest. 


^■' 


I 


25 


CiTAP.  11. 


jr  side. 
it,  their 
t  I  can 
iiments, 


;  of  the 
Britain, 
e  to  rise 
I  British 
in  could 
d  during 
Belgium, 
ic  to  the 
jund  the 
ation,  to 
d  ammu* 
,  to  Riga, 
nstances, 
tish  cabi- 
patience 
subdued, 
the  very 
ur.     Her 
battalions 
wavered, 
IS,  a   few 
ilifax,  and 
irope,  she 
,  to  occupy 
;es  obliged 
/hilst  their 
aast  of  the 
ted  by  the 
willingness 
entered  ia- 


I 


The  thinly  scattered  population  of  Canada  is  disseminaled 
on  a  long  and  single  line  from  Lake  Huron  along  the  shores  of 
Erie,  Ontario  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  to   a  little  distance  be- 
low Quebec.     That  country  has  but  one  open  communica- 
tion with  13ritain,  by  the  mouth  of  the  last  mentioned  river, 
for  though  hereafter  a   communication  may  be  opened  with 
Hudson's  Bay,  the  intervening  country  is  at  present  desert, 
and  no  aiiiitary  operation  could   be  directed    on   that  line. 
That  communication   is   covered  by  the  colonies   of  Nova 
Scotia,  Newfoundland,    Isle    Royale,   Cape    Breton,    which 
serve    as   advanced   barriers   and   depots   to    the   more    im- 
portant  province   of  Canada,   and   secured   by  its  capital, 
Quebec,  a   regularly  fortified  city  which  stands  at  its   only 
entry.     All  military  means  in  men,  arms,  money,  ammunition, 
stores  of  all  kinds,  must  be  conveyed  through  that  city,  and 
up  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Montreal,  before  they  can  be  distri- 
buted through  the  province. 

From  Montreal  PvfonHs  a  double  communication,  the  one 
along  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  Ontario,. the  other  up  the  Uta- 
was ;  but  I  am  ignorant  how  far  the  second,  which  is  the  great 
channel  of  the  lur  trade,  may  be  used  as  a  military  commu- 
nication with  Lake  Huron.  It  would  certainly  be  a  very  fa- 
tiguing route  for  an  army  to  ascend  its  numerous  rapids,  draw- 
/ng  or  poling  their  boats  all  the  way,  against  the  current. 

From  this  simple  view,  it  is  evident  that  the  object  of  every 
mvaderof  Canada  should  be  to  sci/e  upon  Quebec  or  .Mon- 
treal, after  which  the  rest  of  the  province  must  fall  of  course. 
Quebec  may  be  attacked  by  flailing  up  the  St.  Lawrence 
(tins  was  the  route  pursued  by  Wolfe  in  17.09),  or  by  descend- 
ing  that  river  from  Montreal,  or  by  a  difticult  march  .,p  the 
Kennebeck,  and  through  the  desert  which  separates  the 
district  of  Maine  from  Lower  Canada.      This  was  (ho  route 

which  the  brave  and  then  honest  Arnold  traced  with  such  dorv 
and  difficulty  in  1776.  °     ^ 


Montreal  is  still  more  immediatcl 


y  exposed (oaltack,  cither 


Chap.  ii. 


20 


i;i 


lii 


by  descending  the  St.  Lawrence  through  the  rapids,  ffOM 
Brownsville  and  Sacket's  Harbour  (this  was  the  route  of 
Gen.  Wilkinson  in  1813),  or  by  descending  from  Lake  Cham- 
plain  directly  on  the  island  in  which  it  is  situated  (this  was 
the  route  of  Lord  Amherst  in  1760,  and  of  Montgomery  in 
1775).  Montreal  is  not  fortified,  and  Quebec  is  not  calculated 
to  make  a  long  and  serious  defence  against  a  regular  attack, 
scientifically  conducted. 

From  the  same  view,  it  is  apparent,  that  the  object  of  the 
possessors  of  Canada,  unless  they  have  a  great  superiority  of 
forces,  will  always  be  to  turn  the  direction  of  war  out  of  that 
channel  and  transfer  it  to  the  lakes  and  back  settlements  of 
the  Americans.  Thus  did  the  marquis  of  Montcalm,  the 
ablest  general  that  ever  fought  in  America,  operate  in  1756 
and  1757.  The  British  forces  in  Canada  were  very  insigni- 
ficant in  the  last  war.  They  would  have  been  overwhelmed 
by  a  direct  attack,  on  that  plain  and  simple  line  of  operations 
which  is  indicated  by  the  nature  of  the  country,  the  example 
of  preceding  generals,  and  the  expedition  planned  by  Wash- 
ington at  the  very  beginning  of  the  revolutionary  war;  hosti- 
lities would  have  been  closed  on  (lie  northern  frontier  in  a  few 
weeks,  and  it  would  be  worth  comparing  the  probable  ex- 
pense both  of  blood  and  of  treasure,  which  such  an  expedi- 
tion mi'^lit  have  cost,  with  what  was  expended  in  tho  thre^ 
campaigns  of  lOli,  1013,  and  1814. 

IVhj  this  was  not  done,  must  have  been  from  local  and  po- 
litical reasons,  of  which  a  military  writer  cannot  pretond  to 
judge.  Perhaps  from  the  fear  of  hurting  the  prospects  and  in- 
terests of  some  slates  who  apprehended  that  the  St.  Lawrence 
miyht  afford  a  new  channel  for  the  products  of  the  west ; 
perhaps,  from  the  fear  of  drawing  on  America  the  whole  force 
of  r.ritain,a  part  of  the  nation  may  have  been  averse  to  the  con- 
quest  of  Canada.  It  appears,  besides,  that  America  was  as 
unprepared  for  the  content  as  liritain.  After  thirty  years  of 
peace,  there  existed  no  military  establishments  nor  iuBlitutions 


27 


Chap.  ii. 


iU  that  country ;  an  army  was  hastily  formed  and  organized  at 
great  expense,  but  generals,  officers,  men,  and  administra•^ 
tors  were  equally  inexperienced.  Before  they  could  be 
armed,  equipped,  disciplined  and  put  in  motion,  the  govern- 
ment was  obliged  to  rely  upon  the  voluntary  exertions  of  the 
people.  Unfortunately  the  eastern  states,  whose  local 
situation,  numerous,  hardy  and  active  population,  and  well 
appointed  militia,  would  have  enabled  them  to  have  made 
the  most  effectual  exertions  on  the  most  essential  point,  re- 
fused to  co-operate  in  the  cause  of  their  countrymen,  and  the 
people  of  the  western  states,  Pennsylvania,  and  New- York, 
were  the  only  portion  of  the  nation  on  whom  the  government 
could  rely  for  prompt  and  voluntary  aid.  In  consequence,  the 
Americans  were  obliged  to  follow  the  lead  of  the  enemy,  and 
pursue  the  very  march  which  he  designated  to  them  ;  attack 
his  line  at  its  very  extremity,  and  proceed  down  step  by 
step.  It  is  evident  that  they  must  thereby  have  found  him 
stronger  and  stronger  at  every  post,  and  during  so  long  and 
tedious  a  march  through  so  wretched  a  country,  afford  him 
full  time  to  receive  all  his  reinforcements. 

That  to  make  them  follow  this  course  was  the  plan  of  the 
British  commanders  in  Canada  during  the  two  first  campaign^ 
of  1812  and  1813,  a  short  analysis  of  these  campaigns  will 
demonstrate.  Although  they  were  not  men  of  distinguished 
reputation,  their  conduct  of  the  war  does  credit  to  their 
military  iews  and  capacity.  Whilcthcy  amused  the  Ameri- 
can government  with  negotiations,  their  first  step  was  to  des- 
patch Colonel  Proctor,  \vithasmall  corps  of  regulars,  to  raise 
the  militia  of  IJpprr  Canada  an^  nvade  the  territory  of  Michi- 
gan, whilst  aiioliicr  corps  was  sent  by  Lake  Huron  to  carry 
Michilimakinac.  Fleets  wore  equipped  on  (he  lakes,  and  all 
the  N.  W.  Indians  roused  to  arms;  an  operation  premedita- 
ted and  preconcerted  long  before,  by  intrigues  with  their  chiefs 
and  prophets,  especially  wilh  the  celebrated  Tccumseh.  The 
Americans,  on  their  side,  with  an  army  raised  in  Ohio,  inva- 
ded Upper  Canada,  but  after  displacing  a  great  deal  of  use- 


Chap.  ii. 


2« 


iH^^ 


I 


less  and  misdirected  valour,  were  attacked  at  Detroit  by  an 
inferior  force,  and  from  the  inconceivable  weakness  or  cow- 
ardice of  their  chief,  General  Hull,  laid  down  their  arms  and 
surrendered  the  whole  territory  of  Michigan.  The  western 
states  were  laid  open  to  the  merciless  ravages  of  a  savage 
enemy.  These  misfortunes  were  at  length  redeemed  by  the 
bravery  and  good  conduct  of  Generals  Harrison,  Cass,  John- 
son, Governor  Shelby  of  Kentucky  (whose  patriotic  devo- 
tion deserves  to  be  eternally  recorded  by  a  grateful  country), 
by  the  valour  of  the  young  and  heroic  Croghan,  the  naval  vic- 
tory of  the  immortal  Perry,  and  the  spirit  of  the  people  of  the 
western  states,  who  rose  en  masse  to  repel  the  invaders. 
The  Americans  recovered  Michigan,  obtained  complete  pos- 
session of  Lake  Erie,  destroyed  their  Indian  foes,  conquered 
a  portion  of  Upper  Canada,  and  repelled  the  British  to  Lake 
Ontario  and  the  Niagara  frontier.  These  exploits  were  glo- 
rious, no  doubt,  but  what  did  they  cost,  and  what  was  their 
result.  To  protect  against  2000  or  3000  British  and  Indians, 
a  vast  country,  containing  several  hundred  thousand  souls, 
two  armies  were  raised  at  the  most  extravagant  expense  (for 
in  valuing  the  cost  of  a  militia  army,  we  should  include  the 
loss  of  time,  of  professional  duties,  the  private  costs  of 
each  man) ;  one  was  annihilated,  and  all  its  stores,  artillery, 
and  ammtuiition,  were  lost ;  a  fleet  was  built  on  the  lakes. 
Two  whole  campaigns,  from  July,  inV2,  to  November,  1813, 
were  spent  in  accomp/ishing  thfse  objects  imperfectly,  for  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  second  campaign,  Upper  Canada  was 
evacuated  and  Michilimakinac  was  not  even  recovered. 

The  British,  on  their  side,  by  that  able  diversion,  at  the 
sli-rhtest  possible  trouble  and  expense,  not  only  threw  the 
whole  western  territory  into  a  most  dreadful  state  of  alarm 
and  confusion,  and  put  the  whole  nation  to  a  very  great  ex- 
pense, but  drew  all  the  forces  and  attention  of  the  Americans 
from  the  real  and  proper  object  of  their  attack  to  the  most 
distant  point.  Their  system  was,  what  we  call  in  the  military 
hn^uau'e  of  Kurope,  an  offensive  defence.  Unable  to  make 


2d 


Chap.  ii. 


any  powerful  impression  on  the  territory  of  an  enemy  much 
superior  to  them  in  strength  and  resources,  their  object  was 
to  make  him  waste  that  strength  and  exhaust  those  resources 
on  points  of  no  importance,  and  prevent  him  from  closing 
with  them  in  those  where  the  contest  would  have  been  deci- 
ded at  once. 


at  the 


The  state  of  New- York  had  also  entered  with  activity  in 
the  war.  From  1812,  the  American  forces,  collected  on 
Niagara  river,  made,  during  the  rest  of  the  season,  several 
very  ill-directed  attempts  to  land  on  the  other  side.  The 
conduct  of  the  militia  gave  an  additional  proof,  if  any  were 
wanted,  of  the  inefficiency  of  such  troops  to  stand  a  whole 
campaign  in  the  field.  (1)  In  1813  mutual  surprises  and 
small  affairs  of  no  importance  occupied  both  parties  till  the 
month  of  November.  But  in  those  affairs  the  Americans 
were  acquiring  experience  and  steadiness,  and  displayed  a 
great  deal  of  firmness  and  valour  in  the  combats  of  York, 
Sacket's  Harbour,  Stony-Creek,  &;c.  All  this  valour  was 
however  uselessly  displayed,  and  the  expenditure  in  men  and 
money,  the  efforts  made  by  land  and  water  to  obtain  pos- 
session of  the  lakes  and  rivers  of  Upper  Canada,  were 
thrown  away  in  a  wrong  direction.  For  what  purpose  the 
Americans  showed  themselves  so  eager  to  obtain  possession  of 
that  Niagara  frontier  during  the  whole  war,  is  difficult  to 
guess.  It  secured  no  military  advantages  whatsoever,  and 
without  the  possession  of  the  lake,  did  not  even  cover  New- 
York  ai;ainst  invasion.  The  Biitish  very  willingly  and  pro- 
perly  endeavoured  to  fix  their  attention  upon  U,  and  disputed 
itovfirand  over  with  the  greatest  animosity  and  perseve- 
rance. It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  both  in  181  ;J  and  1814  the 
Americans  evacuated  the  British  lines  voluntaril},  after  ob- 
taining possession  of  them  at  a  great  cost  of  blood  and 
treasure. 

In  November,  1813,  General  Wilkinson   invaded   Lower 
(l)Vi(le    on   (liHl  .subject,  WasLingtoii's    It>Uerii,    in    every  page  ottiiein, 

..... J,    .,, ?nri«    -.  •" 


Chap.  ii. 


30 


i^'i 


Canada.  I  cannot  pretend  to  judge  of  the  causes  from 
whence  his  two  expeditions  failed  in  1813  and  1814;  his  ad- 
ministrative service  must  have  been  very  imperfectly  orga- 
nized, and  have  delayed  and  tmbarrassedall  his  movements. 
But  these  expeditions  were  certainly  the  only  offensive  ope- 
rations undertaken  during  the  whole  war  with  a  proper  mih- 
tary  object  in  view.  The  possession  of  Lower  Canada  se- 
cures the  possession  of  Upper  Canada ;  but  after  the  much 
more  difficult  conquest  of  Upper  Canada,  Lower  Canada 
remains  to  be  subdued.  The  forces  which  had  fought  on  the 
Petroit  and  Niagara  frontiers  were  collected  for  that  expedi- 
tion, and  afterwards  divided  between  Plattsburg  and  Niagara. 

To  conclude  the  abstract  of  these  two  campaigns,  we  shall 
observe,  that  in  the  south  the  Indians  were  roused  to  arms, 
through  the  connivance  of  the  Spanish  government  ol 
Florida  and  the  intrigues  of  the  British,  with  the  view  ol 
alarming  the  western  states,  keeping  them  occupied  at  home, 
and  putting  them  to  as  muchtrouble  andexpenseontheirsouth- 
ern  frontier,  as  they  had  been  put  to  on  their  northern  frontier 
in  the  beginning  of  the  war.  This  diversion  proved  useful 
to  America  in  the  end,  as  during  the  arduous  struggle  which 
it  occasioned,  that  army  and  that  general,  whose  untutored 
but  vigorous  genius  decided  the  last  great  victory  of  the 
Americans,  acquired  those  habits  of  patience  and  discipline 
which  secured  it. 

The  naval  contests  of  the  two  nations  do  not  properl> 
enter  into  my  subject.  I  shall  only  observe,  tiint  the  British 
government  had  greatly  undervalued  the  naval  means  ol 
America,  and  the  courage  and  talents  of  her  officers  and 
seamen.  Their  force  was  in  consequence  insufficient  for 
blockading  the  coast,  and  Hull,  Rogers,  Porter,  Decatur, 
Jones,  &c.  were  crowned  with  glory  at  the  very  outset  of  the 
war.  Animated  by  their  example,  the  American  privateers 
swarmed  over  the  ocean,  their  flag  was  victorious  on  every 
sea,  and  they  did  real  and  great  mischief  to  Ihe  trade  of 
Eusland=  even  on  her  own  proud  coasts.     The  fame  of  the 


31 


Chap.  ii. 


ises  from 
;  his  ad- 
tly  orga- 
vements. 
sive  ope- 
)per  mili- 
ainada  se- 
he  much 
r  Canada 
;ht  on  the 
t  expedi- 
Niagara. 

,  we  shall 
[  to  arms, 
iment  of 
;  view  ol 
I  at  home. 
icirsoiUh- 
n  frontier 
ed  useful 
;gle  which 
untutored 
ry  of  the 
disciplinf' 


properl> 
he  British 

means  of 
ficers  and 
Jicient  for 

Decatur, 
tsel  of  the 
privateers 

on  every 
le  trade  of 
me  of  the 


American  navy  was  ably  supported  during  the  whole  war,  by 
the  brave  and  unfortunate  Lawrence,  and  a  crowd  of  other 
heroes.  In  1813  the  British  began  to  be  aware  of  the 
importance  of  the  contest;  they  blockaded  the  American 
harbours,  but  could  not  prevent  our  privateers  from  fre- 
quently slipping  out  and  severelv  annoying  their  trade.  A 
small  armament  sailed  up  the  Chesapeak,  audits  piratical  de- 
predations will  long  be  remembered  in  this  country.  They 
put  the  Americans  to  great  trouble  and  expense,  in  guardmg 
the  long  and  indented  coast  of  tnat  bay,  where  every  point 
is  equally  exposed  to  the  attack  of  a  central  enemy.  But 
the  brutality  and  ferocity  of  their  conduct  at  Hampton,  Elk- 
town,  and  Havre  de  Grace,  forms  a  strong  contrast  with  the 
generous  and  humane  spirit  which  was  uniformly  displayed  by 
the  'Americans. 

At  the  close  of  1 8 14,  the  war  took  another  character.     The 
fall  of  Napoleon  enabled  England  to  dispose  of  her  naval  and 
military  forces,  and  turn  her  attention  to  America.     But  it 
must  be  observed,  that  to  restore  her  finances,  her  trade  and 
manufactures,  to  put  some  order  in  heradministration,  to  guard 
against  popular  discontents  and  satisfy  the  popular  clamour, 
now  as  loud  against  war  as  it  was  formerly  in  its  favour,  a  uni- 
versal peace,  at  least  for  some  time,  was  become  necessary. 
In  fact,  negotiations  had  already  begun  with  America  for  that 
purpose,  and  the  congress  of  Ghent  was  opened  m  August  to 
settle  its  conditions.     As  both  parties  had  agreed  to  waive  the 
discui^sion  of  some   delicate  points,   no    material    difficulty 
could  arise  in  the  course  of  these  debates. 

But  the  trade  of  England  had  sulTered  severely,  her  arms 
h.id  received  some  checks,  her  naval  charactcrwasdiminished, 
and  she  wished,  before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  to  stnke  some 
severe  blows,  retrieve  the  credit  of  the  war,  terrify  Uie  Ameri- 
cans by  a  display  of  the  mischief  which  she  might  do,  chastise 
what  she  termed  thoir  prosumpliou,  and,  perhaps,  (orce  upon 


Chap.  ii. 


3-2 


m 


1    1; 


m 


I 


them  scmo  harder  conditions  of  peace.  The  British  vveii; 
not  aware  that,  during  the  war,  several  brave  and  able  generals 
had  been  formed  on  the  American  side,  that  the  troops  of  the 
republic  had  acquired  a  great  deal  of  steadiness  and  discipline : 
they  undervalued  the  strength  of  their  enemy,  an  erroi- which 
will  probably  not  be  repeated.  At  the  same  time,  by  a  very 
impolitic  measure,  they  extended  their  hostilities  to  the  New 
England  states,  which  they  had  cautiously  sparer',  till  that  mo- 
ment. By  these  ill-timed  measures,  they  began  to  offend  even 
their  partisans,  and  more  signal  insults  soon  roused  against 
them  every  American  spirit,  and  destroyed,  it  is  hoped  for 
ever,  their  influence  on  a-.y  part  of  the  American  population. 

From  thirty  to  forty  thousand  men,  between  May  and  Octo- 
ber, were  successively  despatched  and  collected  in  Halifax, 
Canada,  Bermuda,  Jamaica,  kc.  to  invade  the  most  distant 
pomts  of  the  American  territory.      There  was  no  concert 
between  these  expeditions,  they  had  no  views  of  settlement 
or  conquest;  their  only  object  was  to  plunder,  ravage,  and 
destroy.     In  July,  hostilities  recommenced  with  fresh  vigour 
on  the  Niagara  frontier;  the  forces  on  both  sides  varied  be- 
tween 2000  and  5000  men,  but  if  the  contest  appears  unim- 
portant, both  from  the  smallness  of  these  forces,  and  the 
little  possible  result  of  any  operations  in  that  quartpr.  it  was 
highly  creditable  to  the  spirit  of  the  American  troops,  and  of 
their  brave  commanders,  Brown,  Scott.  M'Ree,  Ripley,Porter, 
Miller,  Jessup,  &ic.  who  displayed  equal  energy  and  forlitude' 
•  n  the  battles  of  Chippeway,  Niagara,  and  (he  brilliant  sortie 
of  Fort  Krie,  which  concluded  the  campaign.     At  the  close 
of  the  season,  both  parties  resumed  their  former  stations,  and 
Uie  Americans  again  evacuated  the  .hitish  territory. 

In  .September,  the  mass  of  the  British  forces  in  Canada 
amounlmg  to  14000  men,  descended  on  Plattsburg:  probably 
with  the  MOW  of  destroying  the  military  stores  of  the  Ame- 
ricans,  and  ravaging  the  country  as  for  as  Albany;  for  asnosi- 
•miKaaeous  attack  was  directed  against  New- York,  it  does  not 


33 


Ohap.  u. 


appear  that  they  intended  to  pursue  the  course  in  which  Bur- 
goyne  lost  his  army,  in  1777.  Whatever  were  these  views, 
they  were  defeated  by  the  glorious  victory  of  Commodore 
Macdonough,  and  the  brave  resistance  of  General  Macomb. 
The  total  destruction  of  their  fleet  rendered  their  farther 
progress  impracticable,  and  they  retreated  in  confusion  and 
disorder  before  a  handful  of  miHtia. 

In  August,  the  small  armament  that  had  committed  with 
impunity  such  ravages  in  the  Chesapeak,  was  reinforced  by 
Admiral  Cochrane,  and  General  Ross;  the  defeat  of  the  Ame- 
ricans, at  Bladensburgh,  afforded  a  new  example  of  the  in- 
sufficiency of  militia  to  stand  in  the  field  against  the  manoeu- 
vres of  regular  troops ;  the  destruction  of  Washington  was  a 
wanton  i^isult,  which  rendered  more  service  to  the  American 
cause  than  a  victory.  The  attack  on  Baltimore  could  have 
no  object  but  plunder  and  devastation,  and  its  failure  closed 
the  war  in  that  quarter.  The  troops  employed  in  that  dis- 
graceful service,  were  then  directed  to  co-operate  in  the  grand 
and  final  attack  on  New-Orleans. 


That  the  British,  by  these  expeditions,  only  intended  to 
chastise  the  Americans  before  the  conclusion  of  peace,  by  the 
destruction  of  their  chief  cities,  and  the  devastation  of  their 
private  property,  is  proved  by  the  fact,  that  peace  was  actually 
signed  at  Ghent,  on  the  24th  December,  1814.  only  one  day 
after  che  first  attack  of  General  Jackson  on  the  British  van- 
guard, and  without  any  reference  to  the  New-Orleans  expe- 
dition. This  expedition  was  fortunately  as  ill  conducted  in 
its  execution,  as  cruel  and  infamous  in  its  purpose.  Tiie  point 
of  attack  was  ill  selected ;  an  overwhelming  force  moved  for- 
wards with  such  slow,  cautious,  and  timid  steps,  that  time  was 
given  for  the  Americans  to  make  their  preparations.  The 
decided,  intrepid  character  of  the  American  general,  his  good 
selection  of  the  point  of  defence,  the  judgment  he  showed  in 
throwing  up  intrenchments  before  his  inexperienced  troops, 
theskillof  the  cannoneers,  the  paiient,  cool,  and  firm  valour  of 

6 


I 


IT 


.'HAP.  II. 


34 


\^ 


1      ! 


!)    ,'i 


ill 


the  Tennessee  volunteers,  formed  in  a  laborious  and  severe 
warfare  with  the  Indians,  the  patriotic  bravery  and  enthusiasm 
of  the  less  experienced  militia,  the  sure  aim  of  the  rifles,  and 
the  presumption  of  the  enemy,  whose  last  attack  was  as  rash 
as  his  former  movements  had  been  tedious  and  dilatory,  did 
the  rest.  Above  all,  that  ruling  providence,  which,  on  this 
occasion,  protected  the  cause  of  freedom  and  justice,  against  ra- 
pine and  violence, decided  the  victory,  and  closed  the  eventful 
history  of  the  wat,  by  this  signal  triumph. 

From  the  review  of  this  whole  war,  it  cannot  be  too  strong- 
ly insisted  upon — 

1st.  That  during  the  campaigns  of  1812,  1813,  and  the  be- 
ginning of  1814,  the  English,  who  had  very  few  forces  in 
America,  and  could  not  spare  more,  endeavoured  only  to  ha- 
rass the  Americans  on  as  many  points  as  possible,  and  make 
them  expend  their  blood  and  treasure  on  objects  of  no  im- 
portance. 

2d.  That  when  they  seriously  took  the  ofleusive  in  1814, 
thry  had  already  decided  on  a  peace,  which  was  necessary  to 
them,  and  only  aimed  at  deterring  the  Americans  from  another 
contest,  by  first  making  them  feel  the  evils  of  war.  But 
they  took  no  measures  for  making  a  deep  or  permanent  im- 
pression on  the  country. 


#^ 


3d.  That  they  were  not  aware  of  llie  excellent  quality  of 
the  American  navy,  of  the  improvements  which  had  taken 
place  in  their  army  during  the  war,  nor  of  the  spirit  and  rr 
sources  of  the  country  in  general,  and  had  formed  an  erro- 
neous and  exaggerated  idea  of  its  party  divisions.  Their  last 
expeditions  were  generally  ill  planned  and  ill  conducted. 


i:i 


4th.  That  their  cflbrtt.  in  the  last  war  are  therefore  not  to 
be  taken  as  the  measure  of  their  strength.  They  know  at 
present,  they  feel  the  importance  of  America  ;  they  are  awarf 


35 


Chap.  if. 


that  she  is  rapidly  growing  their  rival  on  the  seas,  and  sup- 
planting them  with  still  greater  advantages  in  commerce. 
They  are  aware  that  in  a  few  years  it  will  be  out  of 
their  power  to  put  her  down.  We  may  depend,  there- 
fore, that  with  a  better  knowledge  of  the  country  and  of  its 
resources,  with  an  improved  army  and  a  much  greater  dis- 
play of  forces,  as  soon  as  they  are  freed  from  embarrassments 
at  home,  and  at  liberty  to  exert  all  their  means,  they  will 
seize  the  first  occasion,  and  leave  nothing  untried  to  put 
a  stop  to  the  progress  of  America,  wound  her  in  the 
jnost  vital  parts,  and  crush  her  rising  prosperity.  That 
such  an  object,  however  painful  it  may  be  to  the  proud  feel- 
ings of  a  patriot  to  acknovledsje  its  practicability,  however 
painful  to  a  philosopher  and  philantbropist  to  think  that  it 
could  even  be  conceived,  that  such  an  object  has  been 
tried,  is  still  pursued,  and  is  not  absolutely  unattainable,  we 
shall  endeavour  to  prove  in  the  next  chapter.  And  whether, 
in  such  a  case,  it  will  be  prudent  in  America  to  remain  in  the 
same  unguarded  state  in  which  she  was  at  the  beginning  of 
the  last  war,  when  England  had  no  means  to  assail  her,  we 
will  leave  to  the  judgment  of  erery  reflecting  American. 


CHAPTER  in 


•r  ' 


h\:ll 


Development  of  the  principles  on  which  the  next  contest  ht- 
tween  England  and  America  will  probably  be  conducted,  and 
of  the  chief  objects  which  Britain  will  then  seek  to  accom- 
plish. 

The  result  of  tap.  lasf  war  apppars  to  have  lulled  the  Ameri- 
cans into  a  state  of  the  most  complete  security  and  confi- 
dence.    The  general  cry  of  Britain  was,  strengthen  the  go 
vernment  and  the  army  ;  we  have  seen  what  it  has  led  to  m 
that  country.     The  popular  cry  in  America  seems  to  be, 
weaken  the  government  and  disband  the  army.    Whether 
the  reverse  of  wrong  is  right,  whether  the  military  establish- 
ment of  the  United  States  can  endanger  the  public  liberty, 
or  whether  the  principle  of  economy,  and  the  jealousy  which 
the  individual  states  entertain  of  the  patronage  and  ^-ower  ol 
the  central  government,  may  not  be  carried  so  far  as  to  en- 
danger that  public  liberty  and  the  general  safety,  we  shall  ex- 
amine in  another  chapter.     We  shall  content  ourselves  here 
with  observing,  that  the  army  which  had  been  raised  and 
formed  in  the  last  wa   has  been  disbanded,  and  that  a  constant 
outcry  has  been  kept  up  ever  since  for  reducing  and  even 
disbandmg  entirely  the  small  regular  force  which  had  been 
retained. 

England  on  her  side  has  been  silently  and  gradually  im- 
proving her  military  knowledge  and  her  military  establish- 
ments. Her  unexpected  reverses  in  the  last  war  have  turned 
her  most  serious  attention  towards  America.  The  other 
powers  of  Europe  may  fear  her  aggrandizement,  but  they 
fear  still  more  the  principles  of  republicanism,  that  have  still 


m 


".'* 


37 


Chap.  m. 


an  asylum  in  this  country.  As  long  as  Britain  maintains  her 
present  artificial  and  unnatural  power,  she  must  view  Ameri- 
ca as  her  most  dangerous  enemy.  She  is  aware  that  she  un- 
dervalued its  forces  in  the  last  war,  and  that  her  own  expe» 
ditions  were  ill  planned  and  ill  conducted.  Since  the  peace, 
a  number  of  British  military  and  naval  officers  and  engineers 
have  visited  our  frontiers  in  every  direction,  and  under  va- 
rious pretexts.  The  fact  is  notorious  ;  some  of  them  I  have 
met,  and  some  of  their  statistical  and  military  notes  I  have 
accidentally  seen.  Whether  sent  by  their  government  or  im- 
pelled by  their  own  private  zeal,  to  reconnoitre  a  country 
where  they  soon  expert  to  be  employed,  the  consequence^ 
are  the  same,  and  I  am  persuaded  that  there  exists  at  this  day 
in  the  British  war  office,  as  complete  a  series  of  military  me- 
moirs on  America  as  at  Washington ;  perhaps  more  complete, 
if  we  do  not  preserve  with  care  such  documents  and  mate- 
rials as  we  possess.  That  all  that  information  and  all  those 
means  will  be  directed  against  us  on  the  first  occasion,  we 
cannot  doubt.  The  last  war  was  defensive  on  the  part  of 
England ;  she  had  no  object  in  view ;  the  next  will  be  offen- 
sive, and  with  a  view  to  break  down  the  resources  of  Ameri- 
ca, so  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  her  entering  again  in 
competition  with  the  power  of  Britain — her  blows  will  be 
struck  home  and  deep. 


Her  first  object  will  be  to  bring  about,  if  possible,  a  sepa- 
ration of  the  states,  and  to  break  that  union  which  constitutes 
their  strength  and  their  greatness— that  union  on  which  the 
character  and  the  standing  of  America  depend.  There  is 
scarc^'ly  an  individual,  there  is  certainly  no  party  amongst  us 
where  the  mass  of  individuals  would  not  shudder  at  the  bare 
possibility  of  that  separation,  and  of  the  consequent  and  in- 
fallible loss  of  our  republican  institutions  and  national  inde- 
pendence. But  all  are  not  equally  aware  how  the  crafty  and 
ambitious  government  of  Britain,  by  heating  their  passions, 
fomenting  their  party  feuds  and  divisions,  encouraging  their 
local  feelings  and  interests,  and  entertaining  their  jealousy  of 


I  f 


n 


i 


Chap.  in. 


38 


the  federal  administration,  might  gradually  accustom  their 
minds  to  the  idea.  Many  there  are,  who  think  it  hard  that 
the  local  interests  of"  their  states  should  be  sacrificed  for  ge- 
neral measures,  which  perhaps  they  disapprove,  and  which 
may  be  very  hurtful  to  those  very  interests ;  many  who  think 
the  separate  means  of  such  great  portions  of  the  empire  as 
the  eastern  or  western  states,  amply  sufficient  for  their  wants, 
wishes  and  defen-^e  ;  many,  who  young,  ambitious  and  aspi- 
ring, despair  of  playing  &  part  on  the  grand  scene  of  the  ge- 
neral union,  and  expect  a  freer  sphere  of  action  in  these 
smaller  republics.  These  people  do  not  aim  at  a  separation, 
they  only  wish  to  augment  the  indiridual  independence  and 
influence  of  their  states.  They  are  not  aware,  that  in  declaim- 
ing against  the  danger  of  usurpation  at  home,  in  weakening 
the  central  governmemt,  in  gradually  dissolving  the  connect- 
ing links  of  feeling  and  interest  between  the  different  parts 
of  the  union,  they  are  unconsciously  aiding  by  that  narrow 
and  selfish  policy,  the  ambitious  designs  of  England.  Divide 
et  impera^  was  ever  the  motto  of  all  usurpers  on  the  rights  of 
a  free  people,  and  more  especially  of  Englan  1.  If  we  could 
doubt  it  in  rhis  country,  let  us  remember  her  polKy  in  Europe, 
in  France,  in  India ;  let  us  remember  the  talc  of  Henry's  ne- 
gotiations, in  time  of  peace,  in  our  own  country,  2nd  if  any 
American  could  forget  it,  it  should  be  repeated  to  him  daily, 
taught  to  every  infant  with  his  earliest  lessons,  and  insisted 
apon  in  every  assembly  of  the  people,  in  v\'ery  discussion  of 
every  party. 

The  fatal  moment  which  divides  the  feelings  and  the  inte- 
rests of  the  people  of  America,  is  the  last  of  their  liberty  here, 
of  their  cot:sequenc«i  abroad,  of  their  republican  institutions 
and  of  all  their  glorious  results,  plenty,  freedom,  and  happiness 
at  home,  and  an  envied  and  respectable  name  in  the  rest  of 
the  world.  Whatever  dangers  our  liberties  may  run  from  on« 
good  army,  organized  and  directed  by  a  firm  general  govern- 
ment, and  knowing  no  enemies  but  the  foreign  invaders  of  the 
Mates,  there  is  no  doubt  that  as  soon  as  two  rival  armies  shall 


9 


39 


Chap,  hi. 


exist  in  America,  with  all  the  bitter  raitcour  of  neighbouring 
enmity,  the  executive  and  the  military  will  be  strengthened 
on  both  sides,  until,  by  conquest  or  usui^pation,  one  or  two 
military  monarchies  be  erected.  This  is  confirmed  by  the 
universal  experience  of  history :  in  that  case,  England  will  be 
freed  from  any  danger  of  competition  from  America,  for  that 
country  will  have  lost  the  principle  of  its  strength.  With 
such  an  object  before  them,  we  need  not  doubt  that  the  British 
government  will  neglect  nothing  to  bring  it  about ;  they  will 
foment  our  divisions,  manage  the  interests  of  some  states, 
and  bear  all  their  forces  upon  others,  to  crush  them. 

The  second  object  of  England  will  be  to  destroy  those 
naval  and  military  establishments,  which  although  yet  in  their 
infancy,  bid  fair  hereafter  to  rival  those  of  Britain  ;  to  inflict 
deep  and  deadly  wounds  on  those  points  where  the  wealth 
and  industry  of  the  nation  are  concentring  ;  to  ruin  its  trade, 
destroy  its  shipping*  and  put  the  people  to  such  trouble  and 
expense,  as  besides  loading  them  with  taxes  and  making  Ihem 
suffer  all  the  ills  of  war,  may  deter  them  from  ever  renewing 
a  contest  with  CJreat  Britain,  and  disgust  them  perhap?  with 
their  government  and  institutions.  The  English  have  the 
example  of  the  most  free  and  celebrated  nations  of  antiqui- 
ty, for  believing  that  in  a  democracy  the  executive  govern- 
ment is  usually  held  responsible  for  all  the  sufferings  and  mis- 
fortunes of  the  people. 

It  is  not  likely  that,  in  order  to  accomplish  this,  they  will 
venture  any  serious  invasion  into  the  interior  of  the  con- 
tinent. In  the  first  place,  however  exccllout  and  disciplined 
the  troops  employed  on  such  a  service  might  Ix-,  they  would 
infallibly  be  destroyed  in  detail,  and  the  population  is  so  dis- 
seminated in  small  towns,  villages,  farms  and  !i;imlets,  that  no 
particular  point  would  be  worth  the  loss  and  expense  of  such 
an  expedition.  The  militia,  in  that  case,  in  every  wood, 
marsh  ana  passage,  behind  every  hedge  and  every  wall,  with 
their  known  dexterity  in  Bharp-shooling,  would  be  irresistibly 


Chap.  iii. 


10 


H 

1 


destructive.  In  Canada,  from  the  same  reasons,  they  wouli 
probably  adopt  the  same  course  of  offensive  defence, 
which  they  did  in  the  last  war ;  transfer  the  scene  of  hostili- 
ties to  the  back  countries ;  rouse  the  Indians  to  an  active 
diversion  against  the  western  states,  and  send  a  few  auxiliaries 
by  water,  to  support  and  lead  them ;  harass  with  savage  war- 
fare the  back  parts  of  New- York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Illinois, 
Michigan,  and  thus  prevent  the  inhabitants  of  the  interior  from 
supporting  those  of  the  coast;  renew  a  naval  contest  on 
the  lakes,  to  divide  the  attention  and  the  forces  of  the 
Americans,  and  put  them  to  a  useless  and  extravagant 
expense.  They  will  consider  themselves  as  gainers  thereby, 
whatever  be  the  result  of  that  unimportant  contest,  in  which 
victory  will  not  even  secure  the  conquest  of  Canada.  Such 
may  be  their  course  in  those  quarters,  but  it  is  not  there 
that  they  can  expect  to  strike  any  deep  or  decisive   blow. 

It  is  ou  the  coast,  where  the  population,  the  naval  and  mili- 
tary establishments,  the  wealth,  the  trade  and  industry  of  the 
people  are  concentred,  that  such  blows  will  be  struck.  What 
was  the  course  pursued  in  the  Peninsula  by  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  ?  Occupying  the  impregnable  position  of  Alju- 
barota,  he  concentred  behind  it  all  his  means,  formed  his  army 
and  organized  its  service ;  in  front  his  intrenchments  defied 
all  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  ;  behind,  lay  the  city. uid  harbour 
of  Lisbon,  open  to  all  the  supplies  and  reinforcemei/s  he 
required.  The  British  navy  ruled  t\w  sea,  and  gave  him  the 
nutans  of  attackmg  whatever  point  he  pleased;  the  PVench 
were  obliged  to  guard  themselves  on  every  side,  and  he  wait- 
ed, in  secure  patience,for  any  fault  which  they  might  commit, 
or  any  favourable  occasion  which  might  present  itself. 

Thus  on  the  most  central  and  important  points  of  our  coast, 
on  those  points  which  cover  and  connect  ourgreat  land  or  water 
communications,  our  large  cities,  &c.  if  they  should  find  some 
spots,  so  favourably  disposed  by  nature,  that  in  a  short  time, 
and  at  a  small  expense,  they  may  be  fortified  and  isolated  from 


41 


Chap.  in. 


tlie  continent,  an  overwhelming  combination  of  naval  and 
military  forces  will  be  directed  to  occupy  them,  and  when 
organized  on  a  footing  of  permanent  defence,  they  will  be 
held  a*  regular  stations  and  places  of  refreshment  for  the 
troops  and  navy,  grand  deposites  of  all  means  of  hostility, 
arms,  stores,,  ammunition,  &c.  and  of  all  the  plunder  which  will 
be  collected  in  the>country,  centres  of  intrigue,  bribery  and 
conspiracy,  &:c.  Three  or  four  posts  of  this  kind  on  the  coast 
of  the  United  States,  connected  with  the  stations  of  Halifax, 
Uermuda,  Jamaica,  kc.  would  form  a  strong  and  powerful 
blockading  line  round  America.  If  such  a  blockade  required 
40  sail  of  the  line  and  as  many  frigates,  England  could  spare 
them,  and  could  not  possibly  employ  them  on  a  more  important 
service.  Nor  is  this  all.  From  these  centres  of  destruction, 
as  from  the  focus  of  so  many  volcanoes,  their  predatory  par- 
ties will  successively  assail  our  arsenals  and  naval  and  milita- 
ry establishments,  our  trading  and  manufacturing  cities,  com- 
bine their  attacks,  shoot  out  in  every  direction,  carry  their 
ravages  on  every  unguarded  spot,  ascend  every  river  and 
every  creek,  and  force  the  whole  population  to  remain  in  a 
constant  state  of  anxiety  and  alarm,  always  armed  and  always 
marching  from  one  point  to  another.  They  will  be  free  to 
select  their  points  of  attack,  and  to  retire  to  their  boats, 
-vhercver  they  meet  with  resistance,  or  wherever  they  have 
accomplished  their  object. 

Such  situations  exist  in  every  country,  if  the'jnvading  gene- 
rals and  engineers  have  knowledge  and  talent  to  find  1  hem 
out.  That  in  the  revolutionary  war,  the  English  did  not 
succeed  in  such  attempts,  is  only  a  proof  of  the  state  of  in- 
fancy in  which  the  military  art  was  y(!t  in  England,  at  that 
period.  Cornwalhs,  Lord  Howe,  and  several  of  their  most  cele- 
brated chiefs,  committed  the  grossest  blunders  on  such  occa- 
sions. But  if  the  enemy  pursue  that  course  in  the  next 
war,  I  shall  leave  to  the  judgment *of  every  candid  and  W(  II 
informed  American,  whelhr  r  our  navy  is  yet  strong  enough  (o 
oppose  Ihem,  and  what  effect  would  sach  a  harassing  system 

6 


ill 


Chap.  hi. 


42 


^Vi 


II 


of  warfare  have  on  the  patience  and  spirit  of  the  mUitia. 
Those  who  ^tnow  how  badly  it  is  organized  and  equipped, 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  confusion  and  disorder  of 
its  temporary  administration,  and  how  unfit  it  must  be,  from  its 
very  nature  and  composition,  for  any  long  or  permanent  ser- 
vice, will  be  able  to  conceive,  but  not  to  calculate,  the  enor- 
mous trouble  and  expense  which  would  thus  be  occasioned, 
and  how  soon  the  people  would  grow  weary  of  the  war  and  of 
government.  Was  not  this  the  case  in  the  last  war.  We 
undertook  it  to  secure  some  points  which  we  left  undecided 
at  its  close,  because  a  great  portion  of  our  people  refused  to 
co-opcrnte  in  it  any  longer,  and  because  a  division  of  our 
union  was  already  apprehended  in  consequence.  The  same 
reasons  still  exist  on  our  side,  and  stronger  reasons  on  the 
side  of  Britain,  for  renewing  another  contest. 

If  we  endeavour  to  find  out  the  chief  points  of  attack,  and 
examine  for  that  purpose  the  military  qualities  of  the  vast 
extent  of  our  coasts,  we  shall  observe  that,  by  its  geographi- 
cal and  military  nature,  as  well  as  by  the  political  connexions, 
interests  and  habits  of  its  population,  it  is  divided,  from  Maine 
to  Florida,  in  three  great  districts,  Iho  northern,  the  southern 
and  the  midille  or  central.  A  fourth  division  is  formed  by  the 
roast  of  the  gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  mouths  of  the  Alabama, 
Mobile  and  vast  Mississippi,  which  belongs  to  our  western 
territory.  By  (heir  military  properties  the  southern  shores  of 
New-Kngland,  from  Cape  ('od  to  New-Y'oik,  should  however 
be  attached  to  the  middle  district,  whilst,  by  their  poli- 
tical character  and  connexions,  they  belong  to  the  northern 
slates. 

If  we  examine  fhe  coast  of  New-Eiigland  from  Nova  fccotia 
to  Cape  Cod,  it  will  appear,  at  the  first  view,  that  from  the 
nalnrr  of  the  dark,  foggy  and  stormy  sea,  which  bathes  it.  from 
its  indented  figure,  covered  with  small  islands,  and  intersoctod 
by  ports,  creeks,  harbours  and  mouths  of  rivers,  <kc.  it  can 
never  be  subj.rted  to  a  strict  blockade.  From  the  enterprising 
fharacterand  maritime  habits  of  (he  population,  thev  are  adnu- 


43 


Chap.  hi. 


lably  fitted  to  harass  the  trade  of  Britain  by  their  nuifnerous 
privateers,  who  will  always  find  moments  for  slipping  in   and 
out.  on  so  extended,  and  so  indented  a  coast.     From  the  nu- 
merous, concentred,  high-spirited,  well  armed  and  organized 
population  of  New-England,  where  domestic  slavery  has  not 
created  a  class  of  domestic  enemies  ;  from  the  nature  of  the 
country,  mountainous,  woody,  and  barren,  intersected  with 
Streams,  rocks,  and  ravines,  mill-sites  and  natural  obstacles  of 
all  kinds ;  from  the  risk  which  would  be  run  and  the  little  profit 
which  would  be  reaped, by  invading  a  country  where  every  one 
is  active  and  industrious,  but  no  one  opulent,  it  is  not  likely 
that    New-England  will     be    seriously    attacked.     Besides, 
whether  well  founded  or  not,  an  idea  is  generally  entertain- 
ed in  Britain,  that  our  eastern  states  are  favourable  to   the 
English  interest,  disgusted  with  the  spirit  and  measures  ol 
the  American  government,  fearful  that  their  influence  in  the 
union  will  decline  as  the  western  states  grow   to  power  and 
preponderance,  and  consequently  less  averse  from  the  idea  oi 
a  separation  and  from  that  of  forming  an  independent  republic 
under  the  protection  of  Britain,  than  any  other  part  of  the 
union.     From  the  combination  of  all  these  motives,  military 
and  political,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  English   will  direct  any 
severe  aggressions  against  that  quarter  of  America.      The% 
will  rather  manage  its  interest  and  foment  its  discontents. 

However,  if  New-England  takes  a  more  -nanly  and   pa- 
triotic and  wiser  stand,  and  if  Rhode  Island   be   selected  for 
the  seat  of  a  great  national  establishment  and  naval  depot,  as 
has  been  announced,  it  is  probable  that  they  will  endeavon. 
to  occupy  that  noble  station,  whose  advantages  were  appre- 
ciated even  at  the  time  of  the  revolutionary  war.     The  im^ 
portancc  of  which  that  position  would  be  to  them  in  a  niilllary 
point  of  view  we  shall  develope  further.  In  a  political  point  ol 
view  it  would  be  mvaluable  as  a  centre  of  intrigue,  smuggling, 
cons|»»racy,  kc.  provided  it  could  be  guarded  chielly  by  a  naval 
force,  and  would  not  require  too  great  a  proportion  of  land 
troops  to  protect  it,  a  point  which  should  be  ascertained  by 
able  engineers.     By  seaa  considr-rablr  naval  forrr  will  b»>  rr 


I 


Ch\i'.  hi. 


U 


*  / 


IP 


quired  to  blockade  the  coast  of  New-England,  notwithstand- 
ing which  the  American  j^rivateers  will  always  lind  means  to 
escape,  and  retahate  severely  for  &ny  injury  whirh  they  may 
receive.  Boston  is  the  only  place  worth  being  attacked  by  a 
large  expedition. 

fid.  In  the  southern  states,  from  the  Chesapeak  to  the 
extremest  point  of  Florida,  other  motives  vi')  orobably  deter 
the  British  from  any  considerable  or  per:'.i"ient  invasion; 
the  deadliness  of  the  climate  to  foreign  troops,  on  that  low, 
sandy  and  marshy  coast;  the  want  of  good  naval  stations, 
the  want  of  grand  marking  points  of  attack,  and  the  dispersed 
state  of  the  agricultural  population.  Some  islands  on  the 
coast  may  be  occupied  as  deposites  of  plunder ;  some  light 
frigates  and  flying  parties  keep  the  militia  in  movement  and 
alarm  ;  plantations  be  destroyed;  the  negroes  excited  to  rise, 
and  perhaps  Charleston  or  Savannah  menaced  for  the  sake 
of  plunder,  but  no  serious  attempt  will  be  made  there. 

3d.  The  middle  coast  between  Cape  Cod  and  Cape  Fear, 
will  be  the  scene  of  such  attempts.  That  coast,  which  is  so 
admirably  adapted  by  nature  to  become  the  seat  of  a  great 
maritime  power,  forms  a  long  sweeping  curve  in  the  very 
centre  of  the  American  empire,  where  four  deep  bays,  plun- 
ging in  the  heart  of  the  country,  convey  to  its  inland  territories 
the  productions  of  the  exterior.  On  these  are  concentrated 
the  mass  of  the  wealth,  of  the  population  and  industry  of 
America ;  on  these  are  situated  her  chief  national  establish- 
ments. Those  points,  which  will  certainly  attract  all  the 
etlbrts  and  forces  of  the  enemy,  are  the  bay  of  Rhode  Island, 
of  New-York,  the  Delaware,  and  the  Chesapeak. 

For  a  mere  destructive  and  plundering  expedition,  New- 
Vork  is  the  most  important  object  in  America ;  and  if  an 
enemy  once  occupies  the  heights  of  Brooklyn,  that  jjjilacc  is 
untenable ;  for  a  great  commercial  city,  when  bombs, 
bullets  and  rockets  can  reach  its  ships  and  stores,  cannot  be 
expected  tu  sacrilice  them ;  but  N«w-York  requires  an  army 


ib 


Chap.  hi. 


to  keep  it,  which  might  be  better  employed.  This  was  the 
chief  error  of  the  British  in  the  revolutionary  war.  New- York 
may  therefore  be  plundered  or  destroyed,  but  will  not  be  kept 
as  a  military  station,  unless  the  eastern  states  should  again 
adopt  the  same  unwise  and  uupatriotic  course  which  they  did 
in  the  last  war;  and  separate  their  interests  from  those  of 
America.  In  that  case,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  plans  of 
Burgoyne  may  be  revived,  anJ  expeditions  directed  in  concert 
from  Canada  and  Long  Island,  to  conquer  the  regions  border- 
ing on  the  Hudson,  and  thus  permanently  divide  the  republic 
in  two  parts.  At  the  close  of  the  revolutionary  war,  England 
proposed  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  other 
states,  on  condition  that  she  might  keep  New-York. 


Philadelphia,  though  a  great  object  of  plunder,  is  even 
more  unfit  for  a  military  and  naval  station;  its  inland  situatiou 
and  little  defensibility  preclude  the  idea.  Besides,  the  Hud- 
son and  Delaware  bays,  situated  in  the  centre  and  bottom  of 
the  great  curve  which  I  have  described,  present  no  proper 
|)oints  of  occupation,  and  would  not  serve  as  blockading 
stations. 

It  is  on  the  two  extremities  of  this  line,  on  the  very  points 
which  the  American  government  has  selected  as  the  seat  of 
her  naval  establishments,  on  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeak  bay, 
and  on  Rhode  Island,  that  the  efforts  of  the  British  will  be 
directed.  It  is  there,  if  they  can  find  proper  points,  that  they 
will  fix  permanent  military  and  naval  stations,  such  as  I  have 
described  above,  and  follow  the  course  of  hostilities  which  I 
have  mentioned,  combine  from  thence  their  movements  all 
along  the  coast,  and  connect  them  with  those  of  the  stations 
of  Halifax  and  Bermuda. 


\i 


4th.  The  western  states,  forming  a  world  in  them"  ^es, 
have  little  immediately  to  fear  or  to  hope  from  Britain;  and 
she  has  no  influence  amongst  them.  The  feeble  hostilities 
of  the  Indians,  those  which  she  may  direct  against  them  by  the 


Chap.  in. 


46 


I 


r 


*i:- 


the  extremity  of  Canada,  any  one  of  the  states  is  strong  enough 
to  repel;  but  from  their  singular  lopography,  the  whole  im- 
mensity of  regions,  watered  by  the  Mississippi,  Ohio,  Missouri, 
Arkansaw,  and  all  their  tributaries,  have  but  one  natural 
emporium,  New-Oneans.     The  importance  of  that  post,  the 
key  of  the  western  world,  has  been  already  perceived  by 
Britain.     I  have  already  hinted  ihat  the  point  of  attack  was 
ill  selected  by  the  British  chiefs  in  the  last  war :  without  any 
particular  knowledge  of  the  local  topography  of  the  neigh- 
bourhood, I  had  judged  so  from  a  simple  view  of  the  map. 
1  have  since  had  the  satisfaction  of  hearing  my  opinion  con- 
firmed by  indisputable  authority.     But  if  there  should  be  any 
truth  iri  the  report  that  the  Spanish  government  has  proposed 
to  cede  Cuba  to  England,  or  if  she  should  seize  that  colony, 
under  any  pretext,  she  need  not  attack  New-Orleans  a  second 
time.     The  possession  of  Havana  wouH  secure  to  her  the 
dominion  of  the  gulf  of  Mexico,  and    .ose  it  so  effectually, 
that  no  ship  could  possibly  pass  the  channel  of  Bahama, 
without  her  permission.     And  by  intercepting  from  CanaHn, 
the  northern  communications  of  the  western  slates,  she  might 
lay  them  under  a  complete  blockade.     She  will  endeavour  to 
prevent  them,  by  small  diversions  and  Indian  wars,  from  aidmg 
their  Atlantic  brethren.     But  we  hope  that  this  narrow  and 
selfish  policy  will  never  be  that  of  our  brave  backwoodsmen. 
Although  behind  their  forests,  they  might  be  secure  for  the 
present;  although  the  ruin  of  the   maritime   states  might 
strengthen  and  enrich  them  by  a  vast  flood  of  emigration,  yet 
they  would  eventually  fall  in  the  dependence  of  that  power, 
which  would  hold  the  coasts,  and  blockade  them  at  will.    The 
consequences  of  a  separation  we  have  already  shown. 

By  holding  several  posts  of  tho.t  nature,  England  will  prevent 
the  different  parts  of  the  union  from  assisting  each  other;  by 
occupying  Rhode  Island,  she  will  menace  an  extent  of  coun- 
try,  that  will  oblige  m  to  maintain  100,000  men  of  militia 
under  arms  to  guard  it ;  a  similar  station  on  the  Chesapeak 
would  have  a  similar  effect;  Havana  would  immediately 
xi   —  r\-\ «.wi  <^/%n^r>lofA)v  LIqcI':*'''^  oiir  southern 


47 


Chap.  ni. 


shores;  and,  combined  with  the  other  stations  to  Halifax, 
etrcctuallj  close  up  the  whole  of  our  coasts  to  all  foreign  trade. 

If  the  British  find  all  these  important  and  essential  points 
guarded  by  the  Americans,  and  put  in  a  state  of  defence  ;  if 
they  find  them  prepared  against  an  invasion,  they  will  proba- 
bly confine  their  views  to  harassing  them  and  putting  them 
to  trouble  and  expence.  By  displaying  on  our  coast  a  naval 
force  calculated  to  overwhelm  all  opposition,  sending  detach- 
ments to  hover  round  it,  affecting  now  and  then  to  disembark 
and  form  an  establishment,  till  they  have  roused  the  country 
and  forced  the  militia  to  assemble  and  march  in  haste,  then  re- 
embarking  and  appearing  in  another  point  with  the  same  pur- 
pose, they  may  fatigue  our  people  with  perpetual  service,  and 
force  us  for  every  million  wh  .  they  advance,  to  expend  ten 
times  as  much  and  more.  This,  however,  is  but  a  small  con- 
sideration if  we  remain  true  to  ourselves,  constant  and  united. 
The  Americans  should  never  forget  that  the  object  of  Britain, 
in  every  contest  with  them,  will  be  to  divide  and  destroy. 
By  repeated  destruction,  but  especially  by  dividing  this  noble 
republic  and  setting  its  component  parts  at  variance  with 
each  other,  and  by  these  arts  alone,  can  she  expect  to  stop 
its  growth,  and  prevent  her  own  impending  ruin.  If  Ameri- 
ca was  once  put  down,  her  tyranny  and  monopoly  on  the 
seas  would  meet  with  no  rival,  and  by  that  monopoly  she 
would  extend  her  haughty  and  heavy  empire  over  the  rest  of 
the  world.  Her  pride  was  deeply  hurt  by  the  success  of 
the  American  navy;  it  was  touching  her  in  her  vital  parts. 
We  may  therefore  count  that  on  the  next  occasion  she  will 
endeavour  utterly  to  destroy  it,  to  ruin  all  its  establishments, 
and  all  our  chief  seaports,  to  harass  the  whole  of  our  sea 
roast,  unless  some  parts  be  designedly  favoured,  to  create  a 
division  of  interests  between  our  northern,  southern,  and 
western  states,  to  occupy  some  military  posts  on  those  cen- 
tral points,  which  would  be  of  a  great  deal  more  value  to 
her  than  the  whole  barren  and  expensive  province  of  Canada, 
md  that  to   accomplish   this  she  will  spare  neither  ships. 


if 
■  1 1 


hi- 


ll 


w 


m 


CilAP.  Hi. 


18 


monev,  troops,  aims  and  intrigues,  bribes,  promises  and  con- 
^piracies,  nor  any  means  whatsoever ;  that  her  exped.t.ons 
vvill  be  more  formidable  by  their  numbers  and  quahty,  better 
combined  and  directed  than  in  the  last  war;  that  her  troops 
and  especially  her  artillery  and   engineers,  will   be   found 
greatly  improved,  and  that  she  is  better  acquainted  with  the 
resources  and  localities  of  America,  and  no  longer  ei.  ertains 
such  an  overweening  opinion  of  her  own  superiority,  nor  such 
a  contempt  for  the  means  of  her  enemy.    Whether,  with  the 
prospect  of  such  an  attack  before  us,  our  present  confidence 
and  security  be  well  founded  ;  whether  our  present  means  of 
defence  be  sufficient  to  withstand  it,  or  whether  prudence 
does  not  imperiously  call  upon  us  to  organize  them  on  a  more 
effective  footing,  shall  be  the  subject  of  another  chapter. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

investigation  of  the  chief  objections  which  are  made  to  the 
augmentation  and  improvement  of  our  Military  Establish- 
ments.  Insufficiency  of  the  Navy  and  Militia  alone  for  the 
purposes  of  national  defence. 

From  this  brief  analysis  of  the  changes  which  tlie  govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain,  and  the  character  of  her  civil   and 
military  institutions,  have  undergone,  in  the  course  of  her 
late  contests  with  France ;    from  the  improvement  of  her 
forces,  and  the  nature  of  her  grasping  and  envious  policy,  of 
that  policy  which  can  only  support  her  present  overgro'  n 
and  artificial  power,  by  the  depression  and  debasement  of 
every  rising  nation  ;  from  the  review  of  her  conduct  in  the 
last  war,  which  shows  that  what  she  has  done  must  not  be 
taken  as  a  sample  of  all  that  she  can  and  will  do ;  from  the 
abstract  of  the  possible  and  probable  measures  which  she 
may  take  to  humble  and  even  destroy  the  strength  of  Ameri- 
ca on  the  next  occasion,  we  might  trust  that  our  people  would 
be  awake  to  the  necessity  of  preparing  and  consolidating 
their  means  of  defence  in  the  present  period  of  peace,  and 
whilst  England  is  yet  involved  in  financial  difficulties.     As 
nevertheless  there  seems  to  prevail  amongst  a  portion  of  the 
nation  and  some  of  our  statesmen,  apprehensions  concerning 
the  waHike  spirit  growing  in  America,  fears  that  our  military 
force  might  be  employed  on  some  future  day  to  subvert  those 
liberties  which  they  have  so  bravely  defended,  and  conse- 
quently a  desire  of  reducing  ft  to  the  smallest  and  most  in- 
significant  scale,  and  a  dislike  to  apply  any  considerable  por- 
tion of  the  public  revenue  to  military  works  and  prepara- 
tions ;  as  those  feelings  natural  in  a  free  country  are  plausi- 
bly  grounded  on  the  experience  of  past  ages,  find  established 

7 


Chap,  ly .  50 

political  axioms,  it  will  be  proper  to  examine  and  discuss  theni 
before  we  proceed  any  farther. 

The  chief  arguments  used  on  the  occasion,  and  I  do  not 
desire  to  weaken  them  in  the  exposition,  are  these:  Where- 
ever  a  free  people,  either  with  a  view  to  aggrandizement  and 
conquest,  or  even  for  the  purpose  of  self-defence,  have  given 
too  much  strength  to  their  executive  and  their  military  force, 
their  liberties  have  been  uniformly  subverted.     Such  was  the 
fate  of  the  Greek  republics  in  antiquity,  and  of  the  Italian 
commonwealths  in  the  middle  ages,  such  was  formerly  the  fate 
of  Rome,  and  such  of  France  and  of  England  in  modern 
days.     Standing  armies  are  heterogeneous  elements  in  the 
constitution  of  a  free  government,  exclusively  confined  to  the 
profession  of  arms,  isolated  from  the  people,  and  subject  to 
a  discipline,  of  which  absolute  authority  in  the  chiefs  and 
passive  obedience  in  the  subalterns  are  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples.    The  natural  independence  of  soldiers  must  be  blunt- 
ed by  these  habits,  and  they  must  necessarily  contract  a  cer- 
tain disregard  for  civil  virtues  and  those  civil  laws  and  au- 
thorities with  which  they  have  so  little  connexion.     To  these 
cogent  reasons  others  are  added,  equally  forcible,  and  drawn 
from  the  peculiar  constitution  of  America.      Formed  by  a 
confederation  of  independent  republics,  the  central  govern- 
ment is  to  each  of  them  an  object  of  jealousy,  and  they  vigi- 
lantly watch  its  measures  and  resist  any  enlargement  of  its 
powers.     This  is  (he  great  palladium  of  our  liberties,  and 
that  vigilance  should  never  be  intermitted.     Our  constitu- 
tion, our  representation,  are  so  essentially  democratic,  that 
vo  course  of  measures  can  be  pursued  for  any  time,  or  to 
'uiy  extent  by  the  government,  without  the  consent  »nd  ap- 
probation of  a  majority  of  the  people.     They  are  daily  in- 
ve^ti^atcd,  and  by  the  frequency  of  our  elections  are  m  fact 
direcled,  as  they  should  be,  by  the  public  will.     Economy 
should  therefore  be  the  first  principle  of  a  government  where 
the  people  really  lax  themselves,  and  are  not  taxed  by  a  de- 
lusive representation's  in  England;  nor  will  they  impose  on 


51 


Chap.  iv. 


themselves  any  burden,  unless  it  be  demonstrated  to  them 
that  it  is  indispensable  for  their  safety  or  benefit.  Despotic 
governments  alone  can  form  great  and  magnificent  establish- 
ments, and  these  in  their  turn  support  and  strengthen  despo- 
tism. A  standing  army  may  be  necessary  to  such  govern- 
ments fbr  the  purposes  of  invasion  and  foreign  cor  .pest,  but 
these  have  always  been  ruinous  to  a  republic,  and  our  con- 
stitution only  allows  of  a  defensive  system,  for  which  a  naval 
force,  which  is  never  dangerous  to  liberty,  and  our  militia,  the 
people  themselves,  defending  their  own  homes  and  properties, 
and  their  own  rights,  are  amply  sufficient.  We  should  ind 
ourselves  the  bulwark  of  our  country,  we  should  fig  ur 
own  battles,  and  never  surrender  our  arms  into  the  han  :.  of 
any  subsidized  force  whatsoever ;  wherever  the  people  did 
so  they  were  enslaved,  and  they  deserved  to  be  enslaved. 

In  reply  to  these  objections,  I  shall  begin  by  observing  that 
the  example  of  other  nations  is  not  applicable  to  us ;  our 
constitution,  the  nature  of  our  territory  and  of  our  people, 
have  no  parallel  in  history.  That  people  are  universallv  en- 
lightened, universally  republican,  and  universally  armed; 
twenty  state  governments,  each  possessed  of  independent 
forces,  watch  the  general  government,  and  the  members  of 
the  legislature  are  more  anxious  for  popularity  in  their  respec- 
tive states,  than  for  credit  with  an  administration  which  has 
few  incentives  to  offer  to  private  ambition.  Neither  do  we 
require  a  large  force;  we  can  never  be  assailed  by  overwhelm- 
ing numbers,  from  our  distant  and  isolated  situation,  and  from 
the  immense  expense  of  transmarine  expeditions ;  it  is  the 
quality,  and  not  the  quantity  of  our  enemies'  troops  which 
can  render  them  dangerous.  The  immense-  qxtent  of  our 
coasts  precludes  the  possibility  of  their  being  defended  en- 
tirely  by  the  regular  army ;  and  all  those  nations  wlio  were 
subdued  by  their  own  soldiers,  had  first  given  up  tlie  use  of 
arms.  But  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  owr  defence  must 
ultimately  depend  upon  our  militia.  Far  be  it  from  us,  to 
propose  disarming  the  nation;  still  farther,  to  render  America 


Chap.  iv. 


52 


a  military  power ;  we  deprecate  the  spirit  of  conquest,  we 
deprecate  the  creation  of  a   great  military  eslabhshment, 
possessing  a  separate  interest  and  influence  n.  the  country, 
isolated  from  its  political  principles,  solely  subservient  to  any 
executive  whatsoever,  and  strong  enough  to  be  turned  against 
the  people.     A  defensive  system  is  the  only  one  which  our 
constitution  allows ;  but  it  should  be  sufficient,  effective,  and 
well  organized.     The  only  point,  therefore,  which  we  have  to 
examine  is,  whether  the  navy  and  mihtia  are  sufficient  for  that 
purpose,  and  no  argument  can  be  drawn  from  the  dangers 
which  our  liberties  may  run  from  a  standing  army,  if  onr 
defence  i-ruires  one  ;  for  supposing  even  that  it  could  nev4^r 
be  formed  on  republican  principles,  nor  animated  by  patriotic 
feelings,  which  we  hope  and  believe  is  far  from  being  the  case, 
it  would  be  but  a  poor  compliment  to  the  spirit  of  America, 
to  assert  that  the  liberties  of  a  million  of  armed  citizens 
would  run  any  danger  from  a  few  thousand  regulars. 

It  would  be  superfluous  to  go  over  those  arguments,  which 
were  ad-anced  by  Hamilton,  by  Madison,  by  all  the  sages  of 
the  revolution,  at  the  glorious  period  when  the  American  con- 
stitution was  discussed,  and  finally  adopted,  by  the  most  con- 
summate wisdom  that  ever  ruled  the  affairs  of  men ;  those 
arguments,  confirmed  by  so  many  years  of  unparalleled  pros- 
perity, demonstrate  that,  under  our  institutions,  the  liberty  of 
America  can  run  no  risk  from  the  power  of  its  elective  central 
government.    But  if  the  object  of  that  government  be  to  give 
strength  and  dignity  to  the  nation  abroad,  and  union  at  home, 
it  must  be  liberally  provided  with  all  the  necessary  means. 
Let  these  be  inspected  as  jealously,  as  closely,  as  the  nature 
of  our  democratic  constitution  requires;  but  they   should 
exist,  it  is  the  interest  of  every  state  and  individual  that  they 
hhoiild.    Our  liberties,  I  fear,  run  more  danger  from  the  weak- 
ness than  from  the  strength  of  the  federal  government ;  if  it 
cannot  afford  prompt  and  efficient  protection  to  every  part  of 
the  union  in  time  of  war,  if  one  will,  one  administration,  one 


53 


Chap,  iV. 


uniform  organization  does  not  pervade  the  whole  of  our  de- 
fensive Bystem ;  if  the  several  great  divisions  of  our  cwintry 
separate  their  interests,  and  rely  only  on  their  individual 
means  for  their  protection,  not  only  those  means  will  prove 
insufficient,  and  their  defence  unconnected  and  unsystemati* 
cal,  against  an  enemy  attacking  them  with  all  the  contrary 
advantages ;  but  they  will  afford  to  that  enemy  an  occasion  of 
bringing  about,  by  his  intrigues,  his  grand  object,  the  division 
of  America.  The  connecting  link,  the  central  government, 
cannot  be  too  much  strengthened ;  if  once  it  is  broken,  all 
the  evils  deprecated  by  our  jealousy  will  be  felt  with  tenfold 
intensity.  Our  independent  governments,  suspicious  of  each 
ttther,  will  vie  in  eveiy  military  establishment,  and  in  strength- 
ening their  executives,  until  they  will  all  b«  turned  into 
military  despotisms.  The  hopes  of  mankind,  that  a  new  era 
of  liberal  and  enlightened  freedotis  was  going  to  commence, 
these  hopes  would  be  crushed,  the  rising  splendour  of  the 
genius  of  American  liberty,  which  dawned  on  a  hailing  and 
admiring  world,  with  such  pure  and  bright  glory,  accompanied 
^^he  prayers  and  wishes  of  all  good  men,  would  set  in 
i.^^iiessand  in  disappointment ;  the  ^ime  disgusting,  bloody, 
«•  uniform  track  in  which  the  old  world  has  marched,  from 
.iiutual  jealousies,  wars,  and  usurpations,  to  despotism  and 
revolution,  would  again  be  traced  by  the  new,  and  the  same 
dark  and  ensanguined  hue  would  st.\u  the  white  and  unsullied 
pureness  of  her  robe  of  freedom. 

Economy  should  niidoubt'  dly  be  one  of  the  first  principles 
of  every  republican  udmiiiiKtration,  but  economy  does  not  con- 
sist in  avoiding  every  expense  till  necessity  imperiously  calls 
for  it ;  in  such  casos.  parsimony  at  one  time  is  always  followed 
by  extravagant  profusion  at  another.  If  we  do  not  prepare 
our  defensive  means  with  leisure,  order  and  deliberation  in 
time  of  peace,  we  must  create  them  with  sudden  haste  and 
confusion,  and  at  immense  expense,  at  the  moment  ofwur, 
when  they  should  already  be  in  active  motion.  Moreover, 
they  wiU  aeceiiaarily  be  insufioient  and  bidly  brganiized.   Tbt 


1 


Chap.  yv. 


54 


experience  of  the  last  war  should  at  least  have  taught  us  3© 
much.  If  economy  was  the  paramount,  the  only  object  ol 
government,  that  same  experience  should  have  taught  us, 
that  from  various  reasons,  which  shall  be  further  developed, 
no  service  is  more  expensive  as  well  as  inefficient  than  that 
of  the  militia.  However  startling  the  expense  of  great  mili- 
tary establishments,  such  as  those  of  France  or  England,  Rus- 
Bia  or  Austria,  a  little  insight  into  the  details  of  their  adminis- 
tration will  prove,  that  the  force  of  a  great  nation  cannot 
possibly  be  organized  or  exerted  in  a  cheaper  manner. 
Economy  ia  with  great  miUtary  powers  the  first  principle,  for 
every  economy  enables  them  to  augment  their  force.  But  we 
^ould  be  swayed  by  higher  considerations.    (5)  vide  note  5, 

Those  who  are  most  unwilling  to  apply  any  portion  of  the 
public  revenue  to  the  army,  are  generally  liberal  to  the  navy. 
And  it  is  a  very  popular  opinion,  that  by  strengthening  it  suffi- 
ciently, we  might  dispense  with  other  forces.  It  would  be 
the  height  of  presumption  in  an  officer,  who  has  seen  no  sea 
service,  to  venture  a  positive  opinion  on  this  subject,  and  we 
all  know  that  America  contains  all  the  elements  of  a  naval  es- 
tablishment, and  those  of  the  most  perfect  kind ;  her  coasts 
are  admirably  adapted  for  creating  a  naval  power;  her  im- 
mense commerce  is  an  inexhaustible  nursery  of  sailorj,  and 
her  seamen  are  perhaps  the  hardiest,  the  most  skilful  and  in- 
trepid in  the  world.  But  popular  as  our  navy  universally  and 
justly  is,  covered  with  glory  as  it  was  in  the  last  war,  it  is  yet 
in  its  infancy.  (6)  vide  7iole  6.  I  would  refer  its  greatesi 
admirers  to  Rogers,  to  Porter  and  Decatur,  to  be  informed 
whether  it  can  cope  with  all  the  forces  which  Britain  can 
send  against  us  ;  whether  it  can  repel  every  attack  directed 
on  our  extensive  coasts  ;  how  long  it  must  be,  and  what  im- 
mense expense  must  be  incurred,  before  its  establishments 
can  rival  those  of  Britain,  Woolwich,  Deptford,  Chatham, 
Portsmouth,  Plymouth,  die.  1  believe  that  our  few  ships  will 
always  brat  an  equal  British  force.  But  who  can  doubt,, 
that  if  England-  was  at  peace  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  ihe 


55 


Chap.  iv. 


might  pour  from  these  great  estahlishments,  such  an  over- 
whelming power  as  would  effectually  destroy,  or  at  least  block- 
ade our  navy ;  and  on  the  first  occasion,  she  will  certainly 
strain  every  nerve  to  ruin  and  eradicate  every  trace  of  our 
arsenals,  navy  yards,  and  all  marine  establishments.  Instead 
of  protecting  the  nation,  they  will  for  a  long  time  require  to 
be  protected  ;  besides,  it  should  be  observed,  that  by  the  pos- 
session of  Canada,  and  still  more,  if  she  takes  possession  of 
Cuba,  England  should  not  only  be  considered  n%  a  distant 
naval  power,  but  as  a  neighbouring  enemy;  her  ..^ans  of  ag- 
gression are  organized,  not  only  in  England,  but  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  America. 


From  all  these  reasons,  the  objections  to  the  military  esta- 
blishment of  the  United  States  are  reducible  to  this  single  ques 
tion  :  is  the  militia  sufficient  for  their  defence  ?  That  defence, 
for  the  reasons  which  we  have  mentioned  above,  must  ulti- 
mately and  chiefly  devolve  upon  it,  but  can  it  stand  alone  the 
fatigues  of  a  long  and  protracted  campaign ;  can  it  stand  the 
attack  of  an  experienced  and  disciplined  enemy,  directed  by 
chiefs  who  have  made  the  art  of  war  their  sole  and  particular 
study,  without  being  supported  by  a  force  of  similar  nature, 
and  led  by  chiefs  of  the  same  character.  How  often,  during 
the  revolutionary  war  and  during  the  last  war,  has  experience 
taught  us  that  they  cannot.  I  might  content  myself  with  quo- 
ting the  repeated  testirnony  of  Washington  to  that  purpose; 
but  the  subject  deserves  to  be  fully  investigated. 

I  would  render  full  justice  to  the  American  militia.  In  the 
defence  of  their  country,  of  their  homes  and  of  their  liberty, 
they  have  done  wonders,  and  displayed  the  greatest  patriotism, 
self  devotion  and  intrepidity.  Sober,  vigilant,  active  and  brave, 
nature  has  admirably  qualified  them  to  beconegood  soldiers; 
they  bear,  withoui,  repining,  hunger  and  thirst,  heat,  cold  and 
fatigues  of  all  kinds ;  they  are  generally  good  marksmen,  and 
as  light  troops  incomparable  ;  when  covered  h>  walls  or  lines^ 
whrn  fighting  in  woods  or  marshes,  they  will  stand  against  ve- 


Ch 


AP.  IV. 


6(j 


lli.: 


teran  troops,  and  when  supported  by  regulars,  have  sometimes 
eminently  contributed  to  success  in  the  field. 

But,  although  they  will  hold  a  line  as  long  as  they  only  have 
to  tire  before  them,  they  cannot  stand  if  they  are  turned,  nor 
rally  if  they  are  broken  on  any  point,  nor  be  led  to  successive 
assaults,  nor  return  to  the  charge  if  they  lose  their  position. 
It  cannot  be  expected  that  they  should  stand  alone  a  re- 
gular and  scientific  attack,  nor  a  prolonged  campaign ;  and 
besides  the  consciousness  of  inexperience,  both  in  the  chiefs 
and  men,  the  little  confidence  which  they  can  have  in  each 
^  other,  the  novelty  and  terror  of  the  scenes  of  danger  into 
which  they  are  brought,  their  anxieties  about  those  homes, 
those  families,  those  professions  from  which  they  have  sudden- 
ly been  torn,  defects  common  to  all  militias,  the  Americans, 
from  the  very  nature  of  their  government,  have  some  defects 
in  their  militia  system  peculiar  to  themselves. 

1st.  In  the  first  place,  their  organization  in  brigades,  bat- 
talions, and  their  armament  and  equipment,  (whatever  the  con- 
stitution may  require)  their  service,  discipline  and  instruction, 
such  as  they  are,  vary  in  every  state,  and  are  more  or  less 
strict  or  uniform,  according  to  the  care  which  the  several 
state  govcrnncents,  who  jealously  reserve  to  themselves  the 
direction  and  superintendence  of  their  militia,  choose  to  give 
to  these  objects.  When  brought  together,  this  produces  all 
the  inconvenience  which  is  found  in  a  confederated  army 
of  difl'erent  independent  nations ;  armies  which  are  always  bad 
and  insufficient,  even  when  the  troops  which  compose  them 
are  separately  well  organized  and  instructed,  which  is  far 
from  being  our  case. 

2d.  In  the  ncxi  place,  the  mode  of  appointing  the  militia 
officers  varies  also  in  different  states,  but  is  no  where  calcu- 
lated to  put  in  these  important  and  confidential  stations  the 
most  proper  persons.  In  some  the  council  of  appointment, 
hi  most  the  men  themselves  select  them.  In  some  the  staff 
officers  are  named  by  the  state  governments ;  in  some  by  the 


^MmfK'Omii. 


37 


Ch 


AP.  IV. 


choice  of  the  subaltern  officers.  Supposing  that  party  spirit 
and  private  influence  had  no  share  in  these  appointments, 
hovr  are  the  quahties,  instruction  and  fitness  of  the  officers  to 
be  appreciated  by  such  methods.  It  is  evident  that  generally 
their  epaulets  alone  must  distinguish  them  from  the  men 
whom  they  command.  A  few  brilliant  exceptions,  such  as 
Brown  and  Jackson,  Harrison,  Ripley,  Johnson,  kc.  do  not 
militate  against  this  general  rule. 

3d.  Thirdly,    The  manner  in  which  their  services  are  com- 
bined with  those  of  the  regular  army  and  of  each  other,  pro- 
duces serious  inconveniences.     The  law  merely  proviaes,  that 
amongst  the  militia  of  several  states,  officers  of  equal   rank 
take   command  according  to   their  seniority,   and  that  the 
officers  of  the  line  only  take  precedence  of  those  of  the  same 
rank  in  the  militia.  The  governor  of  the  state  where  the  army 
serves  has  the  right  of  assuming  its  chief  command,  whatever 
be  his  military  capacity  and  instruction.     In  consequence,  a 
miUtia  officer,  perhaps  chosen  for  his  electioneering  infuence, 
and  exclusively  applied  in  the  previous  course  of  his  life  to 
other  cares  and  to  other  studies,  may  happen  to  command  and 
direct  the  operations  of  an  experienced  soldier,  who  has  made 
the  art  of  war  the  study  of  his  life.     In  every  other  profes- 
sion, some  previous  information  is   deemed  necessary.     No 
one  would  confide  his  health  to  a  physician,  his  fortune  to  a 
merchant,  his  affiiirs  to  a  lawyer,  without  full  confidence  in  his 
learning  or  experience.     But  we  confide  the  defence  of  our 
country  and  liberties  indiscriminately  to  every  popular  fa- 
vourite.    The  jealousies  and  dislikes,  which  must  break  out 
between  the  militias  of  several  states ;  the  difficulty  of  subject- 
ing them  to  the  command  of  a  chief  who  may  ba  of  a  weaker 
state,  must  strike,  at  the  first  view,   any  person  acquainted 
with  the  nature  of  these  troops  io  all  ages  and  countries. 

4th.  Fourthly.  From  the  nature  of  our  federal  constitu- 
tion.  It  IS  impossible  to  count  on  their  services,  when  their 
♦tatc  governments  do  not  choose  to  co-operate  Uartily  and 


i 


m 


:    i 
i 


Stf 


1  I 


Chap.  "'•  ^" 

.ctivelv  in  the  general  cause.  At  any  rate,  those  governments 

::;:  (he  nghfof  raising  and  org-.-g  as    hey  P  ease  the 

f„.ees.hiohthe  federa^  ,|:™™^-,;Te:y;.and '^states 

tTte  the  article  of  *e  constitution  which  spec.hes  the  cases 

vented  greater  evils,  perhaps  a  separation  ^^  ^f^^'^^f  ^^^j^ 
those  recent  facts  imperiously  prove  how  httle  the  miht.a 
alone  can  be  relied  on. 

«k    Fifthlv       From  the  little  instruction,  authority  and 
creft'of  t?Jf;offi!ers,from  the  very  spirit  of  ind^P™^-- 
of  tie  people,  who  deem  an  exact  disciplme  mcompatible 
trpeCluiherty,it,simpos.h,e.^^^^^^^^^ 
proper  subordination.     And  J;'  *«,  ^lo^:^  '„^^  ,„,„;,,;,« 
proudest  of  nat.ons  at   '"""<=•""»„  "J  ^j  Lt  militar,- 
and  obedient  .n  the  camp.    Jh«J  "''''"^  .     ^^,■     ^  is  noble. 
.„„„vdination  is  --;;';S™t  '  onr-anVof  compelling 
r"^::  :  't  tnUira''-  eveu'thcse  excite  every  day 
^--irs^andalons  and  expensive  lawsui.  and  pubhc  d^ 

cussions,  as  shameful  (o  the  na  mnaUharacter,       thoy 

intolerable  iu  the  daily  course  of  service. 

Gth.  Sixthly.     The  service  of  the  mihUa  '-;'  ^'^  '", 
;,::mitw>thd.aws  .romthclr  ordinary  avocat.ons,  and  whose 


.mmr-^-^m 


59 


Chap. 


IV. 


ments 

le  the 
put  at 

states 
sachu- 
itriotic 
in  that 
e  cases 
tnilitia. 
misfor- 
state  of 
Ameri- 
jovern- 
discus- 
)ly  pre- 
s.     But 

mihtia 


rity  and 
endence 
mpatible 
ivn  under 
reest  and 
ibmissive 
military 
is  noble. 
)mpelling 
jvery  day 
ublic  dis- 
i  they  are 


;  only  in- 
only,  as  I 
ndividuals 
ind  whose 


\ 


losses  should  be  included  in  the  estimation  of  its  expense, 
but  its  temporary  administration,  organized  in  the  sudden 
moment  of  necessity  by  men  of  no  experience,  is  always  dis- 
orderly and  profuse.  From  the  variability  of  its  force,  from 
the  rotation  of  its  service,  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  exactly 
its  numbers  and  consequently  clear  its  accounts,  even  where 
there  is  no  malversation.  It  is  very  difficult  to  settle  which 
charges  belong  to  the  states  and  which  to  the  centra!  govern- 
ment, and  between  them,  all  the  wants  of  the  militia,  their 
armament,  clothing,  equipment  and  approvisionment  of  all 
kinds,  the  hospital  expenses  and  those  of  the  medical  depart- 
ment and  artillery,  &:c.  are  always  miserably  provided,  con- 
fusedly administered,  never  accounted  for,  and  yei  paid  by 
the  nation  at  the  most  extravagant  ratr*.  Are  these  accounts 
all  settled  since  the  last  war  ?  Are  they  ever  likely  to  be 
settled? 

From  all  these  reasons,  the  militia  is  not  calculated  to  re- 
sist alone  a  strong  invasion,  nor  stand  a  long  campaign.  They 
are  brave;  they  may  be  exalted  by  enthusiasm  in  a  day  of 
battle  ;  and,  as  light  troops,  we  have  already  observed,  that 
they  are  incomparable.  But  we  cannot  count  upon  them 
for  the  sole  defence  of  the  country.  If  such  was  our  pur- 
pose, it  would  be  necessary,  by  a  uniform  and  general  law, 
to  divide  it  in  classes ;  to  withdraw  entirely,  from  the  super- 
intendence of  its  respective  states,  a  given  portion  of  the 
youngest  and  most  active  classes,  and  to  commit  tht,  power 
of  requiring  and  compelling  their  service,  by  rotation,  t'uring 
a  portion  of  every  year,  the  power  of  appointing  their  offi- 
cers, and  the  whole  of  their  organization,  administration, 
discipline  and  instruction,  to  the  uniform,  steady  and  simple 
direction  of  the  central  government.  A  military  system 
founded  on  this  principle,  might  be  rendered  niost  perfect 
and  proper  for  a  republic.  But  it  would  be  needless  to 
dwell  on  measures  which  will  not  be  adopted.  The  state 
governments  will  never  commit  their  militias  to  the  federal 
executive.    For  that  very  reason,  if  they  do  not  wish  the 


ll 


Chap.  ly. 


tJO 


Mi 


country  to  remam  in  a  defenceless  state,  they  must  maintain 
a  regular  army  at  its  disposal,  calculated  to  support  the  mi- 
Ixtia,  and  encounter  the  efforts  of  a  disciplined  enemy. 

Even  then,  some  of  the  abuses  and  defects  existing  in  the 
mihtia  system  would  require  to  be  redressed;  and  the  state 
governments  can  do  much  for  that  purpose.     It  were  highly 
desirable,  that  the  organization,   instruction   and  discipline, 
armament  and  equipment  of  the  militia,  were  uniform;  that 
the.r  service    and   administration,   when   acting    conjointly 
with  the  regular  army,  were  better  fixed,  and  that  more  care 
were  taken  m  the  selection  of  their  officers;  some  previous 
instruction  required  by  the  state  governments  in  the  candi- 
dates  for  these  offices,  and  a  preference  given  in  their  ap- 
pomtment  to  such  citizens  as  had  served  in  the  army,  in  some 
former  war,  or  in  the  military  schools. 

A  last  and  a  serious  objection  has  been  lately  raised  against 
luaintaining  a  regular  army  in  America.     It  is  a  delicate  and 
a  painful  subject,  and  one  which  I  do  not  willingly  enter  in. 
borne  disagreeable  differences  have  arisen  between  one  of 
our  most  justly  celebrated  chiefs  and  some  of  our  represen- 
tatives and  evil  authorities.     On  these  it  would  not  become 
me  to  give  an  opinion.     But  it  has  been  pretended,  in  conse- 
quence,  that  the  spirit  of  our  army  is  already  mutinous  and 
arrogant,  and  thftt  it  behoves  us  to  get  rid  of  it  in  time,  and 
•betore  it  grows  dangerous. 

I  trust  that  the  sensitiveness  of  private  feelings,  and  per- 
hap-  the  exaggerations  of  that  party  spirit,  and  of  that  jea- 
lousy of  the  government,  which  sometimes  thwarts  amongst 
us  the  most  useful  measures,  and  throws  a  cast  of  disinge- 
nuous .  liberality  on  our  public  discussions,  unworthy  of  a 
free  and  great  people  ;  I  trust  that  such  are  the  only  foundu^ 
l.ons  of  this  accusation.  But  supposing,  for  the  sake  of  argu- 
ment, that  It  were  founded;  we  should  first  ascertain  whether 
we  can  dispense  with  the  services  of  the  army,  and  if  we  find 


61 


Chap 


.  IV. 


^hat  we  cannot,  we  should  correct  whatever  abuses  may 
exist  in  its  laws,  establishments  and  military  spirit.  Patience, 
discipline,  obedience,  and  a  proper  subordination  to  the  go- 
vernment, and  to  his  chiefs,  in  all  that  concerns  his  military 
service,  to  the  civil  authorities  on  every  other  occasion ; 
such  should  be  the  first  and  most  indispensable  qualities  of 
every  soldier.  The  functions  of  the  army,  in  the  great  po- 
litical machine,  should  operate  as  silently,  as  smoothly  and 
regularly,  as  those  of  its  other  wheels.  If  that  part  of  the 
machine  jars  and  creaks,  and  impedes  the  march  of  the  rest, 
repair  it,  replace  it  in  its  right  order ;  but  if  you  take  it  out, 
and  cast  it  away,  beware  how  the  machine  will  go  on  with- 
out it. 


If  the  navy  and  militia  are  not  alone  sufficient  to  protect 
«s,  it  becomes  of  the  utmost  importance  to  examine  the 
principles  on  which  our  defensive  force  should  be  formed, 
and  the  elements  of  which  it  should  consist.  These  objects 
we  shall  endeavour  to  investigate  and  discuss  in  the  next 
chapter. 


CHAPTER  V. 


ll 


|1 


II  iT 


Necessity  of  organizing  both  /Ae  materiel  one?  personnel  of  our 
defensive  means  on  a  permanent  footing,  in  time  of  peace, 
and  under  the  sole  control  of  the  national  federal  executive. 

The  permanent  force  which  is  necessary  to  protect  every 
nation  in  time  of  war,  and  even  to  secure  its  respectabihty 
and  independence  in  time  of  peace,  divides  itself  under  two 
heads,  which  the  French  writers  term  the  personnel  and  the 
materiel;  and  which  a  lawyer  amongst  us  would  call  the  force 
of  persons  and  the  force  of  things.     The  first  consists  of  the 
troops,  the  second  of  the  arms,  ordnance,  and  ammunition, 
subsistence,  clothing,  lodging  and  necessaries  of  all  kinds,  of 
the  administration  of  all  these  means,  of  the  fortifications, 
roads,  bridges,  canals,  instruments,  &c.  which  are  required  to 
render  the  service  of  these  troops  effective.     However  opi- 
nions may  differ  about  the  necessity  of  organizing  the  personnel 
in  time  of  peace,  it  is  evident  that  the  materiel  must  be  orga- 
nized  with  leisure  and  tranquillity.     The  hasty  works  which 
are  thrown  up  in  the  moment  of  danger,  are  generally  badly 
planned,  insufficient  for  their  purpose,  and  erected  in  the  most 
slovenly  and  expensive  manner.     The  same  may  be  said  of  all 
sudder  preparations  of  war,  the  armament,  the  subsistence, 
med*  dl  means  in  such  cases,  &ic.  are  almost  always  incom- 
plete, extravagantly  expensive,  and  administered  with  confu- 
sion.    The  first  care  of  the  government  should  therefore  be 
to  erect  those  permanent  fortifications  which  are  necessary 
for  the  defence  of  the  country. 

It  may  appear  a  gigantic  enterprise,  and  beyond  our  means, 
CO  fortify  such  an  immense  extent  of  coast  as  that  of  America. 


63 


Chap.  t. 


* 
m 

"t 


Bat  it  is  not  the  number  of  fortified  posU  which  constitutes  the 
strcnglh  of  a  frontier ;  it  is  their  proper  deposition.     It .»  well 
Zl  that  the  Roman  empire  was  never  so  weak  as  when 
every  village  was  converted  into  a  citadel,     [he  expenses 
Thich  government  applies  to  such  purposes,  should  be  ca lula- 
Ted  upon  the  relative  importance  of  the  points  whid.  -t  to 
,0  defend,  and  that  can  only  be  ascertained  by  «^^' »"*  '^ 
entific  surveys.     Such  as  cover  a  vast  and  ""•extent  of  open 
territory  •  such  as  secure  the  great  commumcations  of  a  conn 
try  byTaid  or  water;  such  as  contain  an  immense  proportion 
of  Drivate  pmperty,  or  such  as  are  destined  by  their  position 
r:ata7alan^;ges  to  become  the  seat  of  .-»  ;-  ;j 
military  establishments,  require  to  be  '^'^"^f^'^'^^Zt. 
such  alone,  will  great  expeditious  and  great  ^^^J^^^'^- 
^A      An  invader  would  soon  fruitlessly  rum  nimselt  by  a  con 
rary  co«  Less  important  points  will  th-efore  se Worn  be 

IttaLed  but  by  small  P-aa^oj  Parties  ^^^ -^^''^  ^t't^e 
their  own  local  means  of  defence.  It  the  enemy 
great  expense  and  powerful  means  .n  ^^  -^-g  them  ^M^^^^^^^ 
not  be  guarded,  and  som.  must  be  sacnficed  to  ^ov^r  othe^ 
of  more  importance.  The  destruction  of  New- York  for  ex 
ample,  would  be  a  greater  disaster,  even  to  the  people  of  the 
Niagara  frontier,  than  that  of  B  iffalo. 

In  tracmg  the  probable  views  of  the  enemy  in  the  next  war, 
we  hatZignatL  the  chief  points  ^^^^-:;;--^^;^, 
lifted.     Our  naval  establishments,  on  wh.ch  the  futu  e  great 
ne  s  of  America  chierty  depends,  are  the  most  -mportant ;  no 
penL  can  beconsidLed  too  lavish  for  the  Purpose  o  orga 
nizing  and  strengthening  them  on  a  scale  wor  by  of  th...  fu 
tnre  destinies,  and  enabling  them  to  defy  every  aUack.     It 
h    e  stftionTare  not  occupied  by  us,  they  w.l.     e  occupied 
by  the  British,  and  become  more  mischievous  m  the.r  hands, 
aLentres  of  annoyance,  than  useful  in  ou-,  as  centres  of  d- 
fence.     The  same  observation  applies  to  New-Orleans    but 
hrtbours  pursued  at  this  moment  by  the  Arr.en-ne      - 
neers,  will  soon  give  us  more  exact  notions  on  this  subject. 


Ch 


A  p.  y. 


<)4 


r>  i 


i 


The  reconnaissance  which  they  are  making  is  one  of  the  wisest 
measures  of  the  American  government.  No  permanent  de* 
fensive  works,  requiring  so  much  time  and  expense  before 
they  can  be  finished,  should  be  undertaken  till  such  a  recon- 
naissance of  the  whole  frontier,  under  all  its  military  proper- 
ties, has  ascertained  their  use  and  necessity,  and  combined 
their  relations  with  each  other  on  a  grand  and  uniform  systen*, 
(7)  vide  note  7;  otherwise  chance  alone  and  a  very  unlikely 
and  uncommon  chance,  must  guide  us  in  selecting  proper 
positions.  Such  works  should  not  be  erected  for  small  and 
local  interests,  but  all  with  a  view  to  the  part  which  they  must 
act,  in  the  general  system  of  the  national  defence. 

When  all  the  chief  points  in  the  country  shall  be  sufficiently 
secured  by  permanent  defensive  works,  the  enemy  will  use- 
lessly exhaust  his  resources  in  attacking  them  by  grand  expe- 
ditions, such  as  we  have  mentioned  mthe  preceding  chapter. 
He  will  be  reduced  to  predatory  excursions  along  our  coasts. 
But  the  erection  of  such  works  alone  is  not  sufficient ;  they 
must  be  armed,  manned,  and  communicate  together. 

The  second  care  of  the  government  should  therefore  be  to 
open  easy,  ready,  and  cheap  communications,  by  land  and  wa- 
ter, between  all  these  defensive  posts,  and  to  extend  their 
ramifications  through  the  whole  country,  to  connect  the  gene- 
ral defensive  system,  and  thus  be  enabled  to  carry  their  forces 
yapidly  on  every  menaced  point.  A  scientific  and  military 
topographical  survey  of  the  whole  country,  of  its  levels  and 
soils,  even  of  its  geology,  and  of  all  its  military  qualities,  is 
therefore  indispensable,  before  the  grand  system  of  the  national 
communications,  canals,  roads  and  bridges,  &c.  can  be  or- 
ganized on  a  proper  plan;  such  only  as  are  necessary  open, 
and  no  useless  expense  .avished  on  points  of  no  importance. 
I  need  not  expatiate  on  the  utility  of  such  works  for  a  thou- 
sand purposes,  almost  as  important  as  our  military  defence. 

Bat  to  utilize  these  surveys,  it  is  necessary  that  the  an- 


m 


65 


Chap.  v. 


nual  result  of  the  labours  of  our  engineers,  ihe  col'ection  of  all 
their  views,  projects,  memoirs  and  calculations,  their  topo- 
graphical, military  and  statistical  works  of  all  kinds,  plans, 
views,  charts  and  maps,  descriptive  of  the  whole  of  our  coun- 
try,  unde-  all  its  properties,  and  of  all  possible  improvements 
to  be  made  in  it,  should  be  deposited  in  the  war  office,  classed 
and  registered,  and  religiously  preserved  for  the  government 
to  consult  on  every  occasion.     This  collection  should  form 
the  archives  of  the  forces  and  means  of  the  nation,  the  memoir 
of  its  defence  :  no  part  of  it  should  be  published  nor  allowed 
to  circulate  but  by  the  express  desire  of  the  legislature  or  exe- 
cutive, and  if  copies  be  sent  by  order  of  the  government  to 
uirect  public  works,  commanding  officers,  &c.  the  originals 
should  always  remain  at  the  disposal  of  the  secretary  of  war. 
^uch  an  establishment  is  productive  of  incalculable  economy 
and  benefit ;  it  is  considered  indispensable  in  every  well  orga- 
nized government.  (8)  vide  note  8. 

The  next  care  of  the  government  should  be  to  secure  the  ar- 
mament of  the  nation.     Those  who  are  not  aware  of  the  mag- 
nitude and  importance  of  England's  military  establishments, 
may  see,  in  the  memoir  of  Chevalier  Dupin,  the  immense 
means  of  hostility  and  destruction  which  she  has  collected,  the 
care  with  which  she  improves  them,  the  perfect  order  in  which 
they  are  classed,  preserved,  and  organized,  and  the  readiness 
with  which  they  can  be  put  in  activity.     That  similar,  if  not 
equal  establishments,  should  be  organized  in  this  country,  ad- 
ministered with  order  and  economy,  but  without  parsimony, 
and  directed  by  men  of  consummate  skill  and  knowledge,  is 
most  necessary.     Our  foundries,  arsenals,  military  establish 
ments  of  all  kinds,  destined  to  provide  the  navy  and  army  with 
the  means  of  the  national  defence,  should  be  formed  on  a  scale 
of  magnitude,  corresponding  to  the  power  of  the  enemy  and  to 
Ihe  importance  of  the  objects  which  they  are  destined  to  de- 
fend. 

A  great  part  of  our  armament  is  provided  amongst  us  by 


Cha 


p.  V. 


66 


^1' 


the  state  governments  and  by  the  people  themselves,  for  the 
first  interest  of  a  free  people  is  to  be  universally  armed. 
But  every  man  conversant  with  military  service,  must  con- 
ceive how  necessary  it  is  that  the  armament  should  be  uni- 
form, and  to  what  trouble,  confusion,  and  serious  inconve- 
nience we  must  be  exposed  by  the  multitude  and  diversity 
of  calibers,  when  the  difTerent  stales  and  individuals  are  left 
to  provide  themselves  with  arms,  according  to  their  own  fancy. 
If  all  military  fabrics  were  put  under  the  inspection  and  di- 
rection of  the  national  government,  this  evil  would  be  reme- 
died, and  we  do  not  conceive  what  possible  alarm  such  a 
rtieasurc  could  inspire,  or  what  additional  power  it  would 
give   to  the  gov(<rnmcMit.     At  least,  were  it  for  this   reason 
alone  (and  we  shall  give  many  others),  it  is  indisr-nsablc 
that  a  central  ordnance  department  and  a  corps  of  national 
artillery  should  exist,  not  only  to  provide  for  the  national  ser- 
vice, but  to  serve  as  a  model  to  those  of  our  twenty  different 
states,  to  pursue  those  experiments  and  form  those  great  de- 
pots, which  le.juire  (he  means  of  a  great  nation,  and  to  con- 
cern rate  the  (hcoretical  knowledge  and  modern  and  growing 
miprovemenls  of  that  service.   (9)  vide  note  9. 

The  approvisionmcnt  of  an  army  in  all  the  necessaries  of 
life,  subsistence  and  forage,  clothing  and  covering,  medi- 
cal means  and  hospitals,  kc.  which  completes  what  we  have 
termed  the  matcml  of  the  national  force,  and  is  the  proper 
subject  of  military  administration,  must  be  secured  at  (he  ap- 
proach of  war;  but  during  a  time  of  peace  may  safely  be 
proporlioned  to  lh<  small  force  vhich  is  then  kept  upon  foot. 
Before  the  establishment  of  our  commissariat,  this  part  of  the 
service  appears  (o  have  been  in  a  slate  of  infancy  amongst 
us.  Those  kinds  of  means  are  all  provided  amongst  us  by 
private  conUac(,  a  very  sunicient  way,  if  properly  directed 
and  inspected.  But  our  generals  were  then  obliged  (o  con- 
clude (hose  bargains  and  contracts  themselves,  and  had  nr 
prompt  or  sudicient  mcauH  to  compel  their  execution. 
Charged  (hereby  wi(h   a   imiKiplicily  of  cares  which  (hey 


I 


\M 


67 


Chap.  v. 


;s,  for  the 
ly  armed, 
must  con- 
Id  be  uni- 

inconve- 

diversity 
Is  are  left 
wn  fancy, 
•n  and  di- 
be  reme- 
n  such  a 

it  would 
is  reason 
3r  disable 

natiunul 
ional  ser- 

different 
great  de- 
d  to  con- 
I  growing 


ssarics  of 
g,  medi- 
we  have 
f"  proper 
t  the  ap- 
safely  be 
pon  foot, 
irt  of  the 
amongst 
gst  us  by 
directed 
1  lo  con- 
I  had  nr 
ccution. 
ich  they 


could  not  attend  to,  their  views  were  at  every  moment  turned 
aside  from  those  objects  to  which  alone  they  should  be  direct- 
ed, and  military  operations  frequently  failed  in  consequence. 

If  we  turn  from  the  materiel  of  war,  to  the  personnel  or 
troops,  before  we  develope  the  manner  in  which  they  s.iould 
be  organized  and  employed  in  our  national  defence,  we  must 
a.ain  combat  a  common  prejudice  existing  m  this  country. 
Granting,  it  is  said,  that  a  standing  army  is  necessary  m  t.me 
of  war;  and  not  dangerous  to  our  libert.es,  cannot  we  alway 
organi/e  one  when  it  is  wanted,  and  avoid  burdening  oursel  s 
with  such  an  expense  in  time  of  peace. 

But  if  an  army  is  only  organized  in  timn  of  war,  it  will 
at  first  be  no  better  than  a  militia.  In  the  course  of  time 
it  may  acquire  firmness  and  experience,  generals  and  officers 

may  L  formed,  its  service  and  -d^^'^'^^^^^'^^r^th'pnmmon 
ted,  but,  in  the  mean  time,  if  the  enemy  acts  w.th  common 
foresight  and  vigour,  that  experience  w.ll  be  ;^early  bought  by 
severe  losses  and  humiliating  defeats.     The  difficulty  and  the 
immense  expense  which  will  attend  the  forming  and  recru.U 
;:g    raining'  officering  and  organizing  «t  once  a  wh^  ar-y 
can  easily  be  appreciated ;  the  confusion  and  prodigality  of 
a    sudden  military  preparations  we  have  j^^-^^fjXZ 
In  fact  the  enemy  will  meet  with  no  resistance  from  such  an 
iTin  the  first  Campaign,  and  very  little  in  the  second    and 
what  mischief  may  he  not  do  during  that  time.     This  was      e 
case  even  in  the  beginning  of  the  last  war,  when  the  British 
were  so  ill  prepared  on  their  side. 

An  army  cmsists  of  officers  and  privates.     The  number  of 
th.  praL  may  indeed  be  very  much  reduced  in  time  of 

:.crf^rtheyc^na.ways  be  trained  ill  tl.c^^^^ 
weeks  when  their  services  are  required.     BiU  «^'  ^ '^/^  ^'" 

.nniber  must  be  ^-^^^^^{^^    :^ 'll  3 
line,  military  spirit  and  practical  serMci*, 


!1»! 


Chap.  v. 


tiU 


afterwards  in  the  recruits.  From  some  personal  experience, 
I  can  aver  that  nothing  is  more  inefficient  than  new  corps ; 
it  is  this  which  makes  the  difference  between  them  and  vete^ 
ran  regiments.  Besides,  the  non-commissioned  officers  on 
whom  the  disciphne  and  daily  duties  so  much  depend,  can 
only  be  for.ned  in  a  long  course  of  regular  service. 

But  the  good  qualities  of  all  kinds  of  troops  must  always 
ultimately  depend  on  those  of  the  officers.     From  the  pro- 
gressive and  successive  improvements  of  the  art  of  war  in  all 
its  branches,  in  the  organisation  and  administration  of  armies, 
in  their  discipline,  in  their  movements  and  tactics,  in  the  va. 
rious  and  more   scientific  department  of  the  staff  officer, 
artillerist  and  engineer,   that  art  has  become   an  abstruse 
science,  and  requires  that  a  certain  class  of  men  should  de- 
vote to  it  the  whole  of  their  thoughts,  studies  and  time.    And 
if  these  men  serve  with  the  prospect  of  being  disbanded  on 
the  return  of  peace,  can  it  be  expected  that  with  so  short  and 
precarious  a  career  before  them,  and  so  small  a  stimulus  to 
their  ambition  and  love  of  glory,  they  will  apply  themselves 
with  enthusiasm  to  a  study  in  itself  dry  and  unattractive, 
and  to  all  the  petty  cares  and  details  which  must  employ 
every  moment  of  a  good  officer's  life.     Neither  do  those 
bravo  men  who  defend  then  v,ountry  in  the  hour  of  danger, 
deserve,  when  danger  is  past,  to  be  cast  off  to  want  and  po- 
vefty,  viewed  with  jealousy  and  distrust,  be  arraigned  per- 
haps for  their  very  services,  and  have  the  smallest  pittance 
dealt  to  them  with  unwilling  parsimony,  after  a  great  loss  of 
time  and  labour,  and  when  they  are  incapacitated  for  every 
other  profession.     Such  conduct  is  impolitic  as  well  as  unge- 
nerous and  unjust.     Unless  the  profession  of  an  officer  be 
rendered  as  permanent  and  secure  as  it  is  honourable,  unless 
he  is  thereby  inspired  with  a  proper  love  for  his  service,  and 
for  that  purpose  maintained  in  time  of  peace,  exclusively  ap- 
plied to  the  study  and  practice  of  his  military  duties,  these 
places  in  time  of  war  will  never  ^c  filled  but  bv  idle  loungers 


69 


Chap.  v. 


and  dissipated  coxcombs,  smitten  with  the  flash  of  a  uniform 
and  brilliancy  of  a  parade. 

Even  in  the  subaltern  station  of  an  officer  of  infantry,  how 
various  and  how  important  are  his  functions  ?     They  must 
engross  not  only  the  whole  of  his  time,  but  the  whole  of  his 
thoughts,  hopes,  ideas,  and  prospects.     And  is  it  to  be  ex- 
pected that  with  no  more  information  than  what  he  may  have 
acquired  on  a  militia  parade,  any  citizen,  drawn  from  his 
ordinary  avocations,  to  undertake  the  command  of  a  company, 
will  be  acquainted  with  these  duties,  and  practise  them  by  in- 
tuition.     Suppose  he  devolves  them  upon  his  sergeant,  the 
sergeant  must  possess  the  requisite  qualities.     Such  was  the 
case    in  France  before   the  revolution;   all  military  offices 
belonged  by  hereditary  and  prescriptive  right  to  the  nobihty; 
and  those  luxurious  a"d  effeminate  minions,  whose  only  merit 
was  personal  bravery,  devolved  on  their  plebeian  subalterns 
the  whole  of  their  duties;  but  when  the  revolution  broke  out, 
Hoche,  Soult,  Pichegru,  Massena,  and  a  crowd  of  heroes  and 
warriors,  burst  forth  from  that  class,  where  a  great  deal  of 
military  information  liad  gradually  spread  and  concentred 
Itself. 

The  duties  of  an  officer  of  infantry  are  not  confined  to  the 
exercises  and  manoeuvres  of  his  troop  ;  these  are  intelligible 
to  the  most  vulgarcapacity, easily  learned,  and  easily  directed. 
iBut  his  cares  must  be  extended  to  every  thing  that  concerns 
its  welfare  ;  he  must  be  the  father      his  company;  the  clean- 
liness, temperance,  morality,  and  health  of  his  men  are  under 
bib  daily  inspection;  their  service,, order  and  discipline  he 
should  constantly  superintend ;  their  instruction  direct,  nor 
disdaw  to  enter  into  all  their  little  interests,  and  all  the  details 
of  their  clothing,  feeding,  lodging,  armament  and  equipment, 
&c.     If  the  captain  and  officers  of  every  company  do  not 
keep  a  constant  and  watchful  eye  over  these  details,  the  waste 
and  profusion  of  the  regimental  administration  can  never  be 


■ 


Chap. 


V. 


70 


r  Tiedied  by  the  exactness  or  vigilance  of  any  superior  au- 
thority. A  good  captain  should  form  'le  spirit  of  his  men, 
and  by  attending  with  zeal  and  inclination  to  their  interests,' 
he  will  secure,  sooner  than  by  any  improper  weakness  or 
indulgence,  that  affection  and  respect,  which  a  soldier  should 
feel  for  his  chief,  in  every  well  regulated  army. 

These  cares,  with  the  study  of  his  particular  service  in 
every  situation,  and  a  general  acquaintance  with  the  whole 
theory  of  the  art  of  war,  should  be  common  to  every  officer. 
But  in  the  artiller;  ^  the  previous  information  required  is  still 
more  extensive,  the  details  of  service  are  more  numerous,  and 
the  objects  of  inspection   more  important.     If  indeed  the 
duty  of  the  artillery  officer  be  confined  to  the  direction  of  a 
fixed  battery,  or  command  of  a  company,  he  may  learn  it  by 
rote,  and  that  may  suffice  for  the  service  of  the  militia,  and 
the  defp'>ce  of  fixed  positions  on  the  coast.     But  if  he  wishes 
to  understand  his  profession  theoretically,  he  must  acquire 
much  previous  mathematical  learning,  and  receive  a  scientific 
education.     Nor  is  there  any  part  of  the  sublimer  theory  of 
tactics  to  which  he  should  be  a  stranger;  the  principles  of 
fortification  he  should  understand,  either  to  attack  or  defend 
them  with  success,  and  the  tactics  of  the  field,  to  co-operate 
in  them  with  effect.     As  the  ordnance  department  is  a  branch 
of  the  artillery,  the  fabrication  and  inspection  of  all  kinds  of 
arms,  makes  a  part  of  his  attributions,  and  he  must  be  veised 
in  all  the  process  of  thei f  manufacture.  ( 1 0)  vide  note  1 0.    It  is 
absurd  to  think  of  creating  such  a  corps  at  the  moment  of  war ; 
it  has  recjuired  centuries  to  carry  it  to  perfection  in  Europe. 

• 
The  profession  of  the  engineer  requires  still  more  learning 
and  study,  as  much  indeed  as  those  which  are  called  the  learn- 
ed professions,  the  lawyer's,  physician's,  or  divine's.  There 
is  scarcely  a  branch  of  natural  philosophy  which  should 
be  totally  foreign  to  his  studies;  the  laws  of  mechanics,  the 
force  of  chemical  compounds,  the  specific  weight  and  gravity 


o 

t( 
ti 
c 
r 
c 
c 


71 


CriAP.  V. 


of  every  substance  which  he  may  employ,  should  be  famihar 
to  him.     He  should  be  acquainted  with  the  whole  theory  of 
tactics,  to  judge,  at  one  glance,  of  the  military  properties  of  a 
country ;  he  should  be  fertile  in  resources  and  mventions, 
ready  at  drawing  a  survey,  and  levying  a  map,  prompt  in 
calculatine,  and  accurate  in  balancing  the  means  and  object, 
expense,  time,  and  materials  requisite  even  for  a  sudden  work. 
His  profession,  in  short,  is  one  of  the  most  profound  and 
piv.ticaliy   useful  of  the  branches  of  human  learning;  his 
lalenfs  may  be  pre-eminently  serviceable  in  time  of  peace, 
applied  lo  those  internal  improvements  by  which  commerce, 
agriculture  and  manufactures  are  equally  benefited,  and  in 
time  of  war  his  services  arc  indispensable.     Exact  surveys, 
by  pointing  out  the  proper  places,  and  proper  means  of  de- 
fence, save  at  such  moments  an  incalculable   expense  to  the. 
nation,  which  would  have  been  thrown  away  on  useless  and 
,11-designed  works.     England,  with  laudable  spirit,  is  endea- 
vouring at  preser.:  to  form  a  good  corps  of  engineers  ;  but  in 
America,  the  fruits  of  such  an  establishment  would  be  incom- 
parably greater;  for  in  no  country  can  works  be  erected  of 
such  magnitude,  of  such  benefit  to  posterity,  and  to  the  wor  d; 
works  to  immortalize  the  name,  and  excite  the  disinterested 
ambition  of  any  engineer.     The  genius  of  that  ^^^^l^or^s 
.hould  not  be  cramped  by  an  illiberal  and  short-sighted  par- 
simony, their  feelings  disgusted  from  the  service,  and  the, r 
conceptions   rendered   useless.      Our  engineers   shoi^d  be 
numerous  and  instn.cted,  organized  on  the  most   efficient 
footing,  and  maintained  on  the  most  liberal  system;  for  every 
good  engineer  who  retires,  is  a  real  loss  to  the  country. 
(11)  vidtnote  11. 

The  stair  and  administration  equally  require  to  be  directed 
by  experienced  officers.     An  intimate  acquamtance  w.Ul  the 
various  and  infinite  details  of  military  service,  and  habits  of 
^rder,  economy,  exactness,  and  despatch  of  business,  are  es- 
sentail  in  these  departments.     The  most  serious  ev.l«  result- 


1-1 


Chap. 


V. 


72 


^11' 


i 


edmlhe  last  war  lioin  the  want  of  a  good  commissariat. 
General  officers,  it  may  be  said,  luive  sometimes  distinguished 
themselves  without  any  previous  mihtary  information.     It  is 
true,  that  some  subHmer  geniuses,  soaring  a*  once  to  the 
higher  excellences  of  the  art,  have  formed  rare  and  brilliant 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule.     But  that  genius,  that  intui- 
tive instmct  of  tactics,  that  eagle  glance  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle, which  makes  a  great  general,  which  Moreau  and  Jackson 
displayed  on  leaving  the  bar,  and  Cromwell  and  Conde  in 
their  first  battles,  that  genius  would  not  suffice  to  make  a  good 
staff  officer,  nor  even  a  tolerable  adjutant.     These  should  be 
acquainted  with  the  various  service  of  all  kinds  of  troops  in 
every  situation,  and  with  their  general  discipline  and  admini- 
stration;  they  should  have  the  habit  of  analyzing,  classifying 
and  abridging  the  multitude  of  reports  which  they  receive, 
and  drawing  clear  abstracts  of  them,  &c.     It  would  be  absurd 
to  imagine  that  the  generals  who  command,  direct  and  super- 
intend the  whole  of  the  service,  the  staflf  officers  who  assist 
in  them  those  duties,  and  draw  the  regular  and  pertinent  re- 
ports of  that  service,  require  less  study  and  information  than 
those  who  are  to  execute  their  orders. 

Let  us  not  then  be  reminded  of  a  Curius,  a  Regulus,  a 
Cincnnatus,  and  of  all  those  worthy  Romans  who  repeatedly 
left  the  plough  to  assume  the  command  of  the  legions.     In 
the  first  place  the  art  of  war  was  then  in  its  infancy.     How 
long  would  the  legions  of  Rome  have  stood  the  attack  of  a 
modern  army  with  its  artillery?    The  science  of  the  engi- 
necr  was  out  of  the  question,  and  the  operations  of  those  small 
corps  of  heavy  infantry,  with  very  little  cvalry  and  very  few 
m.ssne  weapons,  were  ronlined  to  the  neighbourhood  of  their 
city,  and  not  calculated  upon  the  surveyed  topography  of  the 
country.     In   the  next  place,   the  Romans,  those  illustrious 
robbers,  wore  a  nation  of  thieves  and  soldiers;  they  subsist- 
cd  by  v>:u  and  plunder,  and  those  very  chiefs,  far  from  being 
rnw  rernnts.  had  served  from  their  earliest  youth,  and  had 


■•^'fff^^WliUftp*'- 


73 


Chap.  v. 


successively  passed  through  every  rank  of  the  militia,  before 
they  attained  to  the  command  of  armies. 

This  chapter  has  been  devoted  to  provins;  the  necessity  of 
organizing  the  two  great  branches  of  our  defence,  both  the 
personnel  and  materiel,  on  a  permanent  and  sufficient  footmg. 
In  the  next,  we  shall  endeavour  to  point  out  the  best  manner 
of  forming  and  organizing  those  means,  employmg  them  in 
lime  of  war  against  such  an  attack  as  I  have  described,  and 
even  utilizing  the  services  of  the  army  in  time  of  peace. 


10 


!' 


I 


CHAPTER  Vr 

A  brief  /Ibstract  of  the  simplest,  safest,  and  most  effectual  mode 
by  which  the  national  forces  might  be  raised,  instructed,  or- 
ganized and  employed  in  time  of  pea"e  and  in  time  of  roar  ; 
of  their  destination  a^id  numbers. 

If  we  have  succeeded  in  proving  the  necessity  of  main- 
taining a  standing  army,  the  next  point  to  consider  is  the  best 
mode  of  forming  and  organizing  it.  Besides  the  general,  ad- 
ministrative, medical  staff,  and  engineers,  an  army  is  compo- 
sed of  corps  of  cavalry,  infantry  and  artillery.  Cavalry  we 
have  little  need  for;  the  enemy  cannot  send  against  us  any 
considerable  force  of  that  description  by  sea,  and  our  northern 
frontiers  are  unfavourable  to  its  movements.  Mounted  rifle- 
men  will  sufllce  for  every  purpose,  and  have  been  employed 
against  the  Indians,  and  even  against  the  British  troops,  at  the 
Moravian  towns,  with  great  effect.  But  where  cavalry  is 
necessary,  it  becomes  most  important  to  maintain  it  on  a  re- 
«.pectal)lc  footing  in  time  of  peace,  from  the  long  fraifiUig  and 
instruction  which  men  and  horses  recpiira,  and  the  difHcuIty 
of  organizing  it  at  the  moment  of  war. 

Kv^n  in  infantry  and  artillc".  from  the  nature  of  our 
nortliern  frontier,  which  is  only  assailable  on  some  points, 
(rom  the  immensity  of  our  western  deserts,  impervious  to  any 
( ivilized  enemy,  from  the  small  numbers  which  can  be  di- 
rected from  the  distant  regions  of  Europe  against  our  eastern 
or  southern  shores,*  wc  need  fewer  troops  than  any  nation 
possessing  a  military  force.     And  our  chief  and  ultimate  de- 

*  This  argtitnfint  I'ses  mucU  of  its  fori  p  il  the  British  acquire  Cnba. 


73 


Chap.  vi. 


fence,  as  we  have  observed,  rests  and  should  rest  upon  our 
militia. 

But  vvc  have  seen  that  the  militia  alone  is  not  sufficient  for 
that  purpose.     The  army,  therefore,  if  properly  organized 
^IL  a'system  concordant  with  our  republican  mst.tut.ons 
should  not  be  considered  as  the  sole  defensive  force  of  the 
nation  ;  but  as  the  firm  basis  on  which  that  force  .s  built,  th 
steady  centre  round  which  it  forms,  the  model  on  which  t 
should  be  organized.     The  free  and  armed  c.tizeiis  of  Ame- 
L  should  In  rise  to  defend  their  country  in  the  hour  of 
danger:  but  those  who  have  made  an  exclusive  and  particu- 
iar  study  of  the  art  of  war,  those  who  are  paid  and  appomted 
by  the  people  for  that  purpose,  should  stand  m   the    ront 
aLnst  the  first  attack,  cover  their  fellow-citizens  by  then- 
steadiness,  guide  them  by  their  experience,  and  give  them  the 
example  of  obedience  and  of  disciphne. 

The  soldiers  in  our  army  avc  raked  by  voluntary  enlistnrient 
at  high  premiums.   Beside,  being  very  expensive  this  method 
is  not  calculated  to  procure  .  chosen  quality  of  men.     \Ne 
certainly  think  that  the  annual  service  of  the  active  class  ol 
the  militia,  in  whatever  small  numbers    would  be  a  more  na- 
tional,  a  more  repubhcan  mode  of  hhng  the  ranks  o     Ik 
army,  and  give  it  a  higher  and  prouder  character.     But  as 
such  :  measure  would  be  unpopular,  even  on  the  sma  lies  sal 
and  as  we  need  but  few  troops,  we  may  expect  that    rom 
whatever  class  our  soldiers   are  drawn,  a  severe  d.sc.phne 
but  tending  to  exalt  the  pride  of  the  soldiers,  and  not  to  break 
their  spirit  with  harshness,  flogging,  and  ill  treatment,  a  pa- 
ternal and  constant  attention  to  their  interests,  a  certain  res- 
pectability given  to  the  military  character,  a  security  against 
d  stress  and  beggary  in  their  old  age,  and,  above  all,  forming 
a  good   corps  ol  otfircrs,  attached  to  their  profession  and 
pnnid  of  it,  will  suifice  to  make  a  good  anny,  even  out  o 
bad  elements.     It  is  to  be  hoped  that  such  a  Bpt.m  w  I 
prevent  those  murmurs,  discontents,  and  frequent  deseit.oni. 


Ch 


AP.   VI. 


76 


which  a  stranger  finds  with  surprise  in  the  troops  of  so  great 
and  noble  a  repubhc,  in  those  very  troops  who  have  so  glo- 
riously distingi.j  i:od  th.jmselves  and  their  country. 

On  the  otiicers  must  ultimately  depend  the  character  of  all 
troops,  and  if  we  can  secure  a  sufficient  number  of  good  offi- 
cers, soldiers  will  soon  be  formed.  There  are  two  modes  ot 
providing  an  army  with  experienced  and  instructed  officers, 
either  by  drawing  them  Irom  the  sub-officers  and  cadets  attach- 
ed to  each  company,  or  by  rearing  them  in  military  school?. 
There  is  a  third  mode,  indeed,  which  1  had  nearly  forgotten, 
and  which  is  much  practised  here  as  well  as  in  England ;  that  is, 
appointing  to  every  rank,  either  by  favour  or  interest,  without 
regarding  the  previous  qualities  or  information  of  the  candi- 
date, and  trusting  to  his  disinterested  zeal  for  acquiring  the 
means  of  promotion,  after  he  has  obtained  the  end. 

As  to  the  first  of  these  modes,  it  can  only  be  applicable  to 
the  service  of  the  line,  and  even  there,  only  in  a  country  where 
the  army  is  raised  by  the  conscription,  as  in  France,  and  com- 
prises in  the  ranks  men  of  all  descriptions  and  degrees  of  in- 
formation. A  few  promotions  amongst  the  most  able  and 
clever  sub-officers  would  tend  however  infinitely  to  exalt  the 
pride  and  character  of  the  soldier,  and  raise  his  profession  in 
his  own  eyes.  In  France,  most  of  our  general  and  superior 
officers  rose  from  that  rank. 

But  engineers  and  officers  of  artillery,  who  require  a  long 
and  scientific  education,  can  only  be  formed  in  mihtary  schools. 
And  for  several  reasons,  it  were  best  that  the  mass  of  our  offi- 
cers  should  also  be  drawn  from  those  establishments,  >vheie 
they  might  be  brought  acquainted,  more  or  less,  with  every 
branch  of  learning  belonging  to  their  profession,  and  with  <he 
general  theory  of  the  art  of  war;  a  knowledge  which  they  can 
scarcely  obtain  in  the  seclusion  and  constant  occupation  of  a 
regimental  life.  The  field  and  stall"  officers,  especially,  who 
are  generally  drawn  iV^m  -he  line,  would  not  have  to  acquire 
lliat  necessary  infoimauon  by  slow  and  paiafui  experience. 


77 


Chap.  vi. 


It  is  acknowledged  that  the  present  organization  of  our 
military  schools,  and  the  instruction  given  in  them  are  insuffi- 
dent.  But  after  the  excellent  report  of  the  secretary  of  wa, 
on  th  s  subject,  little  more  need  be  said.  If  its  v.ews  be 
adopted,  these  schools  will  be  amply  sufficient  for  every  pur- 
pose. 

Th-  greatest  difficulty  which  will  attend  their  organization 
on  thi  .ast  and  noble  plan,  will  be  the  little  encouragemen^^ 
which  they  will  afford  to  young  men  des.rou,  of  pursumgthe 
mUitar,  line,  from  the  small  number  of  scholars  wh"  can  be 
provided  for  on  the  present  scanty  establishment  of  the  na 
^onal  force,.  There  ,s  no  doubt  that  our  -J-f  -^  »-- 
requires  to  be  enlarged.  They  are  overloaded  withbusmess, 
and  what  they  can  do,  they  must  perform  a,  a  hasty,  msuffi- 
"ent  and  unsatisfactory  manner.     They  have  got  no  a,us  n,.- 

tl  French  engineers  had  in  the  regiments  of  sappers  and 
troops  of  the  aim  in  genie.  Ten  times  as  many  engmeer^ 
could  be  most  usefully  and  advantageously  '"-ployed  for  cml 
arwell  as  for  military  purposes,  and  no  money  could  be  la.d 
0  ,t  with  greater  profit  •,  for  the  order,  despatch  and  economy 
of  their  works  would  cover  the  expense  tenfold.  Nothing  .8 
more  expensive  than  bad.  and  nothing  more  economical  than 
<Tood  engineers. 

Most  liberal  encouragement  should  he  given  to  all  yoiing 
men  desii-ous  of  entering  these  schools,  and  on  leaving  them, 
tt,ey  should  be  free,  either  to  follow  the  line  of  public  ser- 
vce,  or  apply  their  ac,.ired  information  to  their   private 
advantage  in  the  construction  of  public  or  private  woifc, 
rids  bridges  canals,  manufactures,  &c.     The  state  govcrn- 
met:  Sr  rLtly  promote  this  o%ct,  by  employmg     e™ 
in  the  direction  of  their  public  works.     This  they  mignt  oo 
wth  great  advantage  and  economy,  and  America  has  labour 
Tf  Lfnature  to  perform  for  centuries,  be.ore  she  reaches  he 
.ummit  of  her  grandeur.    By  these  means  a  vast  fund  of  sc- 


M 


Chap. 


VI. 


78 


entific  mathemat.cal  learningw.il  be  disseminated  through  the 
country,  and  m  time  and  case  of  ne.  J,  every  youn  j  man  th  t 
brought  up,  may  serve  as  an  engineer  in  tL  defLTe  ofM 

taJ^r^r""'''.'^"'"  '*^*"  governments  would  generally 

government  and  c.rcumstances,  we  should  form  and  enter- 
tarn   a  great  number   of  good   officers    nn^   ,u 
safely  reduce  the  number  If  our  so  di  r^    that  t!"   ^^TJ 
necessity  of  creating  and  instructing  new     orps    w7V     m 
lather  diminish  the  forcp  fh.n  fK  ^  '  ^^  ^^"^"'^ 

and   battalion.  anVr;  *:"    LV^V"  1°"'  '"^^^•'- 

3teadi„ess,  would  proje  s'lffi'cieTtt    ^f  a^fe  c'e  f  "'"' 
important  point.     The  milifi,  u  aeience  on   every 

'roops   to 'guard  .hot,  T 'd^r;  '  C;?"  ^  ^cellent  .igh! 

Our  pre,e,,t  e,taUishm.„t  is  ckaily  i„.uffi,ie„,  tor  these 


79 


Chap. 


VI. 


purposes,  an^  if  further  reduced,    wll  become  absolutely 
TLs.     It  comprises  only  ...=  -H  bat.ahons  and  about  300 
offi  cr«  of  infant  y.     In  '>.  o(  v.  ar,  we  shall  need  a  d.v.s.on 
!f  the  army  at  NewO.  .ans.  supported  by  the  m.hfa  of 
Ll*lana"'Mi.sissipp.,  >    »a«a.  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
The  militia,  well  org..ni.e,<     .,ay  perhaps    -««   " 
defence  of  Florida,  Gergia  .  ,d  Carohna,  but  the  Chesapeak 
will  re,,uire  a  strong  div'    o  .    <  the  army  lo  cover  our  nafonal 
Islabh  hments,  the  seat  of  government,  and  the  nch  shores  of 
th     bay.    (Maryland  should  be  attached  to  Ih.s  d.v.s.onO 
n  our  northern  department,  Ohio,  '"'«»- ^'^f^'^^'SX^.'" 
which  the  Illinois  and  Missouri  territor.es  should  be  attached  ) 
7    nire  a  division  of  the  army  to  garrison  our  '"d'a-'f™"*'" 
olhe  Yellow  Stone  river,  and  in  time  "(^^M^^J^^ 
militia  of  these  states,  pour  upon  Upper  Canada.     Another 
"le  required  on  the  Hudson,  on  the  Df--' '»"'=- 
E    -I  .nd  covering  Boston  and  Rhode  Island,  and  another  on 
fh  '  olern  fronfier  of  New-York  and  Vermont.     It  .s  ev.- 
den    that  40  battalions  and  1000  officers  w.U  scarcely  be 
slcent  for  this  service,  even  if  the  militia  be  -  .mproved 
a,  to  give  some  reliance  on  its  service  and  co-operal  on. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  we  should  therefore  mamtain  that 
1    ber     Lll  as\t  is,  in   time  of  peace,  but  we  shodd 
always  have  the  means  of  completing  .t  immediately   in  the 

approach  of  war. 

For  that  purpose  we  might  maintain  twenty  battalions,  re- 
duced to  haff  the  number  of  privates,  a  force  Uttle  supenor  o 
'Xt  we  maintam  at  present,  but  fully  officered,and  even  att    h 
to  each  of  them  a  certain  number  of  supernumerary  ofhcers 
As  soon  as  we  determine  on  raising  the  army  to  the  war 
Establishment,  these  battahons  should  be  completed,  organ 
.edin  brigades  and  divisions,  and  encamped,  whilst  the  super- 
rumerary  officers  and  sub-officers,  detached  w.thsome  chosen 
XCeceiveand  incorporate  tl-^.-crmts  and  organ, 
twenty  other  battalions.     If  the  military  depots  be  amply 


\6r — 


Chap.  vi. 


80 


prvvidcti  with  arms,  clothing,  equipment,  lield  equipages,  kc, 
h  IS  iiiconceivable  in  how  short  a  time  this  may  be  done.  I 
have  seen  corps  thus  formed  with  good  elements,  ready  to 
appear  in  the  ticld  in  the  course  of  a  few  weeks.  The  num- 
ber of  officers  required  in  such  an  organization  of  the  army 
will  occasion  a  trifling  augmentation  in  its  expense,  but  of  no 
moment,  when  compared  with  the  advantage  of  having  all  its 
cadrt  ready  formed  at  the  moment  of  war.  The  economy  of 
time  and  expense,  thus  procured,  will  be  understood  by  all 
who  know  the  value  of  foresight  and  order,  and  the  superior 
quality  of  such  troops,  by  all  mMitary  men.  In  fact,  new 
corps  will  otherwise  be  no  bett'^r  at  first  than  the  militia,  and 
caanot  support  it. 

I  need  scarcely  add  that  depots  of  ordnance,  arms  and 
ammunition,  approvisionment  and  forage,  clothing  and  equip- 
ment, shoul.1  be  formed  at  the  same  time,  and  placed  at  a 
secure  distance  behind  the  armies,  with  some  safe  and  easy 
communication  between  them.  All  roads  and  canals,  ne- 
cessary for  the  a.^mies  to  communicate,  should  be  opened, 
and  the  time  requisite  for  such  movements  be  calculated  with 
precision. 

We  may  then  securely  brave  any  invasion  of  our  territo- 
ry; for  before  the  enemy  can  have  made  an  imprc5-IoM  on 
those  important  points,  which  deserve  to  attract  his  (ilforls, 
and  which  will,  l>y  that  time,  bo  fortilied,  a  corps  of  expe- 
rienced soldiers,  'ed  by  military  chiefs,  and  supported  by  the 
militia  of  the  neighbouring  states,  will  move  against  him  ;  and 
we  trust  that,  in  the  contest,  the  spirit  of  patriotism  and  the 
i:onsciousncs<«  n'  t'  noble  cause  which  they  defend,  will 
'Misurc  ;  icrory  U:  our  troops  and  to  the  American  flag. 

\V(j  cannot  however  entirely  prevent  England  from  haras- 
^lingour  coasts  h)  siuall  predatory  expeditions,  putting  us  there- 
l»v  lo  great  trouble  and  expense,  and  fatiguing  our  militia  by 


»1 


Chap.  vi. 


*-i 


frequent  duty,  marches  and  countermarches.     But  we  can  re- 
taliate severely  upon  her.     Our  numerous  privateers  and  our 
na.y  can  pursue  and  ahaost  destroy  her  trade  on   every  sea, 
alarm  her  on  her  own  coasts,  and  oblige  her  to  divide  her 
naval  forces  in  every  quarter.     We  can  menace  her  coloniesj 
we  can  conque-  Canada.     Invasion  and  conquest  may  seem  a 
measure  contrary  to  our  republican  institutions.     But  in  fact 
this  movement  would  be  a  defensive   measure ;  for  by  the 
natural   situation  of  Canada,   the    British   keep   our  whole 
northern  frontier  from  Maine  to  Illinois  in  a  constant  state 
of  alarm,  and  carry  their  hostilities  in  every  part  of  it,  oblige 
us  to  maintain  on  that  immense  frontier  a  great  naval  and 
military  force,  divide  our  moans  and  attention,  and  surround 
our  country  ;  whilst  by  occupying  Quebec,  or  Montreal,  or 
any  single  point  on  the  eastern  extremity  of  that  line,  we 
secure  the  whole  of  our   northern  and  western  frontier  for 
ever,  and  are  enabled  to  turn  all  our  means  and  attention  to 
the  protection  of  our  sea-coast.     The  rest  of  Canada  must 
fall  under  the  well  managed  efforts  of  any  o.ie  of  our  western 
states.     We  trust  that,  by  a  system  of  defence  thus  organized 
and  conducted,  Britain  would  soon  be  v,eary  of  a  fruitless  and 
hopeless  contest,  where  the  only  injury  she  could  do  us,  in- 
terrupting our  trade,  would  be  returned  upon  her  tenfold,  and 
where  she  would  find  herself  unable  to  stop  the  progress  of 
our  country,  or  hurt  its  vital  interestB. 

Such,  in  the  moment  of  war,  will  be  the  result  of  forming 
a  good  military  rntfiblishment.  But  is  it  necessary,  even  in 
time  of  peace,  that  the  army  should  remain  a  dead  load  upon 
the  nation  ?  Undoubtedly  not.  The  life  of  a  soldier  slu.uld 
be  a  life  of  constant  labour  and  txercise.  Turn  these  to  the 
public  account.  The  Romans,  occupied  with  incessant  la- 
hours,  never  suffered  from  diseases  in  their  armies,  whilst  in 
Europe  they  are  more  destructive  than  war.  And  the  listless 
indolc!)ce  of  a  garrison  life,  in  the  wilderness  of  our  frontiers, 
would  be  iniupvorlablc,  without  oomr  employment,  to  keep 

up  the  health  and  spirits  of  the  soldier. 

1 1 


II  ' 


ii! 


Chap.  vi. 


82 


In  summer  they  should  be  employed  under  the  direction  of 
engineers  in  opening  roads  and  canals,  and  constructing 
bridges  and  fortifications.  The  axe  and  shovel  should  be  as 
famiK  >r  to  their  hands  as  the  musket  and  bayonet.  And  as 
the  oftoers  shiuld  all  be  acquainted  with  the  elements  of 
field  fortification,  these  habits  would  be  of  incalculable  value 
in  time  of  war.  In  the  intervals  of  labour,  military  exer- 
cises, swimming,  shooting  at  a  mark,  &c.  should  fill  every  mo- 
ment, and  the  scrubbing,  polishing,  and  all  the  coxcombry  of 
dress  with  which  they  are  kept  occupied  in  Europe,  be  given 
up.  It  is  a  fact,  however  ridiculous,  that  elegant  white  un- 
dresses were  given  to  several  British  regiments  of  cavalry,  to 
employ  the  soldiers  in  cleaning  them.  Nothing  should  be 
plainer  than  a  soldier's  dress.  Convenience  and  uniformity 
should  be  its  sole  beauty. 

It  will  be  highly  useful  to  accustom  them  to  remain  under 
tents  during  a  part  of  that  season.  Tents  were  latterly  quite 
unknown  in  the  French  army.  During  five  years  service  I 
never  saw  one.  Curtailing  all  the  necessaries  of  life  in  that 
manner,  certainly  facilitated  ihe  rapidity  of  our  movements, 
but  at  an  immense  waste  of  health  and  life. 


I 


The  leisure  of  winter  should  be  consecrated  to  forming  the 
moral  character  and  habits  of  the  soldier,  and  instructing  him 
theoretically  in  his  service.  The  sub-oflicers  especially 
should  be  examined  on  all  the  branches  of  their  duty.  Regi- 
mental  schools  on  the  Lancasterian  plan,  where  all  the  sol- 
diers should  be  taught  at  least  to  read,  write,  and  account, 
rcf^imental  libraries  for  the  use  of  the  officers,  where  books 
of  history,  geography,  mathematics,  and  all  kinds  of  military 
works  should  be  at  their  disposal,  would  be  of  incalculable 
benefit,  and  serve  to  substitute  the  habits  of  decency,  order, 
discipline  and  morality,  to  that  drunkenness,  to  that  gambling 
and  dissipation  in  which  ignorance  and  indolence  so  frequently 
plunge  the  military.  Libraries  might  even  be  established  for 
the  men  ;  it  in  done  in  England.     That  idea  might  be  carried 


r 


E'^.'.Si^saiiU— ■^■-■>-  ...*-;^_...^-. 


83 


Chap.  vi. 


I 


much  farther.  These  schools  might  he  of  use  to  the  neigh- 
bouring population,  in  those  remote  districts  where  our  troops 
are  usually  quartered,  and  the  regiments  become  centres  of 
morality  and  instruction,  instead  of  being,  as  they  usually  are, 
centres  of  vice  and  corruption. 

And  would  an  order  of  men  so  constituted  and  so  employ- 
ed be  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  their  country  ?  Would 
t  he  mon^y  expended  in  qualifying  them  to  lead  and  direct 
the  cffbits  of  their  inexperienced  fellow-citizens,  in  the  mo- 
ment of  danger,  be  wasted  ?  No.  Far  from  forming  a  hete- 
rogeneous clement  in  the  constitution  of  the  republic,  such  an 
army  would  be  the  most  powerful  instrument  of  her  defence 
in  time  of  war,  and  in  time  of  peace  a  most  useful,  respecta- 
ble and  honourable  class  of  citizens.  If  attacked  by  regular 
disciplined  forces,  we  must  have  forces  of  the  same  nature  to 
repel  them,  and  if  it  is  better  to  have  a  good  than  a  bad  army, 
better  to  beat  than  to  be  beaten,  we  must  train  and  discip- 
line them  in  time  of  peace  to  render  their  service  effective 
in  time  of  war. 


Let  us,  therefore,   in  viewing  the  ambitious  and  disorga- 
nizing designs  of  Britain,  her  immense  means,  her  prepara- 
tions for  warfare,  and  the  rapid  improvements  of  her  milita- 
ry system,  neither  abandon  ourselves  to  supine  indolence,  re- 
main unarmed  and  unpreparf^d  until  the  blow  be  struck,  nor 
yield  to  terror  and  despondency  q*\  measuring  the  present 
disparity  of  our  forces.     Let  us  bo'\  are  of  any  insidious  at- 
tack against  our  union;  let  tjs  never  separate  our  interests,  bu* 
organize  ourselves,  and  forlify  our  frontiers,  diffuse  military 
knowledge  by  met:  s  of  our  military  schools,  and  remedy  the 
radical  d^ifects  of  oui  mtiitia  system,  foster  <he  infant  estab- 
lishments o,"  jur  navy,  and  give  every  encouragement  to  those 
brave  mv a  '  ii  * 'lefen  ■   the  republic  in  the  hour  of  danger. 
Le?  us  no^  iaUa  pinimony  for  economy,  nor  indolenc    i")r 
security,  auci  we  have  nolUing  to  fear.     We  h^vc  the  noblest 


Chap. 


VI. 


U 


Country  and  cause  to  defend  that  ever  nerved  the  hand  or 
fired  the  heart  of  patriot  soldier.  The  future  happiness 
and  hberty  of  the  human  race  are  perhaps  confided  to  Ame- 
rica. She  will  not  betray  the  trust.  Jf  we  do  not  fail  to 
ourselves,  wc  may  defy  excvy  enemy,  and  support  against  an 
opposmg  world  tha  standard  of  freedom  and  Washington. 


and  or 

»piness 
Amc- 
fail  to 

nst  an 

)n. 


NOTES. 


NOTE  F. 

Chapter  i.  pauk   11. 

TuE  work  of  Chevalier  Dupin  has  excited  great  attention  in  France. 
The  duke  of  Ragusa,  (Marshal  Miirniont)  who  had  heen  reared  with 
Napoleon  in  the  military  school  of  BryenJie,  and  besran  his  service  in  the 
artillery,  presented  to  tiie  Institute  a  very  able  report  on  that  work,  of 
which  I  have  subjoined  a  translation  in  the  Appendix,  (No.  1  )  From  the 
quap'.ity  of  technical  words,  and  formal  phrases  which  it  contains,  I  found 
it  very  dillicnlt  to  translate,  neither  do  I  always  ai;ree  with  his  excellency's 
opinions.  His  observations  are  sometimes  trifling,  and  hij  encomiums 
exaggerated.  But  his  report  gives  a  very  full  idea  of  the  pre  lent  iDilitary 
force,  and  milil;iry  improvements  of  Britain  ;  it  contains  i"mportant  facts 
and  matter.  N<'<;lecting  therefore  all  ornaments  ol  style,  I  have  confined 
myself  to  rendeiinj;  its  meaning  as  closely,  as  strictly  and  as  literally  a» 
was  in  my  power. 

NOTE  II. 

Chap.  I.  paire  Id.— This  expression  may  seem  rather  strong  in  this 
country,  where  we  are  too  apt  to  borrow  from  English  writers  all  our 
ootions  of  England.  I  do  not  mean  to  deny  that  the  Enirlish  troops 
were  always  very  brave,  very  well  drilled,  wi  II  paid,  well  ft-d,  well 
clothfnl,  and  made  not  only  a  very  handsome  appearance  on  the  parade, 
but  a  very  respectable  one  on  the  field  of  buttle.  But  down  to  the 
present  day,  there  existed  no  military  establishments,  no  schools,  no  mili- 
tary instruction  in  Britain.  The  standing  army  was  M-arccly  tolerated  by 
the  people ;  the  officers  were  very  ignorant  of  the  grand  principles  of  their 
profession,  and  pnnr  i»d  merely  by  wealth  or  parliamentary  inlhience. 
Lloyd  is  the  only  L.np'i):  tiu-lician  worth  luentionhig.  Their  military 
ailminisfralinn  was  proiuse  and  extravagant ;  their  artillery  oHie(!rs  were 
mere  cannon  firers  ;  their  engineei.  .tp  to  this  day  the  worst  in  Europe, 
and  even  in  the  Spanish  wn-  proved  in  the  sieges  of  Badajoz,  Burgos,  and 
St.  giebastian,  their  ignorance  and  incapacity.    The  profusion  of  biwod 


i.%1i^*.«*i.A- 


(Hi 


if  1' 


which  was  spilt  in  these  sieges  and  in  the  ridiculous  assault  of  Bergen-Op- 
Zootn,  was  entirely  owing  to  these  blunders. 

Military  m  ience  in  modern  times  first  began  to  be  cultivated  after  the 
barbarous  ages  of  cliivahy  in  the  Spanish  and  the  Italian  armies  of  Fer- 
dinand and  Charles  the  Vth,  led  by  Gonzalvo,  De  Ley  va,  Pescara,  &c.  In 
the  civil  and  religious  wars  of  the  Netherlands  and  Germany,  under 
prince  Maurice  of  Nassau,  D'Alva,  Parma,  Wallenstein,  but  especially 
underGustavus  Ad(.lphusof  Sweden,  and  the  generals  whom  he  formed, 
its  theory  was  more  deeply  studied  ;  campaigns  were  calculated  and 
movements  combined.  Those  great  generals  had  meditated  upon  the 
tactics  of  the  ancients,  and  adapted  theirs  to  the  nature  of  the  arms  then 
used.  In  the  next  century,  the  whole  science  assumed  a  new  form,  from 
the  vast  improvements  which  took  place  in  the  armament  of  the  troops, 
and  more  especially  in  the  artillery;  from  the  general  progress  of  wealth, 
science  and  industry,  the  greater  means  putinthehands  of  the  sovereigns, 
and  the  creation  of  the  corps  of  engineers  under  Vauban.  France,  under 
Louis  XIV.,  became  the  military  model  of  Europe.  Spain  and  Holland 
had  declined,  Austria  had  numerous  and  good  armies,  but  France  alone 
had  great  and  scientitic  military  establishments,  military  instruction,  a 
good  corps  of  engineers  and  artillery,and  a  general  system  of  fortification. 
It  IS  needless  to  cite  the  names  ef  Turenne  and  Conde,  Luxembourg, 
Villars,  Catmat,  Berwick,  Vendome,  kc.  In  the  next  century,  Frederic 
of  Prussia  improved  the  tactics  of  the  field,  almost  to  perfection, 
although  m  the  grand  combinations  of  a  campaign,  his  conceptions  were 
not  so  vast  as  those  of  the  French  revolutionary  generals:  Russia  and 
Prussia,  two  new  nations,  appeared  on  the  political  scene  of  Europe  with 

Xr  I'd '"^^'r';;!  ^""!^'"S '""'••^-    The  armies  of  France  had  declined 
fn  tlft  «    Marshal  Saxe,  but  her  military  establishments  and 

en  thr.W  r  u."' ''''  P"'"''  "^  '"«  Revolution,  enabled  her  to 
repel  he  efforts  of  all  Europe,  and  to  organize  those  means  by  which 
8he  p  ayed  so  great  a  part  in  the  subse.juent  years.  Since  the  fall  of 
e'^ril: hrr^  powers  of  Europe  are  endeavouring  to  imitate  thost 

During  all  this  time  England  never  figured  as  a  military  power     In  her 

on  bXid "*"p'"'  "[/"'^  ''"^^"•y- '''  -^y  """^  skm,Ts  displayed 
aUhoulh  a  man  ff"""]  """''  ''•''-' ^^-^-^  -^  Cromwell  himsdf 
a  though  a  man  of  prodigious  natural  genius,  were  no  tacticians-  thei 


87 

Henrys,  to  that  of  Wellington,  but  Marlborough  was  formed  under 
Tarenne,  who  foretold  that  he  would  one  day  succeed  him.  In  the  next 
generation,  the  valour  of  the  British  troops  and  the  incapacity  of  their 
commanders,  were  equally  displayed  at  Fontenoy  and  Dettingen.  A 
handful  of  highlanders  were  near  overturning  the  British  empire,  threw 
the  whole  country  in  terror  and  dismay,  and  their  defeat  procured  to  the 
duke  of  Cumberland  a  most  ridiculous  and  exaggera.tcd  reputation, 
which  he  lost  at  Closterseven. 

Under  the  administration  of  Chatham  the  victories  of  the  British 
troops  in  America  were  extravagantly  praised  by  the  vanity  and  ignorance 
of  the  national  writers.  And  yet  in  the  conquest  of  Havana  and  Canada 
their  generals  committed  blunders  that  would  have  disgraced  a  schoolboy- 
But  the  superiority  of  their  navy  assured  them  an  easy  victory  over  an 
enemy  who  could  receive  no  supplies,  and  the  heroic  death  of  the  young 
Wolfe,  in  the  first  battle  wbere  he  commanded,  eclipsed  the  fame  of  his 
much  more  skilful  and  able  rival,  Montcalm,  who,  with  a  handful  of  men, 
had  triumphed  during  three  years  over  all  the  British  forces  in  America. 
J" 

During  the  revolutionary  war,  the  blunders  of  the  English  generaU 
were  still  greater :  nothing  could  equal  the  ignorance  and  presumption  of 
Howe,  Clinton,  Comwallis  and  Burgoyne :  their  vague,  desultory,  unsys- 
tematical  movements,  without  object  or  combination,  which  terminated 
in  the  disgraceful  inactivity  of  the  two  former,  and  the  s  ';il!  more  disgrace- 
ful capture  of  the  two  latter,  present  a  singular  contrast  to  those  which 
the  untutored  genius  of  Washington,  Greene,  Gates,  kc.  suggested  to 
the  Americans. 


It  was  during  the  French  revolutionary  war,  and  very  slowly  and  gra- 
dually, that  the  British  armies  began  to  be  improved,  and  their  military 
establishmonts  to  assume  a  regular  and  scientific  form.  Indeed,  so  im- 
periously was  their  attention  drawn  to  this  object,  by  the  great  contest  in 
which  they  were  involved,  and  so  universal  were  those  military  improve- 
ments to  which  France  led  the  way,  that  their  armies  must  necessarily 
have  been  ameliorated.  I  believe  that  under  the  administration  of  the 
Duke  of  York,  they  beg.in  to  improve  their  military  system  In  Belgium, 
their  troops  made  a  very  poor  figure ;  but  in  Egypt,  under  Sir  Sidney 
Smith,  Abercrombie  and  Hutchinson,  they  appeared  respectably,  and  in 
Spain,  under  Moore,  and  especially  under  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  they 
finally  equalled  the  best  troops  in  Europe.  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  ia 
all  their  recent  improvements,  they  have  chieflv  imitated  the  French. 


as 


W  ' 


NOTE  III. 

Chap  1.  page  i9._The  finances  of  Great  Britain  present  certainly  an 
artifical  and  nnaginary  wealth,  which,  like  the  collection  of  the  electric 
fluid,  may  be  discharged  at  a  single  shock.  Is  th«  artificial  credit  of  her 
paper  money  boundless  and  exhaustless  ?     We  know  that  she  can  never 

Ere  f  !-.t       ■      '■'"  ^'"^  ^^"'••*  '"^  '""'^^^'^  't  '•*  ^i"'  by  paying  the 

Crv  .  nv"  TFf^  '"'^  ''"^'^'""^  "'^'"^"  ^''"^^  J^"  trade  »nd  in- 
dustry,  additionally  loaded,  must  diminish,  and  those  of  the  rest  of  the 

rvmenr'^M'  ?'  "PP'-°^^-hinS  resumption  or  non-resumption  of  cash 
pa5  ments,  w,il  perhaps  decide  this  question  ;  but  this  is  not  the  only  view 
in  which  It  should  be  considered. 

^iT'f';^  ^^"^''"'^  is  not  entirely  artificial:  The  knowledge,  the 
Sc  len  :17"T'  """r  ^"'  '"'"^'^y  «^  *h«  P«°P'«'  -  --'*h  her 
Phed  to  her  I'r  "?""""■■'' '^  "'^'^'^ '  '^'  P°'^- "^  machinery  ap- 
C  000  000  ,7;;;;'^^^"^^^'  :=^«'  «--«>  years  ago.  equal  to  the  labour  of 
Ind  r;ch^nd-      '  T  '  •  ^'l"  "^'^  ^''''  ""^'^h ;  and  the  actual  riches 

but aS    H,      f  "" il"'-?^  "'"  *"  ^•^^  ^''"^'^  "f -t'""»'  bankruptcy ; 
but  after.t,th.s  real  wealth  will  remain,  increased  in  its  value,and  the  repro- 
duang  powers  freed  from  the  immense  load  with  which  th  y  ar   ch    g  d 
may  possibly  begin  to  act  with  renovated  energy.    Every  individualTn  Bri 

Zlu  T  ,'  '"sses  repaired,  before  trade  has  decidedly  run  in 
another  channel,  provided  the  government  does  not  turn  those  ve  y  means 
.n  another  d.rectioir,  and  afford,  in  war  and  plunder,  a  career  toThTde  ! 
perate  enterprise  of  the  people. 

If  this  great  change  should  be  accompanied  by  an  amelioration  of  the 
go  er„,„ent  ,t  should  be  desired  by  all  good  m.  n,  and  especially  by  aS 
good  Englishmen.     But  if  that  government  survives  the  shock,  it  wilf  fo 
a  time,  be  stronger  than  ever.     Freed  from  its  load  of  debt,  i  wm  have 

:iit"rtr:r  f rr'  ^^^  "'^•^"^'  '^^^ '« ^pp— .  ^^ "-- :: 

a  mv  wit    ,1  r' "^    '^^^^  '''  ^^'^  '"'  ""d  •^'^'^t'  »»«  "«vy  and 

a  my,  „,th  all  their  immense  materid,  exist,  and  are  devoted  to  them  • 

!„     mL.  .'        "«"-'="'"'"'«**'"n«d  officers  and  privates,  5852  officers 
and  ll,m  horses,  of  which  l.o,.58,  with  8516  foot  guards,  ^erve  in  Eng-' 


89 

laud,  18,»i3  in  Ireland,  18,280  in  India,  Sic.  Add  to  these  the  navy,  colo* 
nial  corps,  the  native  troops  of  Hindostan,  the  HaDOverian  army,  inc. 
and  this  is  the  state  of  ^teace. 

They  will  be  enabled  to  strengthen  this  army,  by  the  very  misery  of 
the  people ;  and  thousands  after  thousands  of  starving  wretches,  when 
England  coases  to  be  a  mauuficturing  and  industrious  country,  will  seek 
for  employment  in  its  ranks,  and  be  maintained  at  foreign  expense.  That 
{government  exerts  at  present  its  power,  by  the  expensive  system  of  cor- 
rupting the  people;  it  may  then  throw  off  the  mask,  and  rule  by  open 
force.  In  the  mean  time,  it  has  interested  almost  every  class,  in  keeping 
up  the  deception  ;  even  the  poor,  empowered  to  vest  in  the  public  funcTs, 
as  corporate  bodies,  the  economies  which  they  had  laid  up  in  the  saving 
banks,  are  thereby  interested  in  maintaining  the  present  system.  Those 
economies  were  stated,  in  the  course  of  last  year,  to  have  amounted, 
in  England  alone,  to  £1,254,000  sterling. 


NOTE  IV. 

Chap.  2.  pagt  24. — List  of  articles  shipped  to  the  continent  by  Great 
Britain,  from  the  year  1808  to  1813.    Laid  before  parliament. 


Countries. 

i'annon. 

Muskets. 

Barrels  of 
powder. 

Cannon  I    _  Dozen.s  of 
cart.     1  musket  cart. 

Russia, 

Prussia, 

Sweden, 

Spain, 

Portugal, 

Germany, 

148 
105 

545 
14 

22 

117,270 
1,417,270 
1,417.270 
7,512,000 
1,380,000 
1,390,000 

8*0 
12,000 

4,000 
45,000 

2,817 
13,200 

242,112 
34,750 

471,<j23 

2,396 
i^J,800 

7,135,600 
17,44)5,600 

9,950,000 
90,180.000 
19,000,000 
18,000,000 

Total, 

834 

13,234,110* 

77,317 

754,681 

161,761,200 

NOTE  V. 

Chap.  4.  pai^e  54.— The  military  establishments  of  France,  the  firit 
incontestably  in  Europe,  were  administered  with  the  strictest  econo- 
my and  the  most  admirable  regularity.  It  was  by  that  economy  alone 
that  she  was  enabled  to  bring  them  to  such  strength  and  |)erfection.  Her 
fortifications  were  constructed  at  une-third  cheaper  than  those  of  the 

*  The  French  arsenals  in  the  whole  empire  of  Napoleon,  with  the  aid  of  all  the 
privati  fabrics,  iiiid  in  the  period  of  their  greatest  atiivity,  could  only  fabricat* 
;JUO,000  musketi  in  a  year.     Wbiib  was  the  most  coloisal  power?  which  of  the  two 


I 


m ! 


90 

other  powers  on  the  eontinent,  and  probably  ten  times  cheaper  than  ours. 
It  was  by  these  means  that  Vauban  was  enabled  to  repair  three  hundred 
and  build  thirty-five  fortresses  on  a  general  system  of  defence  round  her 
frontiers,  a  measure  (we  cannot  repeat  it  too  often)  which  saved  France 
at  the  time  of  the  revolution.  The  simplicity  and  economy  of  that  ad- 
ministr-ition,  was  brought  under  the  empire  of  Napoleon  to  still  greater 
perfection. 

Before  any  permanent  work  was  undertaken,  its  utility,  in  the  general 
system  of  defence,  and  the  purpose  and  object  for  which  it  was  to  be 
erected,  were  long  and  scrupulously  debated.  The  expense  was  then 
calculated  with  the  nicest  accuracy  and  most  exact  detail,  entering  into 
all  the  el^nents  of  which  that  expensie  was  to  consist.  A  long  expe- 
rience had  fixed  the  principles  of  tuese  valuations.  The  purpose  and  ex- 
pense were  then  compared,  the  funds  provided,  and  not  a  spade  nor  hoe 
was  allowed  to  touch  the  ground  till  these  were  ascertained. 

The  sarrie  order  and  the  same  economy  prevailed  in  all  the  other 
branches  of  tlie  service,  the  fabrications  of  the  artillery,  the  approvi- 
sionment  of  all  the  national  and  regimental  stores,  and  arsenals,  kc. 
The  funds  were  provided  upon  the  closest  estimates,  their  employ  was 
constantly  inspected  by  the  numerous  officers  nf  the  administration,  and 
superior  officers,  who  mutually  watched  each  other.  And  yet  on  the 
funds  thus  furnished,  the  regimental  administrations  generally  contrived 
to  make  yearly  economies,  which  were  emp'  ■'.  in  interior  improve- 
ments or  laid  up  for  unforeseen  occasions.  "W .  n  the  regiment  in  which 
I  began  my  service,  the  8th  chassfurs,  was  destroyed  in  Russia,  a  long 
course  of  admiuistratlTe  economy  had  so  amply  provided  our  stores  with 
armament,  clothing,  equipment  for  men  and  horses,  &.c.  thst  we  were 
enabled  to  reorganize  it  in  a  few  weeks,  with  very  little  aid  from  govern- 
ment, and  send  to  the  army  five  hundred  men,  completely  appointed.  Tlie 
Russian  and  Prussian  armies  were  the  cheapest  in  Europe.  The  Russian 
army  about  50  years  ago  comprised  150,000  men,  and  cost  $6,000,000  ; 
the  Prussian,  under  Frederick  the  Great,  ir.0,000  men,  and  co-st 
511,000,000;  the  Austrian  gl2,000,000.  But  these  nations  had  only 
armies,  and  few  military  establishments,  schools,  fortifications,  arsenals;, 
and  those  of  inferior  quality.  It  must  be  observed,  that  their  armies  were 
all  formed  on  a  militia  system,  and  recruited  by  the  railitia. —  Vide  Gui- 
hert,  Miraheau,  ^c. 


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NOTE  vr. 

Chap.  4.  page  54. — Mr.  Dupin,  in  the  second  part  of  his  Travels 
m  England,  which  !s  more  exclusively  Uescrj{)livc  of  the  state  of  htr 


.ii 


91 

ttaval  establishments,  quotes  a  very  remarkable  pa&sage  from  the  vcport 
of  the  coramissionerg,  charged  in  1806  to  examine  the  best  rneans  ot 
drawing  the  theory  of  naval  constructions  from  the  state  of  iniancy  in 
which  it  was  yet  in  Great  Britain.    In  that  report,  printed  by  order  ol 
parliament,  they  say  :  "The  theory  of  naval  constructions  has  been  car- 
"  ried  to  greater  perfection  in  France  than  any  where  else.     V\  hen  we 
«  built  ships  on  the  exact  model  of  the  French  sliips  which  we  had  taken, 
»  and  that  we  joined  our  talent  for  practical  execution  to  the  theoretical 
«  knowledge  of  our  rivals,  the  vessels  which  we  constructed  vvere  acknow- 
"  ledged  to  be  the  best  in  our  navy."    What  a  crowd  of  reflections  must 
arise  in  our  minds  in  reading  this  passage.    Notwithstanding  the  hig''  re- 
putation and  immense  force  of  their  navy,  the  Eng'-.sh  acknowledge  that 
they  have  yet  much  to  learn,  and  do  not  disdain  to  take  lessons  from  fo- 
reigner., and  even  from  enemies.    Thus  did  the  Romans  m  antiquity: 
thus  should  do  every  wise  and  enlightened  nation. 


NOTE  VII. 

Ghap.  5.  page  64.-This  important  rule,  to  construct  e«n-y  fort  in  tho. 
country,  with  a  view  to  the  part  which  it  is  destined  to  act  in  the  genera 
system  of  the  national  defence,  cannot  be  too  much  insisted  upon    f  rom 
having  neglected  to  organise  such  a  system,  on  proper  and  scientific  sur- 
veys, the  greatest  part,  perhaps  the  whole  of  our  defensive  ^vorks,  after 
all  the  expeiuhture  which  has  been  lavished  upon  them,  will  be  found 
unfit  for  the  purposes  to  which  they  are  destined.    They  were  n  erd> 
erected  with  a  view  to  rov«r  certain  points,  but  not  with  a  view  to  the 
part  wliich  those  points  were  to  act,  to  their  properties  and  j'^  ^tions  with 
each  other,  as  Rrand  depots  of  military  or  naval  means,  points  of  aUa  k 
or  of  descent,  in  first  or  second  line,  supporting  <.r  supported,  covtnn^ 
conimuuK-ations,  movements,  or  destined  to  concentrate  forces,  &ic.   1  he 
detail  of  these  principles  would  be  endless. 


NOTE  VIII. 

Ckat>  W  pa'-e  <'.r».-If  the  memoirs,  charts,  and  plans  contained  in  the 
topo^phicaUffice,  bn  not  kept  with  care,  a.id  fall  into  t-aduM-ous  and 

I'hfld,  or  even  into  imprudent  hands,  they  may  be  P-d-t.  of  t  ^ 
most  serious  evils,  aad  direct  the  enemy  in  ^-^ '"^"^^  ^^^^^ 
convenience  whiob  will  .-suit  from  such  carelessness,  will  »-  ''•-  "^  '^^^ 
and  imm.-nse  loss  of  time  squandered  in  doing  over  and  over  the  same 
"rloys  when  works  are  to  b«  erected.     Indeed,  the  -^vantage  of  ha.ng 

all  the  basis  and  preliminaries  of  every  enterprise,  of  cverj  plan  ol  cam 


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paign,  of  every  civil  or  military  work,  thus  drawn  out  and  laid  down  he 
forehand,  is  so  clear  that  it  requires  no  comment. 


NOTE  IX. 

Chap.  0.  pagt  66. — In  pursuing  a  course  of  experiments  and  improve- 
ments, which  is  always  a  useful  occupation,  our  artillery  should  however 
remember  that  our  military  instruction  is  yet  in  its  infancy,  nor  wait  t«> 
establish  our  system  of  artillery  ou  a  uniform,  simple  and  convenient 
footing,  till  they  have  run  over  the  same  round  of  errors  and  trials  which 
have  brought  at  length  the  European  artillery  to  such  a  state  of  formida- 
ble perfection  The  first  and  essential  point  is  to  render  our  artillery  uni- 
form, so  that  as  many  pieces  and  wheels  as  possible  may  be  the  same  in 
all  the  calibers  both  of  cannons  and  caissons,  and  thus  replaced  wirh  ease 
when  any  one  is  put  out  of  service,  shattered,  worn  or  broken.  In  fixing 
on  a  system  of  artillery,  we  had  best  begin  by  profiting  of  the  experience 
of  Europe.  We  can  hardly  expect  to  imagine  any  thing  which  has  not 
been  imagined  and  tried  under  every  form  in  the  course  of  three  centu- 
ries of  uninterrupted  experiments,  intense  meditations,  and  constant  im- 
provements in  France.  And  after  all  the  wars  of  the  revolution,  in  every 
climate,  in  every  nature  of  soil  and  country,  mountains,  plains,  marshes 
and  deserts,  the  French  artillery,  the  most  scitntific  in  Europe,  have  uni- 
formly come  to  the  conclusion  that  its  system,  with  very  slight  improve- 
ments, was  brought  to  perfection  about  forty  or  fifty  yenrs  ago,  under  the 
direction  of  the  celebrated  Gribeauval.  The  improvementB  which  some 
officers  of  brilliant  talent  and  imagination,  Montalembert,  Congreve, 
be.  have  since  attempted,  have  generally  been  given  up  as  futile  and  in- 
convenient. 


NOTE  X. 


Chap  5.  pa^e  70. — In  the  course  of  this  work,  I  have  always  considered 
tlie  ordnance  department  as  distinjfuished  from  the  artillery  ;  but  why 
they  are  thus  divided  in  two  departments  I  could  never  understand. 
England  is  the  only  country  of  Europe  where  this  dis,iOBition  exists,  either 
because  it  was  so  established  at  first,  or  because  it  was  thouglit  that  the 
immense  quantity  of  armament  which  'iliat  country  fabricates,  required  a 
separate  corps,  occupied  with  no  otht-r  fimctions.  Hut  even  in  F'ngland 
this  system  is  vicious.  The  advantage  of  uniting  tijese  funrtions  in  the 
artillery  is  obvious  and  clear.  Thts  bent  judges  of  the  fabrication  of  arms 
are  those  who  mr  them  and  try  them  constantly :  the  tlu.'ory  of  that  fabri- 
cation whi«'h  requires  such  accurate  iwid  experimental  knowledge,  is  best 
improved  by  practice,  and  the  practice  by  theory.    The  corps  of  the  ar- 


93 

lillery  loses  much  of  its  value  by  this  dirision  of  its  labours  ;  it  becomes  y 
mere  corps  of  cannon  fir^rs. 

In  Fiance  (and  the  artillery  in  all  the  rest  of  Europe  was  more  or  less 
modelled  upon  the  French)  the  young  officer  destined  to  that  service,  after 
two  or  three  years  of  preparatory  studies,  spent  two  years  at  first  in  the 
polytechnic  schoil,  to  acquire  general  mathematical  information,  and  as 
many  aftei  .vards  in  the  school  of  application  of  mathematical  science, 
to  the  particular  servict  of  the  artillery.      He  entered  then  as  second  lieu- 
tenant into  an  arsenal,  to  study  and  practise  the  fabrication  of  armament, 
powder,  projectiles,  firiworks,  &tc.     He  passed  into  a  regiment  of  artillery 
as  first  lieutenant :  when  promoted  to  the  rank  of  captain  in  second,  he 
returned  to  the  arsenals,  and  when  he  rose  to  the  first  captaincy,  took  the 
command  of  a  company.     On  his  next  promotion;  he  became  a  sous  di- 
redeur  of  artillery,  and  superintended  the  fabrics ;  he  then  passed  to  the 
command  o^a  battalion  or  squadron  of  heavy  or  light  artillery,  to  the  di- 
rection of  an  arsenal,  the  command  of  a  regim-^nt,  fctc.    The  construction 
of  all  batteries  and  military  reconnaissances,  conjointly  with  the  engi- 
neers, the  administration  of  the  armament  and  warlike  approvisionment 
of  armies,  the  erection  of  temporary  bridges  on  pontoons,  made  part  of 
his  attributions.    Thus,  in  the  course  of  his  service,  an  officer  of  artillery 
became  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  fabricaiion  of  armament  in  the  ar- 
senals and  all  its  theory,  with  its  properties  and  use  in  the  field,  with  the 
command  and  administration  of  trooj  s,  both  of  horse  and  foot,  and  was 
a  finished  officer  by  the  time  that  he  had  reached  the  higher  ranks  of  his 
profession.    The  artillery  furnished  excellent  staff  and  general  officers ; 
Napoleon,  Pichegru  and  Marmont  were  formed  in  that  service-     In  this 
point  of  view  it  would  be  of  invaluable  use  in  America. 


NOTE  XI. 

Chap  &.  pageTl—k  sliglit  review  of  the  composition  and  function  of 
the  corps  of  engineers  in  France,  will  show  what  importance  was  attached 
to  it  in  that  country.  Till  lately,  France  uiis  thf  only  country  which  had 
such  an  cstablishmoHt ;  the  engineers  of  all  the  othir  powers  of  Europe, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  eminent  and  stlf-tau^ht  individual^  w.'re  very 
bad.  Holland,  Austria,  Prussia,  Sweden,  Hiid  BKvaria,  have  however  pro- 
duced some  men  of  science  and  talent  in  that  profession  ;  Coehorn,  Lands- 
berg,  Glasser,  Virgin,  Rosard,  be. 

The  corps  of  engineers  in  France  was  divided  in  several  classes,  applied 
separately  to  the  civil,  military  or  naval  iervicM.    So  numerous  and  im- 


u 

jsBitant  are  the  cares  which  each  of  these  services  require  from  an  engi 
neer,  so  abstruse  the  calculations  and  meditations  necessary  to  cany  thtm 
to  perfection,  that  the  advantages  of  tliis  division  of  labour  are  ev'dent  at 
firet  view.  Brought  up  in  the  same  preliminary  schools,  the  general  m- 
Ptruction  of  these  classes  was  similar  and  uniform,  their  rank  and  rtipec- 
tability  the  same  ;  they  often  co-operated  either  with  each  other  or  with 
the  officers  of  artillery  in  the  same  works. 

The  topographical  engineer  might  be  said  to  lay  the  ground-work  for 
the  others  to  work  upon  ;  they  depended  on  the  good  and  intelligent  exe- 
cution of  his  surveys,  and  on  their  being  af  .ted  to  the  purpose  for  which 
they  were  required,  either  for  establish.xg  systems  of  military  or  naval 
defence,  or  opening  proper  communications,  roads,  bridges  and  canals- 
The  topographer  was  not,  therefore,  considered  in  France  as  a  mere  sur- 
veyor or  landscape  painter,  but  as  a  most  useful  and  important  officer, 
equal  in  rank  ^nd  respectability  to  the  rest  of  the  corps  of  engineers.  In 
the  staffs  of  armies,  their  sf-rvices  were  considered  as  indispensable.  I  need 
only  mention  the  names  of  Bevthi/^r,  the  friend  and  companion  of  Napo- 
leon, Generals  Bacler  D'Albe,Vallogne,  Colonels  Henry,  Puissant,  fcc.  to 
shor  •  the  rank  and  character  of  these  officers. 

Another  class  of  engineers  was  exclusively  cha.-ged  with  naval  con- 
structions, ship  building,  &,c.  Inferior  as  the  French  navy  was  latterly  to 
the  English,  in  this  branch  it  was  superior,  by  the  public  confession  ol  the 
best jurges  in  England.    (Vide  note  G.) 

Another  class,  applied  to  the  civil  service,  was  ciiargcd  wilii  the  con- 
struction, reparation,  preservation  and  administration  ol"  all  public 
works,  buildings,  roads,  bridges,  eanals,  fcc.  The  beauty,  the  grandeur 
and  convenience  of  these  works,  ar<'  known  f(.  all  who  have  travelled 
in  France  ;  their  solidity,  and  the  adniiri.ble  order  and  cheapness  of  their 
administration,  are  not  equally  so.  Every  project  was  maturely  discussed 
before  it  was  pui  in  execution,  and  then  executed  under  (he  direction,  in- 
spection and  administration  of  that  excellent  corps  of  officers,  who  had 
all  received  a  profound,  scienliflc  and  uniform  education  in  the  same 
schools,  and  worked  on  the  same  principles. 


nor 


The  corps  of  military  engineers  comprised  seven  generals,  102  supc- 
_..ir  officers,  484  subaltern  officers,  besides  six  companies  of  miners,  57(> 
men,  and  four  battalions  of  snppers  or  pioneers,  70U2  men  ;  these  Inst 
were  chiefly  charged  with  superintending  the  details  of  the  work  traced 
by  (he  engiueers,  a  most  useful  establishment.  For  it  doss  not  suffice 
to  trace  works ;  they  must  be  cnndiicttd  by  workmen  who  understand 
them.    Such  a  corpj  un  a  small  icale  would  be  very  desirable  here. 


95 

Tlie  corns  oi  military  engineers  was  not  merely  charged  with  tracing 
the  military  works  required  of  them,  on  plana  adapted  to  the  Purpose    o 
which  they  were  destined,  and  to  the  sites  where  they  were  situated;  they 
were  also  charged  with  their  construction    reparation,  P;«-;-^'«i;;/^X 
all  the  immense  details  of  the  administrat.on  of  these  labours     The  ad 
„,irahU..  order  and  cheapness  of  that  ad,mn.strat.on,  I  need  "J*  '^J^  J" 
Sfirvroad    badges  and  canals,  the  military  topography  of  the  fron- 
ts the  framing  of  miUtary  memoirs,  defensive  or  offensive,  m.htary 
r:::ilances.^  tl  best  means  of  employing  the.r  serv.oes  on 

erery  occasion,  entered  also  into  their  attributions. 


NOTE  XII. 

rfc««  r    ««^e  77  -We  have  subjoined  in  our  Appendix  (No.  2),  the 
evcelLnt  report  of  Mr.  ^^  h";;j;j;XoUeestab 
Colonel  M'Ree  -"-«^-  ^^^"^'iif^ttuTt  e-ember  that  four  years  of 
X^i:;!^^:^^^--  at  the,cho»l  Of  appHcation, 
are  nacessary  tp  form  a  good  cngic'v  ^ 


APPENDIX  No.  I. 


Report  uf  the  Marshal  Duk»  of  Ragusa,  on  a  work,  entitled,  "  Travels  in 
England  and  Essay  on  the  Improvement$  of  the  Artillery  and  Engineer 
Departments  in  that  Country,"  by  Chevalier  Dupin,  Corresponding 
Member  of  the  Insttiliite. 

(Royal  Institute  of  France.)       (Extracted  from  the  Maritime  and  Colonial  Annals.} 

The  Perpetual  Secretary  of  the  Academy  of  Mathematical  Sciences,  certi- 
fies that  the  following  extract  is  taken  from  ths  minutes  of  thfe  mteting  of  Mon- 
day, 23d  March,  1818. 


■ 


H 


The  Academy  has  commissioned  me,  with  Messrs  De  Prony  and  De 
Rosily,  to  report  on  a  Manuscript,  entitled,  "  Travels  in  England  and 
Essay  on  the  Improvements  of  the  Artillery,  &.c.  by  Mr.  Dupin,  Naval 
Engineer.    This  task  we  are  going  to  fulfil. 

The  author  undertook  his  Toyage  with  all  the  means  of  rendering  it 
useful  in  its  results,  the  best  recommendations,  the  talents  necessary  to 
see  and  examine  with  profit,  and  an  ardent  love  for  science,  by  which  he 
had  been  already  more  than  once  distinguished.  Mr.  Dupin  was  uni- 
formly well  received  in  England.* 

Ir.  his  manuscript  he  has  chiefly  attended  to  the  stat»!  ^.  the  materiel 
of  war  in  that  country  ;  but  in  our  account  of  his  interesting  work,  we 
shall  not  confine  ourselves  strictly  to  follow  the  order  in  which  he  has 
arranged  his  subject. 

Ist.  Military  Establishments.— Mr.  Dupin  has  visited  with  atten- 
tion the  chief  military  establishments  of  Great  Britain,  Woolwich,  Ports- 
inoutli,  Chatham,  &ic. 

•  Chiefly  by  the  most  distinguished  military  characters  of  all  ranks,  General  Hut- 
chinwri,  the  fon-ier  commander-in-chitf  of  the  army  of  Egypt,  Generals  Ferguson, 
Long,  Robert  Wilson,  the  celebrated  miUliiry  writer,  the  Colonels  of  artillery  end  en- 
gineers, Mudgc,  Chapman,  Elphinstcne,  Miller,  Griffin,  Captains  Colby,  Rutherford, 


97 

Every  thing  relative  to  ihe  personnel  and  materiel  oi  the  artillery,  hoth 
ill  the  land  and  sea  service,  and  all  fortifications  in  England,  depeiid  on 
one  branch  of  the  war  department*  Woolwich  is  the  most  important 
arsenal  of  that  country,  and  comprises  workshops  (atteliers)  of  all  kinds 
for  the  fabrications  of  the  artillery,  a  foundry,  magazine,  barracks,  a  mili- 
tary school,  fere;  in  short,  all  that  is  necessary  for  instruction  and  for  pre- 
paring, iweserving,  and'putting  in  service  the  waterid  both  of  the  land  and 
sea  service. 

Every  tiling  at  Woolwich  is  on  a  grand  and  even  magnificent  scale; 
Ihe  neighbouring  grounds  have|been  drained  at  great  expense;  the  Thames, 
bordered  with  granite  quays,  and  the  sands  deposited  by  the  river,  which 
seemed  accumulated  beyond  the  power  of  man  to  remove,  dispersed  by 
a  steam-engine  of  prodigious  power.  Canals,  with  well-devised  sluices, 
convey  the  transports  to  the  .'ery  door  of  the  store-hous«s,  which  are 
equally  remarkable  for  their  vast  size,  their  elegant  and  convenient  con- 
struction, the  care  with  which  they  are  kept,  the  canals  which  divide 
them,  to  guard  against  the  communication  of  fire,  the  iron  brMlpeswhch 
connect  them,  and  tiie  immense  and  well  classed  matenel  which  they 
contain. 

Most  of  the  fabrications  for  the  use  of  government  are  carried  on  at 
Woolwich,  the  other  establishments  being  mere  depots.  Powder  and 
small  arms  are  not  fabricated,  but  purchased  by  government  and  proved 
before  they  are  received.  The  artillery  cast  at  Woolwich  is  all  brass.  The 
iron  pieces  are  chiefly  cast  at  the  cannon  foundry  in  Scotland,  a  most 
important  establishment,  where  all  the  processes  of  the  manufacture  have 
been  brought  to  a  point  of  singular  perfection. 

The  parks  of  Portsmouth  and  Chatham  are,  next  to  Woolwich,  the 
chief  depots  of  the  British  artillery,  especially  for  the  sea  service.  I  lie 
same  grandeur  is  displayed  in  their  works,  the  same  care  and  order 
appears  in  their  details,  the  same  quantity  of  matemt  is  deposited  m  them. 

od  FoRTiFiCATioNS.-Portsmouth  and  Chatham,  those  important 
positions,  containing  such  a  mass  of  military  stores,  are  fortified  and  their 
works  were  strengthened  at  the  time  that  an  invasion  was  feared  from  the 
French  army  encamped  at  Boulogne.  Those  of  Portsmouth  arc  re. 
markablefrom  the  judicious  management  of  the  waters  to  augment  their 
defence.  At  Chatham  the  casemates  constructed  in  the  works,  suflic^e  to 
lodge  the  whole  corps  ..f  sappers,  miners,  and  pontoncers.  Generally  there 
h  nothing  remarkable  in  Uie  fortifications  of  England.    They  are  con- 

•f.   A  »iciou<  (1i«pojition.    (Vide  xoMO,  thap,  5.) 

13 


^^ 


p<» 


98 

structed  from  French  books.  Vauhan  is  the  chief  oracle  of  the  British 
engineers  as  of  all  others  ;  Carnot's  works  are  esteemed ;  some  of  Mon- 
talembert's  they  tried,  but  they  prov*d  too  expensive,  even  for  the 
finances  of  Great  Britain.  Some  less  important  but  ingenious  details,  pro- 
posed by  French  authors,  have  been  executed,  and  towers  (1)  of  a  simpler 
construction  than  ours,  built  on  the  coast.  A  plan  of  Gibraltar  in  relief, 
represents  the  multiplied  casemates  by  which  the  English  have  endeavour- 
ed to  reduce  to  absolute  absurdity  attacks  which  were  already  considered 
impracticable. 

3.  Machinert.— The  most  remarkable  circumstance  in  the  Britisk 
artillery  is  the  machinery  employed  in  its  fabrications  The  habitual  use 
or  machinery  has  made  such  progress  in  England,  and  even  the  smallest 
manufactures  are  supported  in  that  country  by  such  ingenious  inventions, 
that  her  great  military  fabrics  must  necessarily  have  received  proportional 
improvements.  The  English  value  man  at  a  very  high  rate  (2);  their 
object  is  to  reduce  his  labour  as  much  as  possible  to  that  mere  direction, 
wh/ch  must  be  exercised  by  an  intelligent  being,  and  to  draw  from  the 
powers  of  brute  matter  or  animal  nature  all  their  moving  forces.  The 
steam-engine,  the  hydraulic  |>res8,  and  various  combinations  of  these  tw© 
machines,  are  at  this  day  the  chief  agents  of  British  industry.  The  work 
of  Mr.  Dupin  gives  some  very  clear  and  useful  details  on  such  machines 
as  he  had  occasion  to  visit. 

The  steam-engine  is  carried  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection  i.j  Britain, 
It  is  really  a  wonderful  sight  to  see  it  work  with  so  little  noise  and  so 
much  regularity,  so  precise,  so  punctual,  and  yet  so  powerful,  that  it 
produces  the  effect  of  200  or  300  horses,  with  a  rapidity  which  can  be 
augmented  to  any  required  degree  of  swiftness. 

The  hydraulir.  press  of  Pascal,  improved  by  Bramah,  furnishes  also 
powers  which  can  be  diversely  applied.  By  means  of  that  press,  the 
British  squeeze  to  the  smallest  possible  volume  their  military  stores, 
equipments,  provisions,  especially  their  forage,  and  thus  render  their 
conveyance  so  easy,  that  in  Portugal  their  armies  always  enjoyed  plenty 
before  a  starving  enemy. 

In  their  arsenals,  one  single  man,  to  whom  the  lever  of  Bramah  gives 
the  lifting  strength  of  fifty,  presents  to  the  instruments  animated  by  the 
steam-engine,  all  kinds  of  materials  that  seem  to  be  fashioned  by  their 
own  voluntary  motion.    Wood,  iron  and  brass  are  presented  to  the 

(1)  Martello  towers. 

(2)  This  is  certainly  a  mistaken  notion.  No  people  valiw  the  life  ef  mi>B  so  cheftply, 
but  machinery  is  cheaper. 


I 


99 


be 


1 


moving  force  of  saws,  planes,  knives,  wedges,  files  and  augers;  they 
assume  in  a  thousand  different  ways  every  kind  of  curve  in  the.r  surfaces, 
and  every  possible  shape,  without  noise,  without  any  apparent  effort  and 
v/}*h  inconceivable  rapidity. 

The  emperor  of  Russia,  in  his  visit  to  England,  purchased  two  Bramah's 
presses  and  thirty  steam-engines,  not  with  the  view  of  depositing  them  as 
a  barren  decoration  in  his  museums,  but  of  employing  them  m  h.s 
arsenals.  Shall  we  observe  that  the  steam-engine,  originally  derived  trom 
the  discovery  of  a  Frenchman,  is  at  this  day  one  of  the  most  po^vertul 
meansof  the  prosperity  of  Britain?  that  the  hydraulic  press,  a  French 
invention,  is  one  of  England's  most  useful  machines  ?  that  the  rnechanicaa 
Brunei,  a  Frenchman,  DOW  directs  the  chief  mechanical  labours  of  Great 
Britain  ?  What  has  not  been  invented  by  French  genius  ?  and  what  is  tn* 
inveiition  of  which  British  policy  has  not  availed  itself. 

4.  Military  Instructiojt.-A  good  instruction  being  the  first  founda- 
tion of  all  success,  the  English,  for  some  years  past,  have  «PP  '^d  wi^^ 
redoubled  care  to  military  education.    They  chiefly  endeavour  to  fo  m  a 
corps  of  artillery  and  engineers,  able  to  rival  those  ot  any  «ther  nation^ 
In  1806  they  established  a  school  for  that  purpose  at  Woolwich,  on  a 
large  scale,  constructed  vast  buildings,  with  all  their  use  ul  dependencies, 
halls,  dwelling-rooms,  laboratories,  cabinets  of  models,  a  library,  Uc.  Pro 
fessors  were  invited,  installed  and  lodged,concourse3  opened  for  the  elec^ 
tion  of  scholars,  in  which  the  candidates  were  examined  ftej"  one  year  o, 
preparatory  studies,  and  those  who  were  admitted  entertained  fou.  yea« 
in  L  school  at  the  expense  of  government.    Their  studies  were  chiefly 
directed  to  mathematics,  physics,  chemistry,  mechanics,  fortifications, 
topography  and  geodesy,  ballistics,  the    nplieation  of  the  theory  of  all 
these  sciences  to  military  practice,  French,  drawing,  fencing,  dancing,  »c. 

The  annual  examinati.ms  are  conducted  at  Woolwich  wiUi  great  im- 
Dartiality.  The  value  of  each  science  is  represented  by  a  given  number, 
Cordoned  to  its  importanc. ;  the  value  of  the  scholar's  examination 
by  aportion  of  it,  proportioned  to  his  progress  in  that  science,  and  the 
8U  n  toL  of  each  chilar's  numb.- in  all  his  classes  gives  the  estimated 
vaLof  lus  instruction,  according  to  which  he  is  afterwards  ranked  ai.l 
Promoted  This  method,  which  necessarily  excites  great  emulation,  was 
Ked,  as  we  believo.  i.;  imitation  of  the  institutions  of  our  Polytechnic 
school  (!)• 

Schools,  well  kept,  and  well  organised,  have  been  established  for  th« 

(1)  These  amelioration,  arc  due  lo  Col.  Mudgc,  the  present  Gov.  MR?,  of  I.e«(!bn 
aad  Corresp  Itnt.  France. 


100 


f'<i 


Fi 


privates,  as  well  as  for  the  officers  (1).  They  learn  in  these  schools, 
reading  and  writing,  arithmetic,  and  a  tincture  of  geometry  and  me- 
chanics ;  nor  are  these  lessons  merely  an  illusive  and  pedantic  exhibition, 
in  a  country  where  every  class  of  workmen  and  mechanics  have  got 
excellent  elementary  treatises  of  the  usual  and  profitable  application  of 
scientific  theories  to  the  practice  of  their  professions. 

Those  schools  for  the  privates,  have  also  libraries  attached  to  them ; 
and  so  much  has  a  taste  for  reading  spread  itself  in  the  army,  that  lately 
a  regiment  sailing  for  the  colonies,  subscribed  to  purchase  a  set  of  books, 
which  government  immediately  augmented  at  its  own  expense.  In 
general  the  British  government  neglects  nothing  to  secure  the  services  of 
useful  men,  by  rendering  their  condition  agreeable.  At  Woolvvicli  a 
whole  street  of  small  but  neat  houses  has  been  constructed,  to  provide 
>vith  isolated  and  private  dwellings,  those  cannoneers  who  have  families. 

At  the  school  of  Chatham  our  author  saw  the  troops  exercising  on  a 
vast  ground,  ]>repared  for  the  purpose.  They  raised  intrenchments,  at- 
tacked them,  (the  sappers  and  miners  by  their  peculiar  modes  of  attack) 
whilst  the  pontoneers,  in  silent  order,  manoeuvred  with  their  pontoons 
at  the  word  of  command,  rapidly  deploying  and  replaying  them  (forming 
and  breaking  up  the  bridge).  The  English  were  far  behind  us  in  military 
instruction  twenty  years  ago;  since  that  time  they  have  studied  our 
institutions,  our  wars,  successes,  and  faults,  our  books  and  experience. 
They  copy  us,  it  is  true,  but  the  English  are  apt  scholars,  and  have  often 
surpassed  their  masters. 

Materiel  OF  the  Artillery. — In  the  depot  of  Woolwich  alone  are 
above  10,000  cannon,  and  au  iinmense  number  of  mortars,  howitzers, 
carronades,  and  swivels.  The  emperor  of  Russia  was  astonished  at  find- 
ing such  a  mass  of  armament,  &ic.  in  a  nation  that  has  so  profusely 
supplied  all  kinds  of  arms,  since  twenty-five  years,  to  all  who  would 
use  them.  He  was  told  that  before  the  war,  this  depot  contained  25,000 
cannon,  and  other  materiel  in  proportion ;  besides  which,  enormous  quan- 
tities were  furnished  by  the  continual  labour  of  the  private  foundries. 

The  parks  of  Chatham,  Portsmouth,  Plymouth,  although  smaller,  con- 
tain also  a  great  quantity  of  artillery.  Every  object  is  ranged  in  these 
magazines  with  the  most  perfect  order  and  exquisite  neatness,  classed  by 
calibers,  taken  to  pieces,  packed,  embaled  and  corded,  ready  for  em» 
barkation,  so  that,  in  lime  of  the  profoundest  peace,  England,  in  twenty- 
four  hours  after  the  order  is  given,  can  despatch  to  any  part  of  the  globe, 
an  immtnse  mass  of  military  stores,  and  means  nf  destructiov.    From 

(1>  Aa  excellent  inslitution,  and  deserving  imit»tioti. 


101 

time  to  time,  they  are  visited,  unbaled,  cleaned,  and  then  packed  up 
again  in  their  cases  and  barrels. 

Enormous  quantities  of  highly  finished  projectiles  lie  in  the  arsenals, 
some  in  piles  of  20,000  or  30,000,  others  loaded,  adapted  to  their  car- 
tridges, [ensabot^s)  and  packed  in  boxes  and  caissons.  They  contain  a 
number  of  mortars  to  fire  granadoes,  for  the  defence  of  towns,  complete 
equipages  of  mountain  artillery,  a  quantity  of  cast  and  forged  iron  car- 
riages for  the  defence  of  the  coasts  and  colonies,  plac  ^  carriages,  and 
coast  carriages,  which  are  merely  naval  carriages  on  frames,  turning  in 
the  Fren;:h  manner,  incendiary  balls  and  carcasses  of  pll  kinds,  &i.c — 
It  did  not  enter  into  our  traveller's  plan  to  enumerate  the  particulars 
of  the  general  system  of  field  artillery,  recently  adopted  in  the  British  ar 
my.  We  know  that  it  is  constructed  at  great  expense,  with  great  care  and 
intelligence,  and  possesses  some  remarkable  advantages  as  to  the  facility  of 
being  easily  embarked  and  disembarked,  a  condition  indispensable  in 
England. 

Improvements  and  Innovations  in  the  British  Artillert. — 
The  British  officers  of  artillery  have  been  lately  very  busy  about  improve- 
ments, but  although  their  discoveries  have  been  announced  with  some 
ostentation,  it  does  not  appear  that  they  have  invented  any  thing  very 
formidable  or  destructive.  In  1811,  incsndiary  balls,  of  a  kind  known 
a  long  time  since  in  France,  were  tried  before  the  admiralty  as  a  new 
invention;  they  have  howitzers  loaded  with  shot(l),  to  which  they  attach 
a  great  importance.  The  best  judges  of  such  inventions  are  those  against 
whom  they  are  directed,  and  their  effect  upon  our  troops  proves  that  we 
should  adopt  them  [i). 

Amongst  the  different  experiments  which  have  been  undertaken  in 
England  for  the  sake  of  improvement,  those  begun  by  Dr.  Hutton  (3)  at 
Woolwich,  on  the  tir(on  the  swiftness  and  direction  of  the  prqiectile)of  the 
artillery,  are  most  remarkable.  These  experiments  are  continued  by  the 
chiefs  and  professors  of  the  arsenal  and  military  school.  Much  talent,  care 
and  perseverance,  and  a  great  deal  of  expense,  have  been  applied  to  them. 
They  will  teach  to  the  artillery  of  other  nations,  those  elementary  prin- 
ciples of  ballistics  which  are  yet  too  little  known.  A  most  exact  pendu- 
lum, of  very  large  dimensions,  is  employed  in  these  experiments,  and  the 
wheeling  disks,  invented  by  a  French  officer,  (4)  are  sometimes  used. 

(1)  Shrapnell  shelli. 

(2)  lu  wriung  this  pasiftge,  the  duke  of  Ragusa  probably  thought  of  the  fcattlo  of 
Salaraanca,  where  he  had  been  wounded  by  one  of  these  shells,  it  is  the  opinion  of 
the  best  judges,  that  but  for  his  wound,  he  would  have  gained  tlie  battle. 

(3)  See  a  full  account  of  these  experiments,  In  Gay  de  Vernon,  toI.  i.  chap.  vii. 
HO.  48,  p.  102-116.    Paris  edition  of  1805 

(4)  Col.  Grobert. 


102 

Mr.  Bupin  was  •greeahlj  surprised  to  find  the  British  officers  ti'ying 
some  experiments  which  he  had  proposed  in  France,  to  ascortain  the  es- 
sential properties  of  the  large  timber  employed  in  constructions.  In  gene- 
ral, the  spirit  of  military  improvement  has  talcen  a  grand  and  decisive 
character  in  Britain.  In  some  affai.  s,  they  suffered  from  our  lancers ;  they 
immediately  organized  corps  ©f  lancers ;  ii  others,  they  were  charge'!  by 
our  cuirassiers,  and  whilst  the  London  '^japers  inveighed  against  them,  the 
British  general^  like  an  able  and  eniightened  chief,  went  in  person  to  visit 
those  manufactories  and  wor^-shops,  at  Paris,  where  our  cuirasses  arc 
fabricated. 

Several  experiments  have  latterly  been  made  for  lightening  the  heavy 
artillery,  especially  for  the  sea  service,  for  however  secure  the  British  navy 
may  appear  in  the  possession  of  its  present  supremacy,  their  government 
still  apply  themselves  with  ardour  to  improve  it 

Generals  Congreve  and  Blnomfield  have  also  turned  their  thoughts  to 
wards  lightening  the  weight  of  the  heavier  calibers  of  the  artillery.  Gene- 
ral Congreve's  cannons  were  cited  at  first  as  possessing  some  wonderful 
and  particular  advantages  over  those  of  General  Bloomfield.  Though  th«be 
may  be  exaggerated,  it  appears,  from  repeated  and  exact  experiments, 
that  they  are  actually  superior,  and  both  have  some  considerable  advan- 
tages over  the  ordinary  artilleiy  for  the  particular  services  to  wluch  they 
are  destined. 


It, 


u 


General  Congreve  is  the  most  active  promoter  of  every  innovation  in 
the  British  artillery.  He  has  occupied  himself  very  much  about  the  con- 
struction of  all  kinds  of  ordnance  carriages,  and  published  a  work  on  the 
subject,  but  in  which  wc  found  nothing  but  what  ws  had  frequently  read 
in  French  authors,  especially  in  Montalembert.  He  has,  however,  taken 
for  that  work  a  patent,  which  if  it  cannot  confer  upon  him  the  glory  of  an 
inventor,  secures  to  him  the  valuable  monopoly  of  the  sale  of  these  carria- 
ges to  the  armateurs,  although,  were  it  not  for  his  patent,  they  might  easily 
have  constructed  them  from  French  books.  These  inventions  have,  never- 
theless, been  appreciated,  at  least  by  the  public,  with  that  partiality  which 
so  easily  attaches  itself  in  England  to  every  thing  that  touches  the  national 
glory. 

The  chief  title  of  General  Congreve  to  fame,  is  the  invention  of  those 
rockets  that  bear  his  name.  Before  they  were  introduced  in  England, 
they  were  used  by  the  Indians,  who  employed  them  in  the  defence  of 
Seringapatani  Their  use  was  proposed  in  France,  wher«  they  <vere  re- 
jected as  producing  more  noise  than  effect. 


,11 


103 

It  is  generally  believed,  or  at  least  asserted  in  England,  aUhouRh  witii 
out  the  smallest  foundat<on,  that  the  rockets  had  a  most  pr  werful  effect  in 
the  last  war,  especially  at  the  battle  of  Ltipsick.  The  artillery  of  several 
pow.rg  ar^  now  seriously  stndving  their  pinperties.  We  hope  that  the 
Fr.  !Hh  artillery,  which  has  some  right  to  give  exLffples,  will  not  follow 
this  om-  For,  except  on  a  very  few  occasions,  those  rockets  have  no  mili- 
tary effect  whatsoever,  and  it  would  be  more  for  the  good  of  humanity, 
than  of  the  military  profession,  that  no  more  powerful  weapons  were  used 
in  time  of  war. 

The  English  use  rockets  of  all  calibers,  for  the  land  and  sea  service, 
against  the  infantry,  the  cavalry,  Uc. ;  they  have  incendiary  roc   -l5,  others 
loaded  with  shells,  &c.     To  these  General  Congreve  has  added  a  new 
variety,  which  is  indeed  of  his  own  invention.     His  new  rockets  carry  a 
parachute,  which  unfolding  itself  n  ajestically  at  the  very  top  of  the  curve 
which  the  rocket  describes,  support,  sometimes  a  bomb,  destined  to  carry 
destruction  on  some  ill-fated  city,  u^iovided  it  meets  with  a  favourab- 
wind)  sometimes  an  incendiary  ball,  wbich,  like  some  biazing  comet,  casta 
its  glaring  light  upon  the  nightly  movements  of  the  enemy.    As  General 
Congreve's  genius  has  soared  to  su(:h  high  inventions,  we  cannot  foresee 
where  he  intends  to  stop.    His  modesty  had  probably  rendered  him  too 
diffident  of  hi3  t.owers,  when  he  went  no  farther  than  to  assart  to  one  ot 
the  great  dukes  of  Russia,  that  ha  J  the  war  continued,  he  would  hav» 
enabled  the  British  army  to  do  without  cannon  or  musketry. 

CoNCLUSicN.-Besides  the  above-mentioned  details,  the  manuscript  of 
Mr.  Dupin  contains  some  very  useful  descriptions  of  the  naval  artiUery,  ot 
the  armament  of  ships,  of  the  topographical  labours  undertaken  under  the 
direction  of  Colonel  Mudge,  &,c.  An  interesting  description  lays  belore  the 
reader's  eyes  the  magnificent  tableau  of  the  Thames  at  London,  loaded 
and  surrounded  with  such  monuments  of  power,  riches  and  uidustry. 

Mr  Dupin,in  pursuing  his  travels,  has  sent  us  two  other  manuscripts,'  in 
which  he  more  particularly  treats  of  the  navy.  An  enterprise  so  useful 
and  so  important,  conducted  with  such  praise-worthy  zeal,  and  accom- 
plished with  such  talent,  will  no  doubt  drav,  attention  and  encouragement 
ripon  that  young  engineer,  who  has  already  honourably  distinguished 
himself.  Your  commissioners  conclude  their  report  by  propo:3*ng  to  you 
to  print  in  the  CoUedion  den  Savants  Elrangers  the  excellent  work  of  Mr. 

"^'"'    (Signed)  De  RositT, 

^    ''       '  De  Prony, 

Marshal  Duke  of  Raousa. 

Approved  and  adopted  by  the  Academy,  and  certified  an  exact  copy 

conformable  to  the  orginal,  by  the  Perpetual  Secretary,  Chevalier  of  St. 

Michel  and  St.  Louis.  Dklambhf.. 


li 


hi 


( 


Ik 


104 


APPENDIX  No.  11. 


Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  the  Chairman  of  the  MiUtanj  Commit- 
tee, upon  the  subject  of  an  additional  Military  Academ,yy  and  a  School 
of  Practice. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  WAR. 

SlRj  15<A  January,  1819. 

la  reply  to  that  part  of  your  letter,  of  the  90th  of  November, 
which  requests  my  opinion  on  the  expediency  of  establishing  one  or  more 
addition,.!  military  academies,  and  their  places  of  location,  and  such  other 
inform  tion  and  facts  as  you  may  deem  proper  to  cofDmiinicate  on  these 
subjects,  with  the  probable  annual  expenses  of  these  establishments,  I 
have  the  honour  to  make  the  following  statement: 

The  number  of  cadets  now  authorized  by  law,  is  two  hundred  and  fifty, 
who  are  divided  into  four  classes ;  the  cadets  of  one  of  which,  every  year, 
terminate  their  studies,  and  are  promoted  into  the  army.  As  the  academy 
is  now  nearly  full,  it  is  p  obable  that  the  number  which  will  annually  ter- 
minate their  studies,  and,  consequently,  will  be  candidates  for  promotion, 
will  not  be  much  short  of  fifty.  The  number  of  vacancies  in  the  army 
which  have  occurred,  from  the  1st  of  August,  18i6,  to  the  1st  of  May, 
J 018,  has  been  one  hundred  and  forty-eight,  or  about  eighty-four  per  an- 
num ;  but,  as  it  i»  probable  that  the  causes  which  have  operated  to  pro- 
duce so  many  vacancies  in  this  tim«-.  have  icen  accidental,  and  conse- 
quent on  the  ckange  from  active  service  to  the  inactivities  of  a  neace 
establishment,  tbore  will  not,  it  is  believed,  iu  future  be  so  many ;  and  that 
the  cadets  who  will  annually  terminate  their  studies  at  West  Point,  will 
be  equal,  or  nearly  so,  to  the  annual  average  vacancies.  In  this  view  of 
the  subject,  an  additional  military  academy  would  not  now  be  required. 
But  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  question  .lught  not  to  be  determined,  by  a 
reference  simply  to  the  wants  of  our  military  peace  establishment,  which, 
from  our  giographical  position,  and  the  policy  of  our  gt veriment,  will 
always  bear  a  smtill  proportion  to  the  population  of  the  country,  and  to 
our  military  establiHiitntiit  in  time  of  war.  So  far  from  graduating  the 
number  or  extent  of  our  military  academies,  by  the  want  of  5 he  army  in 
time  of  peace,  the  opposite  principle  would,  probably,  bo  more  correct; 
that,  in  proportion  as  our  regular  military  cstablishuient  is  small,  the  go- 
vernment ought  to  be  careful  to  disseminate,  by  education,  a  knowledge 
of  th«  art  of  war.  The  army  itself  is  a  practical  schoul  of  this  art, 
which,  except  in  the  higher  branches,  may,  where  it  bears  a  large  proper- 


Ir* 


105 


tion  to  the  population  of  the  country,  supersede  other  modes  of  per- 
petuating or'dLeminating  this  indispensable  art     But,  ,n  a  country  s,tu- 
Ltedas  ours  is,  with  a  small  .tandinR  army,  and  far  removed  froni  any 
power  from  which  w^  have  much  to  fear,  the  important  knowledge  of 
the  art  of  defending  our  shores,  will,  in  a  long  P«ace,  without  he  part  cu- 
lar  patronage  of  the  government,  be  nearly  lost.    The  estabhshment  of 
mililary  academies  is  the  cheapest  and  safest  mode  of  P^ducmg  and  per- 
petuating  this  knowledge.    The  government  ought  to  furmsb  the  mean 
to  those  who  are  willing  to  bestow  the.r  tune  to  acquire  ,t.    The  cadets 
who  cannot  be  provided  for  in  the  army,  will  return  to  pr.Vate  life ;  but 
in  the  event  of  war,  their  knowledge  will  not  be  lost  to  the  country.    The 
gorernment  may  then  avail  itself  of  th.ir  ""^^^  f '«"'="' J"!*'/''?"^^ 
fhey  may  not  be  practically  acquainted  with  all  the  details  of  duty  m  an 
armv,  they  will  acquire  it  in  a  much  shorter  time,  than  those  who  have 
ThldthLdvantlge  of  a  military  education,    ^o  truth  .s  better  sup- 
ported, by  history,  than  that,  other  circumstances  being  nearly  equal, 
victory  will  be  on  the  side  of  those  who  have  the  best  instructed  ofhcers 
The  duties  of  a  soldier  are  few  and  simple,  and,  with  well  instructed 
officers,  they  can  be  acquired  in  a  short  time ;  as  our  own  experience, 
and  that  of  other  countries,  has  satisfactorily  proved.  To  form  competent 
officers,  in  the  present  improved  state  of  the  art  of  war,  is  much  more 
difficult,  as  an  officer,  besides  a  knowledge  of  the  duties  belonging  to  the 
soldier,  has  others  of  a  more  difficu.t  nature  to  acquire,  and  which  can 
only  be  acquired  by  long  experience,  or  by  a  regular  military  education. 

With  these  view..  I  would  recommend  one  additional  military  acade- 
my It  ought  to  be  placed  whero  it  would  mutually  accommodate  the 
southern  and  western  portions  of  our  country,  which  are  the  most  remote 
from  the  present  institution. 

Besides  an  additional  academy,  I  would  submit,  for  the  consideration 
of  the  committee,  the  propriety  of  establisjiing  a  school  of  practice,  to 
be  fixed  near  the  seat  of  government.  On  this  important  subject,  I  re- 
spectfully annex,  as  a  part  of  this  communication,  a  repor  from  Genera^ 
Bernard  and  Colonel  M'Ree,  to  this  Department;  in  which  the  subject 
U  so  fully  discussed,  as  'a  supersede  the  necessity  of  any  further  obse^- 
rations. 

The  expenses  of  orecting  the  necessary  ^"J'd''"«5^J«''  ^".'^f 'f""';! 
military  academy,  on  a  scale  as  extensive  as  that  at  ^^^«f  P"'  '  T "^'^ 
cost  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand  dollars,  of  which  sum,  how- 
«ver.  but  a  small  part  would  be  required  for  this  year.  1  h«  <=""J "^  ««; 
pensc  of  the  institution  would  (excluding  the  pay  ol  the  cadets,  which  i5 

H 


I 


106 


sixteen  dollars  per  month,  and  t^o  rations  p«r  day,)  probably  amount  t« 
about  twenty-two  thousand  dollars  per  annum. 

For  the  school  of  practice,  there  would  be  but  little  expense,  except 
the  erection  of  the  necessary  buildings  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
institution.  The  pay  of  the  superintendent  and  proiessors,  should  they 
be  even  taken  from  the  citi^^ens,  would  not  exceed  eight  thousand  five 
hundred  dollars,  which  would  constitute  nearly  the  whoU'  of  the  current 
expense,  as  the  lieutenants  of  artillery  and  engineers,  v  hiie  at  the  insti- 
tution, will  not  receive  any  additional  pay  or  emoluments.  The  expense 
Of  the  buildings  may  be  estimated  at  eighty  thousand  dollars,  of  whioh, 
however,  but  a  binall  part  would  be  required  for  the  present  year. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be. 

Your  most  obedient  servant, 

J.  C.  CALHOUN. 

Hon.  R.  M,  Johnion,  Chairman  of  iht  Committee 
on  Military  Affair*,  House  of  Representative!. 


$ 


Conaiderations  on  the  Course  of  Instruction  necessary  for  the  Officers  of 
the  different  arms  of  an  Army. 

Circumstances  of  locality;  the  nature  of  the  operations  of  war;  and 
the  variety  of  the  means  employed  for  the  purposes  of  destruction  and 
preservation,  have  naturally  led  to  the  subdivision  of  «"  army  into  several 
parts ;  which  differ  in  their  manner  of  combating,  but  which  are  also 
intended  to  render  reciprocal  aid  to  each  other,  to  co-operate  must  effica- 
ciously t.i  the  same  end,  and  to  constitute,  when  in  action,  but  one  com- 
bined whole. 

This  subdivision  existed  among  the  ancients,  as  it  does  among  the  mo- 
derns ;  and  with  both,  (the  absolute  an  J  relative  numerical  f«rce  of  these 
■ubdivisions  being  supposed  nearly  equal)  the  systems  of  war  have  been 
uni.urraly  more  perfect,  aisd  productive  of  greater  results,  in  proportion  as 
the  several  parts  were  better  calculated  to  act  with  promptitude,  preci- 
sion, and  in  concert.    These  parts  are  designated  in  modern  armies  by 
the  word  arm ;  and  consist  of  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers. 
Each  of  these  arms  acts  occasionally  as  principal  or  accessary.    In  a  bat- 
tle the  infantry  is  in  general  the  principal  arm ;  while  the  three  others 
are  more  or  kilA  accessaries ;  in  the  pursuit  of  a  retreating  army,  the  ca- 
valry become  the  principal ;  and  in  a  siege,  the  artillery  and  engineers 
tfo  'lie  principal  arms,  and  the  rest  arc  merely  great  aaxiliarie*. 


m. 


107 

Among  the  mean«  which  modern  discipline  employe,  to  give  the  PWt- 
e»t  effect^o  the  combined  action  of  these  arms,  ■«  •-trucUon  And  he^ 
the  same  motives  which  have  resorted  to  a  ^"b'^'7^";^ '^  "L^^^^^ 
powerful  cause  of  perfection  in  objects  of  general  ff^Jl^^^'^.'^^^f, 
lo  a  subdivision  of  military  instruction,  as  most  P'«^»f  ^  °  Jf;;,;^^^^^^^^^ 
a«defficien«y  desirable  in  the  operations  of  an  »™y;.  ^h«'"«t^^^^^^^^ 
and  the  objects  and  advantages  of  its  subd.viS.on,  are  the  subjects  of  pre 
sent  consideration. 

To  obtain,  by  the  aid  .f  military  instruction,  greater  effect  in  the  particu- 
lar or  combined  employment  of  the  different  arms,two  modes  """"^d'ately 
present  themselves :  First,  That  each  arm  should  be  cumpos.d  o^^  nd.- 
viduals  vrsed  exclusively  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  that  "«';  ^^fi 
That  the  individuals  composing  each  arm,  should  ^--^T/.^ J^",^^,™. 
the  thc-ory  and  practice  of  all  the  other  arms.  The  first  of  these  methods 
s  itfficLt ;  because,  in  giving  to  each  ^:^f^-^'^^l"^^^:ll^^^^^ 
nec-ssarv  to  the  duties  of  his  own  arm,  it  leaves  h.m  defie.ent  of  wha  i» 

reat  as  Darts  of  one  general  system.     I  he  secona  is  i"if»«  > 

luse  ^th^^^^^^^^^^     of  but  few  individuals  ^o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
telhct  which  is  requisite  to  embrace  four  branches  of  f^^^^^Se, "»  ^''^^^^^^^ 
Sive  as  are  tho..  in  question,  and  to  pracUs.  them  all,  ^'^^  th'it^orrec 
ness  and  promptitude,  which  is  the  F-'-^^dvantage  o    ^^^^  - J^    °  J 
themselves  principally  to  but  one  of  these  branches     In  ord«^  to  a  « 
both  of  these  inconveniences,  the  theoretical  and  Pr;'*^*' ^""^l.^'d  into 
cessary  in  the  conduct  and  operations  of  an  army,  h««  b««"^';'^^^^^ 
two  distinct  classes  -,  the  one  embracing  whatever  .s  common  to  all  the 
arms;  the  other  confined  to  whnt  p^rtUnUrly  appertains    o  "<=«' «'^™- 
arms,  ""^  ""'         .    .,      .y.^^^^on  has  followed  in  the  instruction;  the 

grit  brancn  to  '""=""  .     ^  j  uractlce  of  each  •rm  m  pst- 

previously  been  »«''1"''^'^V  .     and  dutieHr-.^  «hich  constitute  a 

cation  t..  the  particular  obiects  and  due   ^'  -  J^  *  ^        „j,b. 

school  of  application.     In  hose  '^^^^^^''X  '  ach  arm     But  those  na- 

'-"-T  ""'^^  VX  t:^^J^  -arH-  on  root,  find 
nons  who,  H.  tin  ••  ot  peact,  ktep    u  ^^^^^^^  ^^^^ 


108 


last  case,  the  students  at  the  school  of  application  receive  liliewise  two 
kinds  of  instruction  :  1st.  That  which  is  common  to  the  several  arms  tt» 
which  they  are  destined ;  and  £d,  that  which  is  exclusively  necessary  to 
the  arm  in  which  they  are  respectively  to  serve. 

Among  all  nations  possessing  military  academies,  the  schools  of  appli- 
cation for  such  as  are  destined  for  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  arc  the  regi- 
ments of  the  army  in  which  they  are  to  serve.  It  is  oi  joining  and  doing 
duty  with  their  respective  regiments,  that  they  learn  to  apply  the  instruc- 
tion received  at  the  elementary  school,  and  acquire  whatsoever  relates  to 
the  discipline,  the  conduct,  administration,  and  legislation  of  troops.  * 

This  canuot  be  the  case,  however,  with  those  destined  for  the  artillery 
and  engineers,  or  the  topographical  corps.  They  are  all,  more  or  less,  lia- 
ble to  be  employed  separately,  and  immediately  after  leaving  the  school » 
and  are  deprived  of  the  advantages  peculiar  to  the  officer  of  infantry  or 
cavalry,  of  making  their  first  essays  in  their  professional  duties,  under  the 
eyes  of  their  chiefs,  or  of  those  who  hav3  preceded  them  ;  and  being  un- 
assisted by  the  advice  or  opinions  of  their  superiors  in  rank,  knowledge, 
and  experience,  they  are  not  only  left  without  the  means  of  obtaining  the 
instruction  of  whieu  they  are  yet  deficient,  but  are  also  frequently  exposed 
in  the  execution  of  the  duties  confided  to  them,  to  rompromit  the  public 
service  by  the  commission  of  errors,  which  too  often  lead  to  irreparable 
misfortunes,  and  which  are  productive,  at  least,  of  a  wasteful  expenditure 
of  public  property,  always  beyond,  sometimes  exceeding  an  hundred  fold, 
the  expense  of  giving  a  proper  education  to  the  individual  who  has  not 
been  qualified  to  exercise  his  profession,  with  satisfaction  to  himself,  or 
utility  to  his  country. 

T'  se  considerations  alone  appear  to  us  sufficient  to  show  the  advan- 
tage, if  not  necessity,  of  dividing  the  course  of  military  instruction  between 
two  schools  ;  the  one  elementary,  and  the  other  u  school  of  application. 

The  elementary  school  at  Wfst  Point  has  hitherto  been  very  inferior 
as  such ;  and  altogether  inadequate  to  the  objects  for  which  it  was  esta- 
blished. A  project  has  been  presented,  however,  calculated  to  place  this 
school  upon  the  footing  of  the  most  perfect  of  the  kind  which  exist.  As 
to  a  school  of  application,  there  is  none.  The  degree  of  instruction, 
given  to  the  cadets  at  the  school  of  West  Point,  has  heretofore  been  for 

*  In  tiie  military  srhools  of  infantry  nnd  cavalry  in  France,  theoretical  ietioni  in  th^w 
hranch«»  ofinliiUiry  instrutfimi  were  given  to  the  scholars;  and  for  thi  sake  of  unifor- 
mity in  that  in«tniction,  th<'»e  courtes  were  very  meftil.  The  service  of  tlio  dhpols 
KiYcd  afterwardt  as  a  icbool  ut  application 


109 

the  mostpart  limited  to  a  general  acquaintance  with  those  branches  of 
knowledge,  which  are  common  to  all  the  arms  of  an  army  ;  and  which 
ought  to  nave  been  extended,  and  applied  to  artillery,  fortification  and 
topography.    The  consequence  has  been,  that  the  officers  of  infantry, 
art.Ilery,eng.neer8  and  of  the  topographical  corps,  have  had  the  same 
degree  and  kind  of  mstruction  ;  and  ihe  only  real  difference  which  exist- 
ed  between  them  on  leaving  the  school,  consisted  in  the  uniform  of  their 
respective  corps  or  regiments.     If  any  have  been  so  fortunate  as  to  ren- 
der hemselves  serviceable,  either  in  the  artillery  or  engineers,  the  cause 
must  be  sought  for,  in  then- own  industry,  and  not  in  the  education  re- 
«eived  by  them  at  West  Point,  which  was  barely  sufficient  to  excite  a 
desire  for  military  inquiries  and  of  military  pursuit?. 

inluT"'"'  *°  «""f"«te  the  branches  of  knowledge  which  are  common 
to  all  the  arms;  and  those  which  are  necessary,  and  appertain,  more  or 
less  exclusively,  to  each  or  several  of  these  arms.    The  subjoined  table 
exhibits  the  two  principal  divisions  of  the  instruction.    The  first  part 
includes  the  branches  of  knowledge  that  are  necessary  to  all  who  are 
destined  forany  arm  of  the  military  establishment;  either  as  officers  in 
the  exercise  of  their  immediate  professional  duties,  or  as  men  of  infor- 
mation,  liable,  in  the  course  of  their  military  career,  to  be  intrusted  with 
other  interestB.    It  is,  therefore,  that  the  mathematics  for  instance  are  ex- 
tended farther  than    18  strictly  necessary  to  the  officer  of  infantry; 
ulTr\        f  P'^T!'"^^'  philosophy,  and  chemistry,  are  inserted 
Oder  the  elementary  division,  rather  as  forming  part  of  a  liberal  educa- 
.on  than  of  mere  military  utility ;  and  finally,  the  several  kinds  of  draw- 
o'drioT  o  rh"^""  ^''«  ^'^•"'^""t-y  'I'vision,  as  an  advantageous  in- 
uhuTlv      I      "^'Z^'  -^quisition  and  exercise  of  the  art  of  topogra- 

^ II    e,t- nr"    r^""  ''?''"  "^  '^'^"'•^'"^'^  ^-^  "f  ^he  instn^ 'on. 
will  re,|uire  fie  professors,   rtiree  teachers,  n„d  two  instructors     The 

Tor       ""'"'^' "^^  depend  upon  the  number  of  individua  Jt  a 

The  same  table  presents  the  second  part  of  the  instruction    which 
.s  m  addition  to  the  first,  and  is  necessary' to  those  destiner r'the    ^ 

carried  to  a  higher   degree,   which  is  rciulered  necessary  by  their  an- 

rv  ^;  M     ^       ?  '"  *""«''^  '"  *^«  «**«"»  '^''i^h  is  exclusively  necessi- 

7ul  ed  r  "^f""*'  •^"^'"'''"  '  ""^  """'^--y  *«  "•«  ^'^t^"'  that  i  J  only  e. 
quired  fo  the  officers  at  that  arm.  Geometry  and  trigonometry  rcLve 
1  .»^.r  app  .oation  to  topographical  operations,  and  -pherical  trigonome  y 
^.d  descrip  ivo  geometry,  to  the  projection,  Lc.  of  charts.    TW^pTrt  of 

"" ■■'  ^••'  ""=  "Uf,'ui  at  one  scnouJ,  or  two  separ:lt^ 


H 


t! 


lie 

.chool..    In  the  «rst  case,  the  ^^'^f  ^:^:S^ir::^: 
r^^'^"'^°:^T'S.twhethr  the  entire  course  (or  both  of  these  d>v.- 

schools,  it  win  not  be  the  ^f «  '"^'«P;"«''?'  /^'^h/rron  is  herefore 
to  that  here  established,  shou  d  exist  m  fact    J^e  que^.o  ^^ 

reduced  to  this;  shall  the  f^'^'^^^^J^^l'll^Zut  a  separate 
instruction,  be  tau.ht  at  West  ?«»",»' J'^^.^^^J^/^^  part  constitute 
school,  to  be  established  elsewhere  ?  Or    h  U  the  ^^'^"^    P       ^^^^^,  ^f 

an  additional  class  ^[^'^^^y'^lttt^^^  and  topo- 

rr:;i-r^a:^^^^^^^^^^^^  --^  ^^^  "^ 

mentary  classes? 

The  second  dW.io'n  of  the  --°V°Sr""a  "hS'or  eU» 
,„„„ed  .able,  „,d  «Weh  n,u,.  -"'  '"'^  ;7X  ^^jLiion  of  the 
„t  a,,plication,«prad..«l  a.  "ell  »'*t~;„^i°,  „f  mathematics,  to 
elettlentar,  branches  of  mstmc  |0n,  and  *»  '™;'^^^^^  ,h.  ,H,„dkal 
the  theory  of  artillery,  fornncal.on  and  <»W«7^'°„,,i„„,  „H,e  the 
or  academic  part  of  th«dm«n  »'  *«    °;^„°;  "„f  ,he  pound,  to 

application  of  these  *«»'»'    V.^X„"s>ra  course  of  actoal  cxperi- 
reqoires, and  most  be taugh  to  *«  »'"''«"«•"»      ,  .„ „^„„„y  ,„ make 
U.ndl.rac«e«mp— ^^^ 

tS'niu'ret  th"  d^cisi«r  of  the  present  ,ucstio„. 

The  advantages  which  may  be  ■'^^^^f.^rtr.CX'cl^" 

e,tabb.ln„ents,  >-'°'-^^t'  ^    .""sth  aretbe  dnties  of  the  super- 
'rr;hcpnrch,se„fa„-tiona,,ite,»hi^--avo«.^^^ 

^Hsir  ""•-..—,»  library,  instrum...... 

.„  t  e'r:'oT.hose  no"™  on  hand  at  West  Pom. 


A 


A 


III 

taence  their  course  at  the  school  of  application,  if  these  institutions  were 
separate;  and. 

6tli  In  avoiding  a  loss  of  time  on  the  part  of  the  graduates,  which 
would  take  place  on  their  transfer  to  tlie  school  of  application  in  the 
case  just  supposed. 

The  following  are  the  considerations  which  oppose  a  union,  and  which 
consequently  urge  a  separation  of  these  two  schools. 

1st.  The  classes  of  application  will  consist  of  those  i.^dividuals  destin- 
ea  lor  the  artillery,  engineers,  and  topographical  corps,  who  shall  have 
graduated  at  the  termination  of  the  ei.mentary  course  of  instruction,  and 
Who  w.ll  cor^sequently  be  then  promoted  by  brevet  or  otherwise,  in  the 
same  manner  as  those  destined  for  the  infantry.  There  must  probably 
be  two  classes  .f  application,  and  tho  number  of  students  of  which  they 
ought  to  consist,  m  order  to  supply  the  annual  vacancies  in  their  respec- 
11T?7.  T  ''^ '=««  than  seventy.  The  school  will  tnerefore  be 
augmented  by  this  amount,  and  will  be  composed  of  commissioned  offi- 
cers and  cadets,  whose  rights,  interests  and  occupations  will  be  more  or 
less  dissimilar;  and  who  must  consequently  be  governed  by  regulation., 
fcc.  essentially  different,  which  will  at  once  destroy  that  unity  of  system 
necessary  to  all  military  institutions.  ^ 

2d.  The  difference  in  point  of  rank,  in  the  students  of  the  elementary 
Uasses  and  those  composing  the  classes  of  application,  will  originate 
c  aim,  to  precedence  and  superiority  on  the  one  part,  and  resistance  to 
proper  nmUs.""'  """    '"  '''^'''  ^^'''^  "°  regulations  can  restrain  within 

who  I  n  r  i  "'? '""  P'""^*''''*'"  "^  *"^  ^^-"^  department  of  science 
discord^    Individual  interest  and  feelings  must  of  necessity,  and  frequent- 

l^armonv.n.''''.  ^'^^l '^'^ '"''^'"  ^"'^  cadets,  destructive  of  that 
harmony  and  order  which  should  prevail,  and  are  bel'.ved  essentia!  to 
the  successful  operations  of  the  school. 

tion?ofTlt'  V'"'  '^  'i'  *?  ''''  "^  P'"'*''"^*"-^'  '^'^  studies  and  occupa- 
lui   n/to  h.        "  '".  ".t'''  '"'"^  '''^•"•^"^ '"  their  character,  and  re- 

Tlrfn^^^rtVoX-  .  r"'^'/^*'^  ^''"^  '^"'^  ""ler  circumstances, 
wil  render  two  distinct  systems  of  organization  and  police  indispensable 

r«n  ienc?'''"  ^  '""'"^'u  "''^''''  ''''''^^  without  incurring  some  ion- 
JZl  Z  '"';r'  r  "•"'""*  *'••'  """'"•^^  «f  """«  «^vantage  on  the  part 
•f  one  or  the  other  division  of  the  school,  and  perhaps  of  bjth.    The  s. 


112 


it: 


nerintendent  will,  in  fact,  havMwo  schools  to  govern  and  conduct  hi. 
time  and  attention  will  therefore  bo  divided,  altenmtely  occupied  with  the 
peculiar  concerns  of  each,  and  frequently  employed  in  reconolmg  conflict- 
ine  interests.  The  whole  system  of  administration  for  the  two  schools, 
J\\  be  more  or  less  controlled  or  influenced,  by  the  inonvenient  and  un- 
necessary relations  in  which  they  are  placed  to  each  other. 

The  advantages  and  disadvantages  here  enumerated,  as  attending  the 
union  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  course  of  military  instruction  at  the  same 
school,  arc  obviously  too  different  in  their  kind  to  admit  of  being  com- 
pared ;  nor  is  it  necessary  that  they  should  be.  The  expense  attendms 
the  separate  establishment  of  a  school  of  application,  might  be  offered  as 
a  reason  for  rejecting  it  altogether ;  but  by  no  means  for  uniting  it  to  th.. 
TmenLy  school,  when  the  operations  of  both  would  be  obstructed  m 
consequence  of  so  doing,  and  their  ultimate  success  rendered  more  than 
doubtful. 

Amone  the  advantages  that  will  be  derived  from  the  establishrnent  of  a 
school  of  apt>lication,  are  the  means  it  will  afford  of  providing  for  other 
departments  of  national  service,  besides  those  which  have  been  men- 
tioned ;  and  by  locating  it  immediately  under  the  eyes  of  the  government, 
the  measures  necessary  to  enlarge,  or  to  adapt  it  to  the  particular  objects 
in  view,  will  be  more  readily  ascertained,  and  applied  with  greater  cer- 
tainty of  effect.    The  necessity  of  this  institution  will  become  urgent,  in 
the  event  of  one  or  more  additional  elementary  schools  being  created     It 
%vill  then  be  expedient,  for  those  very  reasons  of  economy  which  now  form 
the  only  objections  that  can  be  opposed  to  it ;  and  it  will  he  necessary, 
because  it  will  enable  the  respective  candidates  for  th.  -f";-"-'^'-^'"'^;^^' 
and  topographical  corps,  to  be  assembled  at  the  same  school,  and  to  re- 
ceive in  co.nmon  their  last  degree  of  instruction  ;  and  because,  that,  by  no 
other  means,  can  that  uniformity  in  the  instruction  and  duties  of  each  ol 
these  arms  he  attained,  which  is  essential  to  their  perfection. 

We  are,  therefore,  of  opinion,  that  a  school  of  application  is  decidedly 
necessary  to  the  military  service  of  the  cou  .try ;  that,  to  be  rendered  effi- 
cieut  it  ought  to  be  separate  from  a'l  immediate  connexion  with  any  other 
institution  ;  and  that  it  should  have  a  central  location,  and  as  little  re- 
moved as  possible  from  uiidei-  the  observation  of  government. 

Which  is  respectfully  submitted  to  the  honourable  J.  C.  Calhoun, 
Secretary  of  VVar-^^  BERNARD,  Brigadier  General. 

^  WM.  M'REE,  Major  of  Engiueers. 


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